255 F. Supp. 3d 573
M.D. Penn.2015Background
- Plaintiff Suarez was convicted in Maryland in 1990 of carrying a handgun without a license, a misdemeanor with potential term up to three years.
- Defendants maintain the Gun Control Act (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) bars firearm possession for persons with disqualifying convictions; plaintiff was prevented from possessing a firearm.
- Plaintiff filed a 2-count complaint on May 20, 2014 seeking relief from enforcement and challenging the Act as applied to him and as to Second Amendment rights.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and for summary judgment; Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment.
- The court held Count One (statutory challenge) to be dismissed with prejudice; Count Two (as-applied Second Amendment challenge) survives and is decided on cross-motions for summary judgment.
- Plaintiff’s background includes a long-term marriage, three children, church leadership, current employment with a government-security clearance, and a 2009 state court finding that state firearm disability could be removed; he had a 1998 DUI conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of punishable in §921(a)(20)(B) | punishable means capable of punishment, so max 2 years or less applies | punishable means the maximum punishment the court could impose | punishable = maximum possible punishment; plaintiff fails on Count One |
| Framework for as-applied Second Amendment challenge | Marzzarella governs all Second Amendment challenges; Barton is irrelevant or supplementary | Marzzarella; Barton only governs first prong of Marzzarella for as-applied challenges | Barton and Marzzarella harmonized; Barton governs as-applied challenges; proceed to analysis |
| As-applied plausibility of §922(g)(1) for plaintiff | plaintiff falls outside the intended scope because his conviction is old, minor, nonviolent, and he is non-dangerous | plaintiff remains within the scope; Barton supports broader prohibitions | plaintiff pleads plausible as-applied claim; allowed to proceed to summary judgment on Count Two |
| Granting summary judgment on Count Two | evidence shows plaintiff outside the statute's scope | statutory framework bars his possession; not outside scope | summary judgment for plaintiff on Count Two; §922(g)(1) as applied violates Second Amendment |
Key Cases Cited
- Heller v. District of Columbia, 554 U.S. 570 (U.S. 2008) (recognizes core Second Amendment protection and presumptively valid prohibitions)
- Marzzarella v. United States, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (two-prong test for Second Amendment challenges; presumptively valid prohibitions)
- Barton v. United States, 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011) (as-applied challenges possible if circumstances place outside intended scope)
- Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (interprets 'punishable' as maximum punishment for §921(a)(20)(B))
- Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23 (U.S. 2007) (statutory interpretation guiding 'punishable' term)
- United States v. Leuschen, 395 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2005) (interpretation of 'punishable' in §922(g)(1) context)
- United States v. Essig, 10 F.3d 968 (3d Cir. 1993) (precedent on punishment terminology in §922(g)(1))
- United States v. Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1989) (historical interpretation of penalty terminology)