MAW ENTERPRISES, L.L.C., ET AL. VERSUS CITY OF MARKSVILLE, ET AL.
No. 2014-C-0090
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
September 3, 2014
2014-C-0090
WEIMER, Justice.
Supreme Court of Louisiana
FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NEWS RELEASE #045
The Opinions handed down on the 3rd day of September, 2014, are as follows:
BY WEIMER, J.:
2014-C-0090 MAW ENTERPRISES L.L.C., ET AL. V. CITY OF MARKSVILLE, ET AL. (Parish of Avoyelles)
Retired Judge H. Charles Gaudin, assigned as Justice ad hoc, sitting for Justice Jeannette T. Knoll, recused.
For the reasons assigned, we find that Couvillon has not stated a claim for which it can receive legal remedy under the applicable substantive law and that, as a result, the lower courts erred in overruling the City‘s peremptory exception of no cause of action. The decisions of the court of appeal and the district court are hereby reversed, and judgment is rendered sustaining the City‘s exception of no cause of action and dismissing Couvillon‘s claims at its costs. REVERSED AND RENDERED.
CLARK, J., dissents for reasons assigned.
HUGHES, J., dissents with reasons.
09/03/14
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2014-C-0090
MAW ENTERPRISES, L.L.C., ET AL.
VERSUS
CITY OF MARKSVILLE, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT, PARISH OF AVOYELLES
A property owner/lessor filed suit against the City of Marksville seeking to recover damages for the City‘s denial of a retail alcoholic beverage permit to the lessee of its property. We granted certiorari to review the correctness of the judgment finding liability on the part of the City and awarding damages. In particular, we consider the City‘s contention that an error occurred in denying its peremptory exception of no cause of action. Finding merit in the City‘s claim that the plaintiff property owner failed to state a cause of action for interference with a contractual relation caused by the denial of a liquor permit to its lessee, we reverse and render judgment in favor of the City.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 30, 2009, MAW Enterprises, L.L.C. (“MAW“) entered into an agreement with Couvillon‘s Payless, Inc. (“Couvillon“) for the lease of premises
located at 333 E. Mark Street in Marksville, Louisiana. The property houses a convenience store that has been operated by various parties since 1978. In conjunction with the convenience store operations, a retail alcoholic beverage permit had been issued at that location continuously from 1978 to the effective date of the lease.
According to the terms of the lease, the first ninety days were to be rent free. At the expiration of that period, the parties were to re-evaluate the monthly rent, with a possible increase not to exceed $.05 per gallon of gasoline sold at the fuel pumps located on the premises. Once “any and all legal and/or monetary issues regarding the license to sell liquor/beer on the premises” were resolved, the lease was to “transfer” to a new lease with rental payments of $4,000 per month.
MAW, the lessee, applied for and was granted an occupational license by the City of Marksville (“the City“) in December
On April 22, 2010, MAW and Couvillon jointly filed a “Petition Seeking Writ of Mandamus and Damages, and Alternatively a Declaratory Judgment” against the City. The petitioners sought a writ of mandamus ordering the City to issue a permit to sell alcoholic beverages to MAW or, in the alternative, a declaratory judgment declaring the municipal ordinance on which the City allegedly based its denial of the permit to be without effect, together with damages and attorney‘s fees.
In June 2010, while the lawsuit against it was pending, the City granted MAW the requested retail alcoholic beverage permit. Thereafter, on July 2, 2010, MAW
dismissed its claims against the City with prejudice, and the matter proceeded with Couvillon as the sole plaintiff.
The City filed peremptory exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action to Couvillon‘s claims. Basically, the City argued that Couvillon, with interests arising solely through a lease with MAW which is tied to sales of gasoline and not alcohol, does not have a cause of action against the City for economic losses sustained as a result of the denial of the retail alcoholic beverage permit to MAW. Additionally, because the lease agreement is not tied to sales of alcohol and Couvillon did not apply for the permit itself, the City argued that Couvillon lacks a right of action against the City for the alleged wrongful denial of the permit. After a hearing, the district court denied both exceptions, and the case immediately proceeded to trial on the merits. Upon the close of evidence, the district court took the matter under advisement and allowed the parties to submit post-trial memoranda.
