Sturdevant v. Likley
2013 Ohio 987
Ohio Ct. App.2013Background
- Appellant Heather Sturdevant sued Terri Likley for defamation, false light, and IIED arising from a March 2011 public meeting statement about rumors that Sturdevant was having an affair.
- At the meeting, Likley stated that if rumors were true, Sturdevant was having an affair; Likley clarified she did not believe the rumors.
- The trial court granted summary judgment on all claims, holding Likley’s statements were non-actionable opinion.
- Sturdevant appealed, arguing the statements were defamatory and not protected as opinion; trial court’s reasoning extended to other torts.
- Ohio appellate court reviews de novo whether a statement is protected opinion under Vail/Wampler framework, and whether there are genuine issues of material fact on the remaining claims.
- Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on all claims, concluding Likley’s statements were constitutionally protected opinion and not actionable false light or IIED as a matter of law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was Likley’s statement protected opinion or actionable defamation? | Sturdevant asserts the rumor statement is a factual assertion. | Likley contends the remark was merely an opinion about rumors and not a factual assertion. | Protected opinion; no defamation. |
| Was there a genuine issue of material fact on false light claim? | Sturdevant claims false light from the rumor statement. | Likley’s statement did not attribute false characteristics; context shows opinion. | No genuine issue; false light not actionable. |
| Was there a genuine issue of material fact on IIED claim? | Sturdevant alleges outrageous conduct causing severe distress. | Commentary at a public meeting was not extreme or outrageous. | Not actionable; summary judgment proper. |
| Did Restatement Section 602 apply or affect the outcome? | Restatement test could create a conditional privilege. | Ohio rejected Restatement’s rumor test for this context. | Restatement test not applicable; speech protected as opinion. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. City of Columbus, 117 Ohio St.3d 328 (2008) (defamation standard and fault element in Ohio)
- A&B-Abell Elevator Co. v. Columbus/Central Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 73 Ohio St.3d 1 (1995) (definitional scope of facts vs. opinion in defamation)
- Vail v. The Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 72 Ohio St.3d 279 (1995) (separate protection for opinion ancillary to freedom of press)
- Wampler v. Higgins, 93 Ohio St.3d 111 (2001) (independent protection of opinion in non-media contexts)
- Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St.3d 243 (1986) (test for determining whether language is fact or opinion)
- McKimm v. Ohio Elections Comm., 89 Ohio St.3d 139 (2000) (objective meaning to listeners in defamation analysis)
- Vail v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. (2), - (-) (see above (listed with Vail 72 Ohio St.3d 279))
- Welling v. Weinfeld, 113 Ohio St.3d 464 (2007) (false light standard and knowledge of falsity requirement)
- Yeager v. Local Union 20, 6 Ohio St.3d 369 (1983) (outrageous conduct generally not mere insults for IIED)
- Stembridge v. Summit Academy Mgt., 2006-Ohio-4076 (2006) (trial court determines outrageousness as a matter of law)
- Jarvis v. Gerstenslager Co., 2003-Ohio-3165 (2003) (outrageous conduct and standards for summary judgment)
- Finley v. First Realty Property Mgt., Ltd., 185 Ohio App.3d 366 (2009) (appellate standard for IIED/intentional torts in Ohio)