51 F.4th 877
9th Cir.2022Background
- 911 caller reported Paul Mono was acting erratically and threatening someone with a firearm; five Orange County deputies responded.
- Mono (65, legally blind) was agitated, made verbal threats, waved a cane, and deputies observed an unloaded revolver holstered on a couch.
- Deputies Montoya and Johnson fired through a window and killed Mono; deputies say Mono reached for/raised the gun; plaintiff (wife Susan Peck) and a ballistics expert dispute that he ever grabbed or raised the gun and say he was moving away.
- The firearm was recovered unloaded and in its holster; disputed timelines, ballistics, and eyewitness statements created genuine factual disputes.
- District court denied qualified-immunity summary judgment for all deputies; Ninth Circuit affirmed denial for the shooting deputies (Montoya, Johnson), reversed as to the three non-shooting deputies (Frey, Lind, Carrington), and granted qualified immunity on the Fourteenth Amendment familial-association claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Qualified immunity for deputies who fired (excessive force under Fourth Amendment) | Peck: disputed facts (ballistics, eyewitness) show Mono never grabbed the gun or posed an immediate threat, so deadly force was unlawful. | Deputies: evidence shows Mono reached for/raised a gun toward them; deadly force reasonable. | Denied qualified immunity for Montoya and Johnson — accepting plaintiff's version, a jury could find no immediate threat and that deadly force was unlawful. |
| 2) Qualified immunity for non-shooting deputies (integral-participant liability under §1983) | Peck: Frey, Lind, Carrington were integral participants by surrounding the house, positioning at windows, and facilitating the shooting. | Deputies: mere presence/back-up is not enough; no common plan or knowledge that their actions would cause an unconstitutional shooting. | Reversed denial for Frey, Lind, Carrington — not integral participants; liability requires common plan/acquiescence or setting in motion acts one knows will cause the violation. |
| 3) Fourteenth Amendment familial-association claim by spouse | Peck: deprivation of companionship/ society of husband supports due-process claim. | Deputies: Graham limits excessive-force claims to Fourth Amendment; no evidence of purpose-to-harm required for substantive-due-process spouse claim. | Deputies entitled to qualified immunity on the familial-association claim — encounter required snap judgments, and no evidence of a purpose to harm unrelated to law enforcement objectives. |
| 4) Appellate jurisdiction and scope of review in interlocutory qualified immunity appeals | Peck: N/A (plaintiff resists defendants’ attempts to reframe facts). | Deputies: challenge district court’s factual determinations and assert entitlement as a matter of law. | Court: constrained by Johnson v. Jones and Estate of Anderson — cannot resolve evidence-sufficiency disputes on interlocutory appeal; must assume plaintiff’s factual view and draw reasonable inferences for qualified-immunity analysis. |
Key Cases Cited
- Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (addressing interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity and deadly-force context)
- Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (limits appellate review of evidence-sufficiency questions in qualified-immunity interlocutory appeals)
- Estate of Anderson v. Marsh, 985 F.3d 726 (9th Cir.) (explains jurisdictional bar on reweighing evidence in interlocutory appeals)
- Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (per curiam) (qualified-immunity two-step and view facts in plaintiff’s favor)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard governs excessive-force claims)
- Cruz v. City of Anaheim, 765 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir.) (distinguishes armed suspects who reach for weapons from armed but non-reaching suspects)
- Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321 (9th Cir.) (deadly force unjustified where suspect not posing immediate threat)
- Reynaga Hernandez v. Skinner, 969 F.3d 930 (9th Cir.) (integral-participant doctrine and limits on mere-bystander liability)
- Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773 (9th Cir.) (integral-participant liability where officers shared plan and knew of use of particular force)