In written reasons, the district court concluded that the City‘s denial of a retail alcoholic beverage permit to MAW was unjustified. More particularly, the district court found that the City had relied on a municipal ordinance to deny the permit that was more restrictive than state law and, thus, without effect. Additionally, the court found that the reason advanced at trial for the denial of the permit was arbitrary and capricious.2 The court determined that although MAW was subsequently granted a retail alcoholic beverage permit, the business never recovered and MAW ultimately abandoned its lease with Couvillon. The court found that, as a result of the City‘s conduct, Couvillon sustained damages in the form of lost rentals which amounted to $72,000, less a $15,000 credit for rents paid by MAW after it obtained the permit.
At Couvillon‘s request, the court awarded attorney‘s fees in the amount of $7,500. A judgment consistent with the district court‘s written reasons was signed on August 21, 2012. Following the denial of a motion for new trial, the City appealed the adverse judgment.
On appeal, a divided panel of the appellate court affirmed the district court judgment. MAW Enterprises, L.L.C. v. City of Marksville, 13-456 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/13/13), 128 So.3d 575. The majority found that, in denying MAW the requested permit, the City relied on a municipal ordinance which makes it “unlawful for any person to sell any alcoholic beverage within a distance of 300 feet of a parish or municipal playground or of a building used
premises entitled to issuance of a permit under state law,
Judge Peters dissented, disagreeing with the majority‘s conclusion that
Following the denial of its application for rehearing, the City applied for review in this court. We granted certiorari to review the judgments of the lower courts and, in particular, to examine the correctness of the lower courts’
determinations that Couvillon‘s petition states a cause of action. MAW Enterprises, L.L.C. v. City of Marksville, 14-0090 (La. 3/21/14), 135 So.3d 625.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Because we find it dispositive, we address, at the outset, the City‘s claim that Couvillon‘s petition failed to state a cause of action and that the lower courts erred in overruling the City‘s peremptory exception.
The burden of demonstrating that a petition fails to state a cause of action is on the mover. Scheffler, 06-1774 at 5, 950 So.2d at 647. Because the exception of no cause of action raises a question of law and the lower court‘s decision is generally based only on the sufficiency of the petition, review of the lower court‘s ruling on an exception of no cause of action is de novo. Id. The pertinent inquiry is whether, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and with every doubt resolved in the plaintiff‘s favor, the petition states any valid cause of action for relief. Id.
Generally, under
Applying the legal precepts set forth above, we find, contrary to the conclusions of the district and appellate courts, that Couvillon cannot maintain a valid cause of action against the City under the facts of this case. A review of the petition, and of the evidence adduced without objection, reveals that the operative fact which gives rise to this litigation is the City‘s denial of a retail alcoholic beverage permit to MAW. Essentially, Couvillon alleges that the City had a duty to issue a retail alcoholic beverage permit to its lessee, MAW, and that its failure to issue the liquor permit caused gasoline sales at the convenience store to plummet, which in turn caused MAW to default on its rent obligations and, ultimately, to cancel the lease. Couvillon‘s claim against the City, therefore, is premised on allegedly tortious
conduct by the
Claims, such as Couvillon‘s, for indirect economic loss caused by negligent injury to property that interferes with contractual relations were addressed by this court in PPG, 447 So.2d 1058. In PPG, the defendant‘s dredging operations caused damage to a natural gas pipeline owned by Texaco. Id. at 1060. As a result, Texaco was unable to fulfill its contract to supply natural gas to the plaintiff, which was forced to obtain gas from another source at an increased cost. Plaintiff filed suit to recover the increased cost of obtaining the natural gas. The defendant responded by filing an exception of no cause of action, arguing that Louisiana has never recognized a right to recover for negligent interference with contractual relations. Id.
On review, this court characterized the PPG case as bringing “into focus the broad question of recovery of an indirect economic loss incurred by a party who had a contractual relationship with the owner of property negligently damaged by a tortfeasor.” PPG, 447 So.2d at 1059. The court explained that in previous cases confronting this issue, Louisiana courts had generally denied recovery without analyzing the problem, adopting a prohibitory rule based on Robins, 275 U.S. 303,4 and Forcum-James Co. v. Duke Transportation Co., 231 La. 953, 93 So.2d 228 (1957).5 PPG, 447 So.2d at 1060. Rather than continue to follow this mechanical
approach, the PPG court abandoned the per se rule excluding recovery in favor of a case-by-case application of the duty-risk analysis. See PPG, 447 So.2d at 1061.
