806 F.3d 451
9th Cir.2015Background
- T.B., born 1994, has cognitive and motor disabilities and requires gastrostomy (g-tube) feedings; his parents withdrew him from public school in 2003 and ran a partly district-funded "garage school."
- Disputes with San Diego Unified led to administrative due process (IDEA) hearings over 2006–07 IEPs; the ALJ found most district positions proper but ruled the August and December 2006 IEPs failed to (1) specify a qualified person to perform g-tube feedings and (2) include adequate transition plans; ALJ ordered IEP modifications.
- The Brenneises sued in district court under the ADA and Section 504 and sought attorneys’ fees under the IDEA; the district court awarded modest fees (~$55k) and granted summary judgment to the district on civil-rights claims.
- On appeal the Ninth Circuit: affirmed summary judgment for the district on two civil-rights counts, reversed as to one count (challenge to 2007–08 IEP implementation re: g-tube staffing) and remanded; vacated and remanded the fee award finding errors in applying the IDEA fee-cutoff statute and in the district court’s fee accounting.
- Central legal questions: whether state (California) statutes/regulations on who may perform specialized health services (g-tube feedings) are enforceable as the required accommodation under ADA/§504; whether defendant’s post-ALJ IEP proposals were evidence of deliberate indifference; and whether parents’ rejection of a cash settlement barred fees under 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(3)(D)–(E).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether California statutory requirements about who may perform g-tube feedings create a mandatory, enforceable accommodation under ADA/§504 | State law prescribes the minimum form of accommodation (designation of qualified credentialed person or trained designated school personnel); failing to follow it can support civil-rights liability | State law does not create a per se accommodation or automatic liability; district acted in good faith and interpreted state law differently | State standards are enforceable as minimum accommodations, but violation alone is not per se deliberate indifference; plaintiffs must still prove deliberate indifference (knowledge + failure to act) |
| Whether the district was deliberately indifferent regarding the 2006–07 IEP (failure to specify qualified g-tube feeder) | District knew statutory requirements and nonetheless failed to specify a qualified person, showing deliberate indifference | District engaged in detailed efforts and reasonably believed an Individualized School Healthcare Plan and trained staff could satisfy requirements; at most negligent/mistaken | No reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference for the 2006–07 IEP; summary judgment for district on Count IV affirmed |
| Whether the district’s 2007–08 IEP implementation (post-ALJ) demonstrated deliberate indifference or unlawful failure to implement ALJ’s order | After ALJ ruling, district still proposed BSA takeover with minimal training; a jury could find this was deliberate indifference and noncompliance | ALJ expressly allowed future proposals of different employee classifications if they met statutory requirements; district may have believed it complied | Genuine dispute of material fact exists as to 2007–08 implementation; summary judgment for district on this claim reversed and remanded (Count V) |
| Whether parents’ rejection of district settlement offer barred post-offer attorneys’ fees under IDEA §1415(i)(3)(D) and whether they were "substantially justified" in rejecting it under §1415(i)(3)(E) | Offer ($150,000/yr cash-out) was less favorable from parents’ perspective (no guaranteed payment of incurred attorneys’ fees, stay-put and re-enrollment terms harmful, cash did not cover existing program cost); rejection was substantially justified | Offer would have been generous and ended disputes; parents unreasonably demanded more and acted all-or-nothing | District court erred: the settlement did not include payment of past fees, the stay-put/re-enrollment and funding scope made it not clearly superior from parents’ perspective, and parents were substantially justified in rejecting it; fee cutoff under §1415(D) was incorrectly applied and fee calculation must be revisited |
Key Cases Cited
- Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982) (defining FAPE under IDEA)
- Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988) (stay-put protection pending review)
- Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001) (deliberate indifference standard for ADA/§504 deliberate indifference)
- Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2002) (analysis of ADA and §504 together)
- Mark H. v. Hamamoto, 620 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2010) (reasonable accommodation and burden principles in special-education context)
- Payne ex rel. D.P. v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2011) (IDEA exhaustion applies only to relief that IDEA could provide)
- Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985) (Rule 68 settlement policy and costs allocation)
- Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992) (prevailing-party standard for fee awards)
- Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2008) (district court must explain how fee awards were calculated)
- Padgett v. Loventhal, 706 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 2013) (allocation of fees where work benefits both successful and unsuccessful claims)