Swartz v. Sylvester, 546 F.Supp.3d 37

Thomas Swartz, a Bourne firefighter, refused in May 2016 to sit for a Class A uniform photograph, citing sincerely held religious beliefs against portrait photography for "personal recognition."
Fire Chief Norman Sylvester had directed the department to collect Class A photos for identification/accountability and to display on a public bulletin board and for media use; several department-wide emails and a chain of command implementation support that the photos were mandatory.
After Swartz refused (and sent an email reiterating his religious objection), Sylvester denied the exemption, ordered make-up dates, and suspended Swartz for 24 hours without pay and imposed a six‑month restriction on out‑of‑grade opportunities when Swartz still did not sit for the photo.
Swartz later sued Sylvester under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the Free Exercise Clause; he also asserted a state-law wage claim (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148) after his 2018 termination.
The district court granted summary judgment to Sylvester on the § 1983 claim based on qualified immunity, finding the photo directive neutral, generally applicable, rationally related to legitimate interests, and not clearly violative of established law; the court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state wage claim and dismissed it without prejudice.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether ordering and disciplining Swartz for refusing a Class A photo violated the Free Exercise Clause	Swartz: the directive coerced him to act against sincere religious beliefs; enforcement after his objection shows religious hostility or non‑neutrality	Sylvester: the directive was facially neutral, generally applicable, and served legitimate government purposes (accountability, public display, media use)	Court: No Free Exercise violation; policy was neutral and generally applicable and had a rational basis
Whether Sylvester is entitled to qualified immunity for the § 1983 claim	Swartz: even if a violation occurred, it was clearly established that forcing religiously motivated refusals to comply with such directives is unlawful	Sylvester: reasonable official would not have known this conduct violated the Free Exercise Clause given lack of analogous precedent and the unusual, non‑clear nature of Swartz’s belief	Court: Qualified immunity applies — no clearly established law put Sylvester on notice his conduct was unlawful
Whether the court should retain supplemental jurisdiction over Swartz’s state wage claim (Ch. 149, § 148)	Swartz: state claim was related to his employment and pleaded in amended complaint	Defendants: argue lack of any agreement to be paid for accrued time; federal claim disposed	Court: Declined supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed the state claim without prejudice

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (qualified immunity protects officials unless they violate clearly established rights)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (qualified-immunity two-step framework)
Ashcroft v. al‑Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (need for precedent placing constitutional question beyond debate)
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (neutrality and general applicability in Free Exercise analysis)
Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (neutral, generally applicable laws need only rational basis)
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (courts must defer on sincerity and nature of religious beliefs)
City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500 (need for closely analogous precedent when assessing clearly established rights)
Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144 (distinguishing when strict scrutiny applies under Free Exercise)