In embarking upon that duty-risk analysis in the case before it, the court in PPG noted that the possibility of multiple actions and the potential for an unforeseeable extension of liability may have influenced prior courts in categorically denying recovery for negligent interference claims as a matter of public policy. PPG, 447 So.2d at 1061. Recognizing that imposing liability upon a tortfeasor for damages sustained by a third party who has contracted with the owner of negligently injured property could create liability “in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class,” the court pointed out that the rule of law that prohibits negligent damage to property does not necessarily require that a party who negligently causes injury to property be held
the court held: “It is a basic principle of the law that a tort-feasor is responsible only for the direct and proximate result of his acts and that, where a third person suffers damage by reason of a contractual obligation to the injured party, such damage is too remote and indirect to become the subject of a direct action ex delicto, in the absence of subrogation.” Id., 93 So.2d at 230.
property encompass the risk that a third party who has contracted with the owner of the injured property will thereby suffer an economic loss.” Id.
In the instant case, while the City argued that Couvillon‘s claim is one for “indirect economic loss incurred by a party who had a contractual relationship with the owner of property negligently damaged”6 requiring, under this court‘s holding in PPG, analysis of scope of liability principles encompassed by the duty-risk analysis, the court of appeal majority rejected this argument out of hand, finding that “Couvillon stands in the position of the property owners in Louisiana Crawfish, 5 So.2d 380, PPG Industries, 7 So.2d 1058, and Robins, 5 U.S. 303, 48 S.Ct. 134, not the parties to whom recovery was denied.” MAW Enterprises, 13-456 at 5, 128 So.3d at 579. In other words, the majority reasoned that as the owner of premises exempted from local geographic limitations regarding the location of businesses holding retail alcoholic beverage permits under
The flaw in this reasoning is exposed by the dissent. In his dissent, Judge Peters noted that the court of appeal majority erroneously focuses on the word “premises” in
So.3d at 580 (Peters, J., dissents) (emphasis added). For the reasons that follow, we agree with Judge Peters’ assessment that the court of appeal majority erred.
Under the traditional duty-risk analysis, whether a duty is owed is a question of law. Hardy v. Bowie, 98-2821, p. 12 (La. 9/8/99), 744 So.2d 606, 614. “The inquiry is whether the plaintiff has any law – statutory, jurisprudential, or arising from general principles of fault – to support his claim.” Id. In the instant case, the lower courts, and Couvillon, relied on
A. No permit shall be granted under this Chapter in contravention of any municipal or parish ordinances adopted pursuant to the zoning laws of the state.
....
C. (1) When prohibited by municipal or parish ordinance, no permit shall be granted for any premises situated within three hundred feet or less, as fixed by the ordinance, of a public playground or of a building used exclusively as a church or synagogue, public library, school, full-time day care center as defined in R.S. 17:405(A)(4), or a correctional facility housing inmates, including but not limited to a halfway house....
....
E. The prohibitions in this Section do not apply ... to any premises which have been licensed to deal in alcoholic beverages for a period of one year or longer prior to the adoption of the ordinance.
Reduced to its essentials, the statute provides that while a parish or municipality may by ordinance restrict the issuance of retail alcoholic beverage permits based on the proximity of “premises” to certain enumerated facilities, a permit cannot be refused on the basis of the existence of such a local ordinance if the
“premises ... have been licensed to deal in alcoholic beverages for a period of one year or longer prior to the adoption of the ordinance.”
At issue in this case is whether the reference to “premises” in
Found in the chapter of the La. Revised Statutes entitled “The Alcoholic Beverage Control Law,”
by a permitting authority would be owed to the person applying for the permit and not the owner of the premises where the business is sought to be located.8
Louisiana R.S. 26:71, entitled “Permit required; fees; exceptions,” provides that “before engaging in the business of manufacturing, supplying, or dealing in alcoholic beverages, all persons shall obtain from the commissioner ... a permit to conduct each separate business ....”
Of particular relevance is
Ensuing provisions also demonstrate that permits are directed to persons. Louisiana R.S. 26:77, for example, requires an applicant for a permit to publish a signed notice in the appropriate newspaper indicating “I am applying for a permit to sell alcoholic beverages at retail at the following address: ___.”
