Sutton Levetz, Brenda Gail v. Sutton, Thomas Michael
2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 6803
| Tex. App. | 2013Background
- Brothers Brenda Levetz and Thomas Sutton dispute estate matters arising from their father’s will and a corollary will contest in Bowie County.
- The dispute began with Sutton’s breach of fiduciary duty/related claims and Levetz filed to transfer venue for convenience to Bowie County.
- Mediation produced a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) approved to form part of the record.
- Levetz later claimed lack of capacity to enter the MSA due to fibromyalgia and medications; Sutton sought enforcement of the MSA.
- The trial court held Levetz had capacity, denied setting aside the MSA, and granted Sutton’s enforcement motion, then severed and transferred the breach of contract claim to Bowie County.
- On appeal, Levetz challenged the severance/transfer and the enforcement award; the court sustained the challenge to severance and reversed the judgment on enforcement, remanding for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether severance was proper | Levetz argues severance separated intertwined issues. | Sutton argues severance avoided prejudice and aided efficiency. | Severance was improper; the contract claim and capacity issue are interwoven. |
| Whether the MSA was properly enforceable | Levetz asserts insufficient evidence of breach and improper on-record relief. | Sutton contends the MSA can be enforced and the court can grant declaratory relief. | Enforcement failed; breach and specific performance not proven; remand appropriate. |
| Whether the trial court erred in admitting/excluding testimony on capacity | Levetz objects to expert testimony timing and to exclusion of her testimony. | Sutton defends the evidentiary rulings as proper under procedures. | Court erred in evidentiary rulings; capacity evidence insufficiently supported. |
| Whether Levetz’s testimony and expert were properly admitted/excluded | Levetz argues improper exclusion of her testimony and expert. | Sutton asserts timely disclosure and admissibility standards were met or not prejudicial. | Exclusion of contested testimony reflected error; remand for proper proceedings. |
| Whether the judgment properly addressed breach of contract and declaratory relief | Levetz contends the final judgment exceeded the scope of the capacity determination. | Sutton asserts the judgment furthers enforcement of the MSA. | Judgment improper; remedy limited to contract formation issues; remand for merits or transfer determination. |
Key Cases Cited
- Cadle Co. v. Castle, 913 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995) (ADR settlement enforcement not via special summary procedure)
- Cadle Co. v. Castle, 913 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995) (enforcement of mediated agreements requires contract-like action if consent withdrawn)
- Gunter v. Empire Pipeline Corp., 310 S.W.3d 19 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009) (no special ADR procedure; mediation cannot create a summary enforcement)
- Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo, 279 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2009) (breach of contract claims follow standard pleading/proof requirements)
- City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (standards for legal and factual sufficiency review in nonjury trials)
- Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Aircraft Network, L.L.C., 213 S.W.3d 455 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006) (formation elements of contract; capacity as defense to formation)
- Winchek v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., 232 S.W.3d 197 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007) (elements of breach of contract and proof burden)
- Mantas v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 925 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1996) (no summary enforcement of mediated settlement; enforce as contract)
