Sung Jang v. Loretta E. Lynch
812 F.3d 1187
9th Cir.2015Background
- Petitioner Sung Kil Jang, a North Korean national, fled North Korea in 1998 and arrived in South Korea in 2000 after time in China, Vietnam, and Cambodia.
- In South Korea he attended and completed a two‑year college, worked, obtained South Korean citizenship and passport, stayed over four years, and had family ties there.
- Petitioner entered the U.S. in 2004, conceded removability, and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection; IJ denied relief finding he had been firmly resettled in South Korea; BIA affirmed.
- Petitioner conceded the factual showing of firm resettlement but argued that 22 U.S.C. § 7842 (North Korean Human Rights Act §302) prevents treating North Koreans as firmly resettled in South Korea for asylum purposes.
- The core legal question presented is whether § 7842 precludes applying the firm‑resettlement bar when the prior country of residence is South Korea.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 22 U.S.C. § 7842 prevents finding a North Korean is "firmly resettled" in South Korea for asylum eligibility | § 7842 treats North Koreans as not being South Korean nationals for asylum purposes, so the firm‑resettlement bar should not apply | § 7842 only addresses nationality for refugee/asylum definitions and does not alter the firm‑resettlement analysis, which focuses on practical offers of permanent status and rights | Court held § 7842 does not affect firm‑resettlement; petitioner was firmly resettled and asylum was barred |
Key Cases Cited
- Toor v. Lynch, 789 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2015) (agency interpretations receive Chevron deference when statute is ambiguous)
- INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (step‑one statutory ambiguity analysis uses ordinary tools of construction)
- Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for judicial review of agency statutory interpretation)
- Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 2006) (firm‑resettlement inquiry focuses on receipt of an offer of permanent resettlement)
- Tchitchui v. Holder, 657 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2011) (asylum’s purpose is to protect refugees with nowhere else to turn)