The foregoing provisions thus make it clear that the permits required under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law are directed to persons engaged in the business
reference to “premises” in
Once we find the City did not, by virtue of
of action in favor of Couvillon on that basis, it becomes apparent that Couvillon‘s complaint hinges solely on its contention that the City‘s fault in denying a retail alcoholic beverage permit to its lessee, MAW, caused gasoline sales at the convenience store to plummet, which in turn caused MAW to default on its rent obligations and ultimately to cancel the lease, resulting in injury to Couvillon for which it is entitled to reimbursement under the broad provisions of
As previously discussed, since PPG, claims such as Couvillon‘s require a careful case-by-case application of the scope of liability principles encompassed by the duty-risk analysis.9 We begin that
resolving whether Couvillon has a cause of action under these facts. Under PPG, the question presented is properly framed as follows: whether the economic damages sustained by Couvillon, caused by the City‘s denial of the permit to MAW, which prevented MAW from meeting its contractual obligation to pay rent, fall within the scope of the protection intended by the law‘s imposition of a duty on the City not to refuse a permit to an otherwise qualified applicant. In answering this inquiry, we are guided by the following principles explained by the court in PPG:
Rules of conduct are designed to protect some persons under some circumstances against some risks. Policy considerations determine the reach of the rule, and there must be an ease of association between the rule of conduct, the risk of injury, and the loss sought to be recovered. A judge, when determining whether the interest of the party seeking recovery of damages is one that falls within the intended protection of the rule of law whose violation gave rise to the damages, should consider the particular case in terms of the moral social and economic values involved, as well as with a view toward the ideal of justice.
PPG, 447 So.2d at 1061 (citations omitted; emphasis in original).
In PPG, the court applied the foregoing principles to find that the duty violated did not encompass the particular risk of injury sustained by the plaintiff. The court reasoned:
There is clearly an ease of association in the present case between the rule of law which imposes a duty not to negligently damage property belonging to another and the risk of injury sustained by Texaco because of the damage to its property. As noted, however, a rule of law is seldom intended to protect every person against every risk. It is much more difficult to associate the same rule of law, in terms of the moral, social and economic values involved, with the risk of injury and the economic loss sustained by the person whose only interest in the pipeline damaged by the tortfeasor‘s negligence arose from a contract to purchase gas from the pipeline owner. It is highly unlikely that the moral, social and economic considerations underlying the imposition of a duty not to negligently injure property encompass the risk that a third party who has contracted with the owner of the injured party will thereby suffer an economic loss.
PPG, 447 So.2d at 1061 (emphasis in original).
We find the reasoning of the court in PPG persuasive in this case. It is difficult to associate the moral, social, and economic
There is another important policy consideration advanced by the court in PPG that guides our analysis here – the recognition that imposition of responsibility on the City for Couvillon‘s damages could create liability “in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.” PPG, 447 So.2d at 1061, quoting Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444. For example, if any of MAW‘s employees were laid off or experienced decreased hours while MAW was unable to
sell alcohol, they arguably sustained damages which in all likelihood would not have occurred but for the City‘s conduct. Likewise, if any of MAW‘s alcoholic beverage suppliers were unable to sell alcohol to MAW, they arguably sustained damages which in all likelihood would not have occurred but for the City‘s conduct. The same holds true for suppliers of other products who might have experienced a decrease in sales due to decreased foot traffic which in all likelihood would not have occurred but for the City‘s conduct. “Because the list of possible victims and the extent of economic damages might be expanded indefinitely, the court necessarily makes a policy decision on the limitation or recovery of damages.” PPG, 447 So.2d at 1061-62.
The relevant policy considerations outlined by the court in PPG, as applied to the unique facts of this case, lead us to conclude that the duty violated in the present case simply did not encompass the particular risk of injury sustained by Couvillon and did not intend protection from the particular loss for which recovery is sought by Couvillon. As a result, Couvillon has failed to state a cause of action in negligence.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons assigned, we find that Couvillon has not stated a claim for which it can receive legal remedy under the applicable substantive law and that, as a result, the lower courts erred in overruling the City‘s peremptory exception of no
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
09/03/14
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2014-C-0090
MAW ENTERPRISES, L.L.C., ET AL. VERSUS CITY OF MARKSVILLE, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT, PARISH OF AVOYELLES
Clark, Justice, dissenting.
