Swindol v. Aurora Flight Sciences Corp., 194 So. 3d 847

Background

Swindol, an at-will employee of Aurora Flight Sciences, parked a car on company property with a firearm locked inside; Aurora learned of the firearm and terminated him the same day under a no-weapons policy.
Aurora held a plant-wide meeting calling Swindol a security risk; Swindol sued in federal court (diversity) for wrongful discharge and defamation; wrongful-discharge was dismissed with prejudice on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
The Fifth Circuit certified to the Mississippi Supreme Court whether an employer may be liable for firing an employee for storing a firearm in a locked vehicle consistent with Miss. Code § 45-9-55, and whether § 45-9-55(5) bars the suit.
Section 45-9-55(1) prohibits employers from enforcing policies that effectively ban transporting/storing firearms in locked vehicles in employer parking areas; subsection (5) states an employer shall not be liable in a civil action for damages arising from occurrences involving such transportation, storage, possession, or use of a firearm.
The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the Legislature has already declared it legally impermissible to fire an employee for having a firearm inside a locked vehicle on company property (through § 45-9-55 and related provisions) and that § 45-9-55(5) does not shield Aurora from liability under the facts presented.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether an employer may be liable for firing an employee for storing a firearm in a locked vehicle consistent with § 45-9-55	Swindol: § 45-9-55 creates an express legislative prohibition making such terminations legally impermissible (thus actionable despite at-will rule)	Aurora: at-will doctrine permits termination; no new exception should be judicially created	Held: Yes. The Legislature (via § 45-9-55 and related law) already made such terminations legally impermissible, so employer may be liable
Whether § 45-9-55 creates a judicially-grafted public-policy exception to at-will employment	Swindol: statute effects a public-policy exception to at-will discharge	Aurora: any exception should be judicially created; statute should not be read to create employee tort remedy	Held: No new judicial exception needed—legislative action (statute and constitutional provisions) supplies the prohibition against termination for this conduct
Whether § 45-9-55(5) immunizes employers from civil liability for damages arising from the transportation/storage/possession/use of firearms covered by the statute	Aurora: subsection (5) is an explicit bar to civil damage actions and thus precludes Swindol’s suit	Swindol: subsection (5) should not be read to render subsection (1) meaningless or to bar claims for wrongful discharge based on an employer’s violation of the statute	Held: § 45-9-55(5) does not shield Aurora here; it was intended to provide immunity for occurrences (actions of employees/third parties), not to negate the prohibition in subsection (1) or strip all remedies
Whether federal court should create a new exception to at-will employment or defer to the state supreme court	Swindol: statutory language supports recognizing remedies for employees	Aurora: federal court should not expand state-law exceptions; leave to state courts/legislature	Held: The Mississippi Supreme Court answered the certified question; no federal judicial grafting required because the Legislature has acted

Key Cases Cited

McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., 626 So.2d 603 (Miss. 1993) (adopts two narrow public-policy exceptions to at-will employment)
Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So.2d 874 (Miss. 1981) (refuses to create a public-policy exception where legislature has not provided statutory remedy)
Galle v. Isle of Capri Casinos, Inc., 180 So.3d 619 (Miss. 2015) (reaffirms McArn limits and rejects expansion where employee willingly participated in illegal conduct)
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (U.S. 1938) (governs federal courts applying state substantive law in diversity cases)