91 F. Supp. 3d 381
E.D.N.Y.2015Background
- Plaintiff Janesia Stroud alleges she swallowed sharp objects from a Wendy’s chicken nugget in a Wendy’s franchise in Valdosta, Georgia, sustaining throat injuries and ongoing pain.
- Complaint names Tyson Foods (alleged manufacturer) and Wendy’s International (franchisor/operator) as defendants; neither is incorporated or headquartered in New York.
- Complaint contains no domicile allegation for Plaintiff; medical record indicates Plaintiff is a Georgia resident.
- Plaintiff urges New York courts have personal jurisdiction: (1) general jurisdiction based on Tyson’s Buffalo plant (operated via an entity called Zemco) and Wendy’s New York subsidiaries, and (2) specific jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) and (a)(4).
- Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2); the Court granted dismissal without prejudice, advising suit may be brought in the appropriate forum.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether New York has general jurisdiction over Tyson and Wendy’s | Tyson and Wendy’s do continuous business in NY (Tyson via Buffalo plant/Zemco; Wendy’s via NY restaurants/subsidiaries) so they are "doing business" in NY | Neither defendant is incorporated or has principal place of business in NY; their NY contacts are not the kind of continuous/systematic contacts that render them "at home" | Dismissed — no general jurisdiction under Daimler’s "at home" standard |
| Whether NY courts can attribute subsidiary/affiliate contacts to parent for general jurisdiction | Parent corporations’ NY contacts can be established through alter ego/agency (Zemco/Wendy’s NY) | Agency/alter ego attribution insufficient here; Daimler casts doubt on broad attribution | Dismissed — court declines to find an "exceptional" basis to treat parents as at home in NY |
| Whether specific jurisdiction exists under CPLR §302(a)(1) (transacting business) | Defendants transact business in NY and thus are subject to long-arm jurisdiction | Even if they transact business, Plaintiff’s Georgia injury did not arise from any NY activity; no articulable nexus | Dismissed — no nexus showing that claim arose from NY transactions |
| Whether specific jurisdiction exists under CPLR §302(a)(4) (real property) | Defendants own/use/possess NY real property, supporting jurisdiction | Ownership of NY property is unrelated to Georgia-based injury; no connection between property and cause of action | Dismissed — no relationship between NY property and the alleged injury |
Key Cases Cited
- Penguin Gr. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 609 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2010) (plaintiff bears burden to demonstrate personal jurisdiction)
- Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491 (2d Cir. 2006) (prima facie showing required to survive Rule 12(b)(2))
- Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2012) (elements for long-arm/specific jurisdiction analysis)
- Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) (general jurisdiction requires corporation be "essentially at home" in forum)
- Gucci Am., Inc. v. Bank of China, 768 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2014) (applications of Daimler in Second Circuit)
- Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (traditional New York "doing business" test and agency attribution principles)
- Landoil Res. Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1990) (standard for continuous, permanent, substantial activity)
- Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., 750 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2014) (post-Daimler guidance on general jurisdiction)
- Jazini v. Nissan Motor Co. Ltd., 148 F.3d 181 (2d Cir. 1998) (limits on attributing subsidiary presence to parent for jurisdiction)