In determining whether the plaintiff‘s petition stated a cause of action, the primary concerns are whether the City owed a duty to the plaintiff, and whether the risk and resulting harm were within the scope of protection afforded by the duty breached.
“Whether a duty is owed is a question of law. The inquiry is whether the plaintiff has any law—statutory, jurisprudential, or arising from general principles of fault to support his claim.” Hardy v. Bowie, 98-2821 (La. 9/8/99), 744 So. 2d 606, 614.
Plaintiff also alleged, however, that the City should have issued the license
based upon the grandfather clause contained in
C. (1) When prohibited by municipal or parish ordinance, no permit shall be granted for any premises situated within three hundred feet or less, as fixed by the ordinance, of a public playground or of a building used exclusively as a church or . . . school . . .
* * *
E. The prohibitions in this Section do not apply to any premises which have been licensed to deal in alcoholic beverages for a period of one year or longer prior to the adoption of the ordinance.
This statute speaks to the right of the premises owner to either maintain an existing liquor license on his property or to market his property to others as being eligible for locating a business requiring a liquor license, even after a local ordinance is passed which bars issuance of a liquor license to his property due to its proximity to a church or school. The undoubted purpose of the statute is to protect property owners from economic damages resulting from a local government re-zoning or passing an ordinance barring a liquor license at a location where one had previously been issued, and then refusing to issue a license based upon the ordinance or new zoning. Based upon this grandfather clause, the City had a duty to issue a liquor license to a qualified person or entity for conducting business on plaintiff‘s property. The City argues, and the majority evidently finds, that such a ruling would mean that the permit belonged solely to the premises, contrary to the “language and spirit” of Title 26. Nothing
Title 26 is a multifaceted scheme developed by the legislature to control the sale of alcoholic beverages. It regulates who may be licensed, where a licensee may operate his business, and, to some extent, what type of business may sell
alcohol. The Title makes it clear that there are two aspects to liquor licensing: personal eligibility and premises eligibility. The qualifications for applicants are contained in
According to the Title, then, an otherwise qualified individual may only be issued a liquor license if the premises is also eligible for a license. For instance, a qualified individual cannot obtain a new, non-grandfathered liquor license for a location next to a school, if there is a local ordinance restricting such licensing. Likewise, an unqualified individual cannot obtain a liquor license at any location, even one at which licensing is presently allowed.
As stated above, the limits on where a license may be granted are contained in
A. No permit shall be granted under this Chapter in contravention of any municipal or parish ordinances adopted pursuant to the zoning laws of the state.
B. (1) No permit shall be issued by the commissioner or by any municipality or parish to authorize any business in any subdivision of the state where the business has been prohibited by referendum vote.
* * *
(3) Any premises licensed to deal in alcoholic beverages, upon proper application, shall be issued a permit . . . The new permit shall be of the same class as the one for which the premises has a license.
C. (1) When prohibited by municipal or parish ordinance, no permit shall be granted for any premises situated within three hundred feet or less, as fixed by the ordinance, of a public playground or of a building used exclusively as a church . . .
* * *
E. The prohibitions in this Section do not apply to any premises . . . which have been licensed to deal in alcoholic beverages for a period of one year or longer prior to the adoption of the ordinance.
The Louisiana Civil Code mandates that when a law is clear and
unambiguous and the application of the law does not lead to absurd consequences, the law must be applied as written without any further interpretation of the intent of the legislature.
Further evidence of the legislature‘s scheme in licensing premises is contained in other statutes in Chapter 1. For instance,
A. The following shall apply to permits issued under this Chapter:
* * *
(4) When the location of a place of business is proposed to be changed, the proposal shall be received and must be approved by the issuing authority before such action is taken. The change of location shall be noted on the permit by the issuing authority and the permit shall be invalid unless the notation is made.
(5) The permit, in addition to any other permit required to be displayed, shall be posted in a conspicuous place on the licensed premises, so as to be easily seen and read by the public. No other signs or notices, except those required by state or federal law, shall be required to be displayed by the retail dealer.
