Sumner v. Jim Lupient Infiniti, 865 N.W.2d 706

Sumner, injured Jan. 2012 at Lupient, sought workers’ compensation benefits; Lupient, self‑insured, denied primary liability.
Eleven interventions, including North Memorial Health Care and Mercy Hospital (Relators), moved to intervene; Lupient objected to nine interventions.
Relators did not attend the hearing or participate; no stipulation or permission to be absent.
A one‑day hearing occurred; the compensation judge denied reimbursement due to nonattendance under Minn. Stat. § 176.361, subd. 4.
WCCA affirmed the denial in a divided decision; the majority held attendance mandatory unless a stipulation or established right; the dissent suggested attendance could be limited to settlement negotiations if substantial prejudice is shown.
Majority affirmed; the court interpreted the statute as unambiguous and applied the denial penalty for nonattendance.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is attendance mandatory for intervenors under § 176.361, subd. 4?	Intervenors must attend to preserve rights.	Statute requires attendance; nonattendance justifies denial.	Yes, attendance is mandatory.
Is denial of reimbursement proper when an intervenor fails to appear?	Denial is too harsh without considering stipulations or established rights.	Denial follows from failure to attend.	Yes, denial proper absent stipulation or established right.
Is § 176.361, subd. 4 ambiguous or unambiguous?	Word meanings could be ambiguous between 'appear' and 'attend' (two interpretations).	Statute unambiguous; 'appear' equates to mandatory attendance.	Unambiguous; governs outcome.
Are there exceptions to the attendance requirement that apply here?	Stipulation or deemed established right could excuse attendance.	Neither stipulation nor deemed establishment present.	No, exceptions not met; no relief from attendance.

Nelson v. Schlener, 859 N.W.2d 288 (Minn. 2015) (read statute as whole; avoid reading provisions in isolation)
Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs., 841 N.W.2d 147 (Minn. 2014) (‘shall’ denotes mandatory duty; attendance required)
Kollodge v. F. & L. Appliances, Inc., 248 Minn. 357, 80 N.W.2d 62 (Minn. 1956) (statutory construction principle: read provisions together)
Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309 (Minn. 2001) (read statute in context; avoid misreading)
State v. Nelson, 842 N.W.2d 437 (Minn. 2014) (contextual interpretation of terms in statute)
Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 848 N.W.2d 206 (Minn. 2014) (unambiguous statute; policy arguments irrelevant to interpretation)
Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (U.S. 1993) (contextual meaning of terms; approach to dictionary definitions)