457 F.Supp.3d 1193
N.D. Fla.2020Background
- In Nov. 2018 Florida voters (≈69.1%) approved Amendment 13 (now Fla. Const. art. X, § 32), which bans racing Canis familiaris in connection with wagering and prohibits wagering on live dog races in Florida effective Jan. 1, 2021; the amendment directs the legislature to specify civil or criminal penalties for violations.
- Plaintiffs are greyhound-racing businesses and an association (Support Working Animals) that allege imminent economic injury from the ban and bring pre-enforcement constitutional challenges (Takings, Equal Protection, Contracts Clause, Substantive Due Process) against Governor DeSantis, Secretary of State Lee, and AG Moody (official capacities).
- Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (standing, ripeness, Eleventh Amendment) and for failure to state claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
- The court held plaintiffs have Article III standing and their claims are ripe for pre-enforcement review, and that Ex parte Young does not bar suit against the AG but does bar suits against the Governor and Secretary (Eleventh Amendment) in this context.
- On the merits the court found each constitutional theory deficient as pleaded and dismissed plaintiffs’ claims against the Attorney General for failure to state a claim, but granted plaintiffs leave to amend by May 11, 2020.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing / Ripeness | Economic harm is imminent from the Jan. 1, 2021 ban; pre-enforcement relief appropriate | No actual injury yet; future legislature actions uncertain | Court: Plaintiffs have standing; claims are ripe for pre-enforcement review |
| Eleventh Amendment / Proper Defendants (Ex parte Young) | Governor, Sec. of State, AG are proper defendants for injunctive relief | Defs: Amendment 13 is self-executing; state officials lack enforcement duties so Eleventh Amendment bars suit | Court: Governor and Secretary dismissed (Eleventh Amendment); AG is proper defendant (has supervisory/enforcement authority) |
| Takings Clause (Fifth / 14th) | Amendment 13 deprives owners of economically beneficial use of property (dogs, business, equipment) and thus is a compensable taking | Amendment 13 is a valid exercise of the police power; not a per se taking; no reasonable investment-backed expectations | Court: Dismissed — plaintiffs allege a protected property interest (personal property) but fail to show a compensable taking (police power justification; no total loss of all economic use; Penn Central factors not plausibly alleged) |
| Equal Protection | Amendment 13 irrationally singles out dog racing while permitting other animal racing (underinclusive discrimination) | State has rational bases (animal welfare, regulation of pari‑mutuel wagering); rational-basis review applies | Court: Dismissed — rational-basis review applies and Amendment 13 is rationally related to legitimate state interests |
| Contracts Clause | Amendment 13 impairs contracts of those engaged in dog racing | Industry is heavily regulated; changes to regulatory scheme permissible; no specific contracts alleged or substantial impairment pleaded | Court: Dismissed — plaintiffs failed to identify particular contracts or substantial impairment; state interest justifies regulation |
| Substantive / Procedural Due Process | Amendment 13 deprives property and livelihood without due process | Amendment 13 is a legislative act subject to rational-basis review; no fundamental right implicated; legislative process sufficed | Court: Dismissed — no fundamental right pleaded; rational-basis review satisfied; procedural due process claim fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (permits prospective injunctions against state officials to enjoin ongoing violations of federal law)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires injury in fact, causation, redressability)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (complaint must state a plausible claim)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (Iqbal pleading standards for plausibility)
- Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (multi-factor test for regulatory takings)
- Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (categorical taking where regulation deprives property of all economically beneficial use)
- Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (police‑power regulation does not automatically constitute a taking)
- Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) (property‑bundle analysis for takings)
- Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983) (Contracts Clause analysis; state regulation justified by public purpose)
- Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (legislatures may select one phase of a field to regulate; rational-basis deference)
- Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014) (pre-enforcement challenges can present injury-in-fact when enforcement is credible)
- Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n, Inc. v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 399 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2005) (parimutuel wagering regulation lies at the core of state police power)
- Lewis v. Governor of Alabama, 944 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2019) (standing and Ex parte Young analysis caution against treating general statutory authority as sufficient enforcement connection)