Sykes v. State
147 A.3d 201
| Del. | 2015Background
- In 2006 Ambrose Sykes was convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree rape, first-degree kidnapping, second-degree burglary, and related offenses for the 2004 murder and sexual assault of Virginia Trimnell; jury recommended death and judge sentenced him to death.
- Evidence at trial: victim’s body found in a suitcase in her car, DNA matching Sykes in vaginal swab and on a comforter, victim’s property and credit card use tied to Sykes, and other circumstantial evidence.
- At the penalty phase defense presented limited mitigation (family testimony about relationships and impact); Sykes did not allocute.
- In postconviction (Rule 61) proceedings Sykes presented expanded mitigation: extensive childhood abuse, poverty, exposure to father’s criminality and sexual violence, developmental/neurological impairments (Dr. Armstrong), and expert testimony about prison adjustment (Dr. Haney).
- The Superior Court denied relief; the Delaware Supreme Court reviewed claims of ineffective assistance (multiple theories), Sixth Amendment impartial-jury claim tied to a judge’s erroneous allocution remark, juror impartiality (Juror No. 9), sufficiency of evidence on rape/kidnapping/burglary, and the Weber argument about kidnapping being incidental to rape.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Sykes) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Ineffective assistance for failing to investigate and present mitigation at penalty phase | Trial counsel failed to investigate leads (law‑clerk memo) and did not present substantial childhood-abuse, deprivation, and neuropsychological mitigation; prejudice because a reasonable sentencer might have imposed life | Counsel performed adequate mitigation work; even with added evidence aggravators remain overwhelming so no prejudice under Strickland | Court: counsel’s mitigation investigation was objectively unreasonable (Strickland prong 1) but, on de novo reweighting, no reasonable probability of a different sentence; postconviction relief denied |
| 2. Trial judge’s allocution remark — Sixth Amendment impartial jury claim (and related ineffective assistance for not litigating this theory) | The judge’s erroneous comment that defendant might allocute during guilt phase could have tainted jurors; counsel should have raised a Sixth Amendment impartial-jury claim | The curative instruction cured any prejudice; claim was previously adjudicated (barred) and, in any event, no prejudice | Court: curative instruction adequate; no prejudice shown; claim barred as previously adjudicated under Rule 61(f)(4) |
| 3. Juror No. 9 impartiality / counsel’s failure to strike | Juror No. 9 had been a prior rape victim and later was purportedly known to a witness (St. Jean); counsel should have struck for cause or used peremptory; prejudice because juror could be biased | Juror affirmed ability to be fair; no evidence she failed to perform impartially; claim procedurally defaulted if not raised at trial; no demonstrated prejudice | Court: no prejudice shown; failure to strike not ineffective; direct challenge barred by Rule 61(i)(3); juror removal decision upheld |
| 4. Insufficiency of evidence on rape/kidnapping/burglary and failure to retain forensic pathology expert (including Weber claim) | State did not prove lack of consent; binding occurred after death per postconviction expert (Arden); counsel should have retained expert to impeach medical testimony and argued kidnapping was incidental to rape (Weber) | There was substantial evidence of rape, burglary, and kidnapping; forensic differences were speculative and would not likely have defeated verdicts; claims of insufficiency were previously adjudicated | Court: claims barred as previously adjudicated (judgment of acquittal denied at trial); no reasonable probability that expert testimony or appellate argument would have changed outcomes; ineffective-assistance claims fail on prejudice prong |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (standard for prejudice inquiry and counsel’s duty to investigate mitigation)
- Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (counsel’s failure to investigate mitigation can be objectively unreasonable)
- Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (counsel’s duty to investigate record and known mitigation sources)
- Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945 (2010) (prejudice inquiry under Strickland when mitigation evidence omitted)
- Weber v. State, 547 A.2d 948 (Del. 1988) (kidnapping incidental-to‑underlying‑offense doctrine)
- Sykes v. State, 953 A.2d 261 (Del. 2008) (direct‑appeal opinion upholding convictions and initial sentencing issues)
- Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 840 (Del. 2013) (Delaware discussion of Strickland prejudice in capital context)
- Outten v. Kearney, 464 F.3d 401 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussion of state‑court Strickland findings and federal review)