156 So. 3d 751
La. Ct. App.2014Background
- Judith Sullivan, a 70‑year‑old assisted‑living resident with cerebellar ataxia (wheelchair‑bound, legally blind), sued Malta Park for deficient care; her husband Madro Bandaries served as caregiver and was present at her deposition.
- At a deposition taken by defense counsel F. Evans Schmidt, Schmidt asked Sullivan whether her husband’s partner/associate (M. Claire Trimble) was having a sexual relationship with her husband; the questions were posed as affirmative statements and Sullivan denied knowledge.
- Sullivan filed a supplemental petition adding an IIED claim against Schmidt (and others), alleging Schmidt knew the allegations were untrue, targeted her while knowing her medical vulnerability, and caused severe emotional distress.
- Defendants moved for a peremptory exception of no cause of action; the trial court granted dismissal, reasoning deposition questions fell within the scope of discovery and did not meet the extreme/outrageous threshold.
- The appellate court reviewed de novo, accepted Sullivan’s well‑pleaded facts as true, and found the questions palpably irrelevant to the litigation and, given Sullivan’s vulnerability, sufficient to state an IIED claim; the judgment was reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether deposition questions alleging an extramarital affair support IIED | Sullivan: Schmidt intentionally posed false, offensive questions to a known vulnerable person to cause distress | Schmidt: Offensive questions alone are insufficient; inquiry was within discovery scope and arguably privileged | Questions were palpably irrelevant and, given Sullivan’s vulnerability, could support IIED; claim survives no‑cause exception |
| Whether plaintiff’s medical condition permits treating her as a "vulnerable victim" for IIED | Sullivan: Her age, terminal illness, disability made her peculiarly susceptible; Schmidt knew this | Schmidt: Pleadings describe physical impairments but not that anxiety stems from them; treat her as ordinary person | Court: Accepting allegations, her vulnerability is a proper factor; jury could find conduct extreme/outrageous |
| Whether allegations of an extramarital affair alone foreclose IIED | Sullivan: Claim is not merely for alienation of affection; focuses on intentional emotional harm | Defendants: Louisiana does not recognize IIED claims based solely on extramarital affair allegations | Court: Price (alienation rule) inapplicable here; extramarital content does not categorically bar IIED claim |
| Whether broad discovery scope or qualified privilege defeats IIED claim | Defendants: Deposition questions fall within discovery and are protected by qualified privilege | Sullivan: Questions were neither relevant nor discoverable; privilege requires pertinence to litigation | Court: Questions were palpably irrelevant; broad discovery and qualified privilege do not bar the IIED claim at pleading stage |
Key Cases Cited
- White v. Monsanto, 585 So.2d 1205 (La. 1991) (elements and high threshold for IIED)
- Penalber v. Blount, 550 So.2d 577 (La. 1989) (attorney may be liable for intentional torts against an adversary)
- Montalvo v. Sondes, 637 So.2d 127 (La. 1994) (attorney generally owes no duty to opposing parties; distinguishes intentional torts)
- Maw Enterprises, L.L.C. v. City of Marksville, 149 So.3d 210 (La. 2014) (standards governing peremptory exception of no cause of action)
- Nickerson v. Hodges, 84 So. 37 (La. 1920) (classic vulnerable‑victim IIED precedent involving exploiting known peculiar sensibilities)