15 F. Supp. 3d 868
E.D. Wis.2014Background
- Thomas J. Tadder worked for UW system from 1983 until termination on April 10, 2008; sued under the Rehabilitation Act (Board of Regents) and Title I of the ADA for prospective relief (official-capacity claims against Falbo and Bower).
- Personnel records include a 1982 DVR document noting a vocational handicap, a 1990 diabetes diagnosis (insulin treatment from 1993), and doctor correspondence (Dr. Penn, 2004) describing insulin-dependent diabetes, peripheral neuropathy, obesity, depressive disorder, intermittent cognitive deficits, and suggested accommodations (breaks/snacks, coworker assistance, neuropsych eval).
- From 2004 onward UW staff documented repeated performance problems (forgetfulness, rule violations, safety lapses), progressive discipline (reprimands, suspensions) and multiple attempts by HR to obtain medical specifics and accommodation requests; Tadder often did not complete forms requested.
- Defendants provided some accommodations (breaks, snacks, FMLA leave); coworkers sometimes assisted during hypoglycemic events; defendants sought medical clarification from Dr. Penn but did not arrange an independent neuropsychological exam.
- Between 2006–2008 performance incidents escalated (loafing, negligence, falsified time, leaving doors unlocked, disposing of books, failing to report injury), culminating in termination for repeated policy violations and progressive-discipline grounds.
- Vocational testing in 2013 showed below-average cognitive/clerical skills; court found genuine disputes about disability status under pre-ADAAA law but granted summary judgment on failure-to-accommodate and discrimination grounds because defendants provided reasonable accommodations and termination was supported by legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Falbo (Board President) is a proper defendant for injunctive relief | Falbo, sued in official capacity, can be ordered to provide reinstatement and prospective relief via his office | Falbo lacks unilateral authority to grant reinstatement; only Board can act | Court treated official-capacity suit as against Board; summary judgment denied on this ground (Falbo not dismissed) |
| Whether Bower (Chancellor) is a proper defendant under Ex parte Young | Bower as executive head has connection to enforcement and can be sued for injunctive relief | Defendants initially argued Bower lacked connection and is immune | Defendants conceded Bower has some connection; claim against Bower not dismissed |
| Whether Tadder is a "disabled" person under pre-ADAAA ADA definitions | Tadder relies on diabetes, depressive disorder, intermittent cognitive deficits, DVR record and vocational testing to establish impairment/substantial limitation | Defendants argue impairments are not shown to "prevent or severely restrict" major life activities under pre-ADAAA standard; diabetes alone insufficient without stronger evidence | Court: disability question is very close under pre-ADAAA; genuine dispute exists but court did not need to resolve because other claims fail |
| Whether defendants knew of Tadder's cognitive impairments | Plaintiff cites Dr. Penn letters, medical leave requests and internal emails as notice | Defendants note DVR document was not reviewed by supervisors and claim no specific diagnosis of cognitive impairment was provided | Court: supervisors had notice through medical correspondence and internal communications; knowledge dispute not dispositive |
| Whether defendants failed to reasonably accommodate (ADA/Rehab Act) | Tadder says he needed more structured duties, routine tasks, or managerial support given cognitive limits; he often did not personally request accommodations | Defendants provided breaks, sugary snacks, FMLA leave, inquired of treating physician, and sought medical specifics; employers not required to provide every requested accommodation or pay for treatment/evaluations | Court: defendants met their accommodation duties, interactive process did not break down due to plaintiff’s nonresponse; summary judgment for defendants on failure-to-accommodate claim |
| Whether termination was motivated by disability (disparate treatment) | Plaintiff contends discipline escalated after medical issues disclosed and progressive discipline was used as a means to terminate | Defendants point to long record of misconduct spanning years (many predating full awareness), progressive discipline, admissions by Tadder of violations, and legitimate safety/performance reasons for firing | Court: termination supported by legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons; even if disability contributed to poor performance, firing for inability to perform job is lawful; summary judgment for defendants on discrimination claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment standard)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment burdens)
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (summary judgment requires more than metaphysical doubt)
- Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (pre-ADAAA standard: "prevent or severely restrict" for substantial limitation)
- Brumfield v. City of Chicago, 735 F.3d 619 (7th Cir.) (Rehabilitation Act adopts ADA Title I standards)
- Garg v. Potter, 521 F.3d 731 (7th Cir.) (employer may fire employee unable to perform job even if disability causes inability)
- Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916 (7th Cir.) (diabetes can substantially limit eating under pre-ADAAA in some cases)
- Jovanovic v. In-Sink-Erator Div. of Emerson Elec. Co., 201 F.3d 894 (7th Cir.) (employee obligation to request accommodation; exceptions for some mental disabilities)