T.S. v. B.S.
2018 Ohio 4987
Ohio Ct. App.2018Background
- Petitioner T.S. (ex-wife) sought a domestic-violence civil protection order (CPO) against respondent B.S., her ex-husband, after a February 6, 2018 phone call in which B.S. said he was “ready to go to jail, ready to kill someone, [and] ready to die.”
- T.S. testified she feared for her life, upgraded her home security, missed work, and called police; she described a history of escalating angry and intimidating incidents by B.S. before and after their 2012 divorce.
- B.S. admitted making the statements but said they were general, not directed at T.S., and argued they expressed internal despair or protective anger regarding his children.
- The trial court denied B.S.’s Civ.R. 41(B)(2) motion for involuntary dismissal at the close of T.S.’s case and ultimately granted a five-year CPO protecting T.S. (but not the children).
- B.S. appealed, raising three assignments: denial of the dismissal motion, error in granting the CPO, and abuse of discretion in setting the CPO duration at five years.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denial of Civ.R. 41(B)(2) motion was proper | T.S. presented sufficient evidence that B.S. threatened her and caused reasonable fear | B.S. argued T.S. failed to meet burden; evidence insufficient to justify CPO | Court: denial not an abuse of discretion; T.S.’s testimony provided competent evidence of fear |
| Whether evidence supported granting a CPO under R.C. 3113.31 | B.S.’s statement ‘ready to kill someone’ and refusal to deny threat when asked placed T.S. in fear of imminent serious physical harm | B.S. contended the statement was vague, nonimminent, and not directed at T.S. | Court: credible evidence supported finding of threat; reasonable fear in light of history; CPO proper |
| Whether the threatened harm qualified as “imminent” | T.S. relied on precedent that imminence need not be immediate if a reasonable person fears unconditional serious harm | B.S. argued threat lacked immediacy and specificity | Court: imminence interpreted as reasonable fear (not immediate action); requirement satisfied given parties’ history |
| Whether five-year duration was an abuse of discretion | T.S. sought sufficient duration given repeated escalation and severity | B.S. argued five years (the maximum) lacked sufficient explanation and was excessive | Court: not an abuse; given severity and continued escalation post-divorce, five years permissible and within statutory maximum |
Key Cases Cited
- Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (1983) (abuse-of-discretion standard defined)
- Fleckner v. Fleckner, 177 Ohio App.3d 706 (2008) (threats that cause reasonable fear satisfy R.C. 3113.31; imminence explained)
- Felton v. Felton, 79 Ohio St.3d 34 (1997) (preponderance-of-evidence standard for domestic-violence CPOs)
- Thomas v. Thomas, 44 Ohio App.3d 6 (10th Dist. 1988) (statutory criterion: existence or threatened existence of domestic violence)