* * *
Likewise, the majority even recognizes that
permit to sell alcoholic beverages at retail at the following address: ___.‘” The majority fails to mention that
* * *
F. Each notice of intent poster shall be posted conspicuously outside the premises for which application is to be made for no less than fifteen consecutive days prior to the filing of an application for a retailer‘s permit for the premises. Such display of a notice of intent poster furnished by the office of alcohol and tobacco control shall serve as the only state official public notice required. However, if the application is for premises for which a permit was in effect within the previous six months, the notice of intent poster shall be posted upon the filing of the application and remain posted for at least fifteen days thereafter.
Finally, of course, the grandfather clause, itself, speaks of “premises . . . which have been licensed to deal in alcoholic beverages for a period of one year or longer prior to the adoption of the ordinance.”
The majority quotes with approval Judge Peters’ statement in dissent, “the change in nomenclature” from “persons” to “premises” is best explained by resort to the title of the statute. The majority ignores the fact that the change in nomenclature completely changes the meaning of the statute, and for no reason, as the statute is unambiguous as written. The majority errs in its belief that the words “persons” and “premises” are interchangeable, or that the legislature mistakenly applied the grandfather clause to “premises” rather than “persons.”
Once the City‘s duty to plaintiff under Title 26 to issue a liquor permit to plaintiff‘s lessee is established, the next step is to determine whether the harm alleged (and for the purposes of an exception of no cause of action, assumed to be true) falls within the scope of protection afforded by the duty breached.
Rules of conduct are designed to protect some persons under some circumstances against some risks. Policy considerations determine the reach of the rule, and there must be an ease of association between the rule of conduct, the risk of injury, and the loss sought to be recovered. A judge, when determining whether the interest of the party seeking recovery of damages is one that falls within the intended protection of the rule of law whose violation gave rise to the damages, should consider the particular case in the terms of the moral, social and economic values involved, as well as with a view toward the ideal of justice.
PPG, 447 So. 2d at 1061. In finding that the duty violated did not encompass the particular risk of injury sustained by PPG, this Court reasoned:
There is clearly an ease of association in the present case between the rule of law which imposes a duty not to negligently damage property belonging to another and the risk of injury sustained by [the gas company] because of the damage to its property. As noted, however, a rule of law is seldom intended to protect every person against every risk. It is much more difficult to associate the same rule of law, in terms of the moral, social and economic values involved, with the risk of injury and the economic loss sustained by the person whose only interest in the pipeline damaged by the tortfeasor‘s negligence arose from a contract to purchase gas from the pipeline owner. It is highly unlikely that the moral, social and economic considerations underlying the imposition of a duty not to negligently injure property encompass the risk that a third party who has contracted with the owner of the injured property will thereby suffer an economic loss.
As in PPG, there is a clear ease of association between the law which required a permitting authority to issue a license to a qualified entity such as MAW Enterprises and the risk of injury sustained by MAW. The critical difference here, which the majority fails to recognize, is that the assessment should be of the ease of association between the law which requires the City to issue a license to a qualified applicant at plaintiff‘s premises, which is grandfathered under state law, and the risk of injury sustained by plaintiff as a result of the City‘s failure to follow that law. What is present here, but not in PPG, is the existence of a statute, passed by the legislature as part of the regulatory scheme contained in Title 26, which protects the economic interests of property owners such as plaintiff from the actions of local government under the exact fact situation we have here, i.e., the local government passes an ordinance which purports to restrict the issuance of a liquor license to a premises at which liquor licenses had been issued for over a year. This statute containing the grandfather clause clearly has an ease of association with plaintiff, and, likewise, its moral, social and economic considerations clearly encompass the imposition of the risk to plaintiff under these circumstances.
I respectfully dissent.
09/03/14
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2014-C-0090
MAW ENTERPRISES, L.L.C., ET AL. VERSUS CITY OF MARKSVILLE, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT, PARISH OF AVOYELLES
HUGHES, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Couvillon is the property owner. Couvillon leased the property to MAW. The terms of the lease specifically tied the rental to the issuance of a permit to sell alcohol. The City admittedly wrongfully delayed the issuance of the permit, which resulted in economic loss to MAW and Couvillon.
There was no “negligent injury to property” resulting in physical damage as occurred in the cases cited by the majority. A City vehicle did not crash into the store and thus interrupt the sale of alcohol. Rather, the City wrongfully delayed issuing a permit to the lessee which, it is easy to see, damaged the lessor as well.