Sullins v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 108 A.3d 1110

Employee John Sullins worked for UPS for ~32 years and was diagnosed with diabetes (1987) and diabetic neuropathy (1998), with preexisting sensory/motor deficits in hands and arms.
On March 5, 2003 Sullins suffered a work-related injury to his upper extremities (cubital and carpal tunnel) and later had surgeries; treating physician assigned 44% impairment to arms and 40% to hands.
Physician attributed about 10% of each extremity/hand impairment to the work injuries and the remainder to diabetic polyneuropathy; occupation had no role in development of the neuropathy.
Commissioner and Workers’ Compensation Review Board found two concurrently developing disease processes and apportioned benefits to cover only the work-related portion.
Appellate Court reversed, concluding the diabetic neuropathy was a preexisting disability under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-349(a), so Sullins was entitled to full compensation for the combined disability (less prior payments).
Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court: diabetic neuropathy was a previous disability that combined with the 2003 injury to materially and substantially increase overall disability, bringing § 31-349(a) into play.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Deschenes apportionment rule applies or § 31-349(a) governs when a progressive nonoccupational disease manifests before a later occupational injury to the same body part	Sullins: diabetic neuropathy was a preexisting disability that combined with the workplace injury to materially and substantially increase disability, so § 31-349(a) requires full compensation	UPS: Deschenes controls; this is a case of two disease processes (one nonoccupational, one occupational) subject to apportionment because employer should not pay for nonoccupational disease	Held for plaintiff: facts show a preexisting disability that materially increased the resulting impairment; § 31-349(a) applies, not Deschenes apportionment

Deschenes v. Transco, Inc., 288 Conn. 303 (Conn. 2008) (apportionment permitted when disability results from two concurrently developing disease processes, one nonoccupational and one occupational, and work conditions did not influence the nonoccupational disease)
Cashman v. McTernan School, Inc., 130 Conn. 401 (Conn. 1943) (preexisting progressive disease that becomes symptomatic after a work injury can trigger full compensation under predecessor principles)
Jacques v. H. O. Penn Machinery Co., 166 Conn. 352 (Conn. 1974) (unknown preexisting condition made materially worse by a workplace injury — death compensable under § 31-349 framework)
Levanti v. Dow Chemical Co., 218 Conn. 9 (Conn. 1991) (prior impairments that materially increase overall disability justify § 31-349 relief even if they do not combine in a special way)
Hartz v. Hartford Faience Co., 90 Conn. 539 (Conn. 1916) (foundational principle that employer takes the employee as found; aggravation of preexisting condition by employment is compensable)