910 F.3d 909
7th Cir.2018Background
- On May 20, 2013, truck driver Craig Strand received parking tickets at a Planned Parenthood lot; Officer Curtis Minchuk (in uniform, working security) issued them and later confronted Strand.
- The encounter escalated after Minchuk allegedly demanded a bribe, slapped Strand's phone, tore his shirt, and a physical struggle followed in which Strand punched and held Minchuk’s throat.
- The fight ended when Strand stood up, backed four to six feet away, raised his hands, and twice said, "I surrender. Do whatever you think you need to do. I surrender, I'm done." Strand was unarmed.
- While Minchuk was still on the ground, he drew his service weapon and fired, hitting Strand in the abdomen; Strand survived and was later convicted in state court of felony battery of an officer.
- Strand sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force; the district court denied summary judgment and qualified immunity to Minchuk, finding a material factual dispute about whether Strand was "subdued" when shot.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that, viewing the record in Strand's favor, disputed timing/circumstances preclude resolving excessive-force or qualified-immunity questions as a matter of law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Strand) | Defendant's Argument (Minchuk) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Minchuk's use of deadly force violate the Fourth Amendment? | Shot an unarmed, surrendering man who posed no immediate threat; force excessive. | Reasonable because Strand had just violently assaulted Minchuk and could resume attack; threat persisted. | Material factual dispute over whether Strand was subdued; cannot resolve on summary judgment. |
| Is Minchuk entitled to qualified immunity? | No — clearly established law forbids deadly force against a subdued, nonthreatening suspect. | Yes — given the recent assault and short timeline, a reasonable officer could have believed deadly force necessary. | Denial of qualified immunity affirmed because factual disputes prevent legal resolution now. |
| Was the timeline between surrender and shooting so brief that force was reasonable per precedent? | Timeline uncertain; record permits a jury to find sufficient time elapsed to render force unreasonable. | Asserts surrender was sudden and insufficiently separated from assault to preclude reasonable fear. | Court cannot resolve timeline on appeal; factual determination required at trial. |
| Does precedent clearly establish that shooting a suspect in these circumstances is unlawful? | Yes — circuit and Supreme Court law establishes no deadly force once suspect is subdued and not an imminent threat. | Argues controlling cases (e.g., Johnson v. Scott) permit a one-second reaction exception; here facts support reasonableness. | Law clearly forbids shooting a subdued, nonthreatening person, but unresolved facts prevent a definitive qualified-immunity ruling now. |
Key Cases Cited
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (deadly force may not be used against an unarmed, nondangerous suspect)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (excessive-force claims judged by objective reasonableness of totality of circumstances)
- Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014) (consideration of governmental interests and split-second judgments in force analysis)
- Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (2014) (at summary judgment courts must view evidence in the light most favorable to nonmoving party)
- Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (clearly established law must be defined with specificity)
- Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (clearly established law requires that precedent place question beyond debate)
- Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (officers can be on notice that conduct violates law even in novel circumstances)
- Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (denial of qualified immunity is immediately appealable under collateral-order doctrine)
- Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995) (limits appellate review of qualified immunity denials to legal questions when facts viewed for plaintiff)
- Weinmann v. McClone, 787 F.3d 444 (7th Cir. 2015) (deadly force unreasonable unless suspect poses imminent danger or actively resists)
- Johnson v. Scott, 576 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2009) (one-second gap between surrender and force can support qualified immunity depending on facts)
- Ellis v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1993) (an officer who could justifiably shoot at one moment does not retain unfettered right to shoot thereafter)
- Horton v. Pobjecky, 883 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 2018) (circumstances can materially change so deadly force may become unreasonable)
- Becker v. Elfreich, 821 F.3d 920 (7th Cir. 2016) (denial of qualified immunity where suspect surrendered with hands up and was not fleeing)
- Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2014) (denial of qualified immunity where suspect had been motionless and visible to officer for upwards of ten seconds)
- Abbott v. Sangamon County, Ill., 705 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 2013) (well-established that officers may not use significant force on nonresisting or passively resisting suspects)
- Warlick v. Cross, 969 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1992) (trial procedures and special interrogatories can resolve factual disputes bearing on qualified immunity)