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Julian J. Miller v. Albert Gonzalez
761 F.3d 822
7th Cir.
2014
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*2 WOOD, Judgе, Before DIANE P. Chief ROVNER, Judges. CUDAHY and Circuit ROVNER, Judge. Circuit began evening Julian Miller of Octo- ber wedding his mother’s re- ception, and ended it in the back police cruiser with a broken police blamed two officers from the Ke- nosha, in- police department Wisconsin tentionally breaking jawhis and sued them § violating under U.S.C. 1983 for his rights by using civil excessive force in effectuating his arrest. The district court granted officers’ motions for appeals. and Miller I. entering p.m.

Befоre his mother’s 9:00 wedding reception, Miller and a friend marijuana. reception, smoked At the Mil- place. and 44th the corner of 21st Avenue in an hour of vodka three shots ler drank station, approached gas ended at As Gonzalez reception a half. When in a corner of idling Miller’s red car p.m., or 10:30 he saw p.m. 10:00 approximately closer, got he gas station. And as he girlfriend and then off dropped drinking exit the car beer. Before saw Miller Kenosha. to a local bar headed *3 inquiry, Miller bar, more In answer to Gonzalez’s he smoked some he the entered running in the area. seeing anyone high off that denied marijuana topped and then to which asked Miller his name before Gonzalez more Heineken beers with three Miller, knowing probation, on was a.m. he was at around 1:00 leaving for another bar license, home, and had driving without a been unready go to Apparently beer, replied his car with a bar, exiting he seen one more where headed off to name, Johnson.” bought a with the fake “Julius more and then drank a few beers if he was on asked Miller heading the road before When Gonzales final Heineken for in- that he was probation, to Miller admitted planned where he gas off to a station and disor- burglary girlfriend. probation call his deed on pay phone the to use becoming was derly conduct. who gas to the driving as Miller was Just fidgety and nervous over the increasingly station, police department re- the Kenosha in exchange, placed course of the his hands stabbing a that oc- a call about ceived Gonzalez instructed pockets. his front away the two blocks from curred about his front Miller to take his hands out of Police Officer gas same station. Kenosha run. Miller switched pockets and not to surrounding the Albert Gonzalez searсhed pockets front to his his hands from his suspect for the while Officer neighborhood step took a backwards and pockets, back the witness to Stange interviewed Shane pursuit. running took off with Gonzalez witness, That who lived on stabbing. the Serendipitously, Miller headed north on stabbing where the oc- the floor below Street, curred, and east on 44th that at around 1:40 21st Avenue then Stange told of the stab- directly a knock at a side door that back toward thе scene a.m. he heard sergeant, who had been apartment. bing. After hear- Gonzalez’s upstairs led to the station, gas Stange, radioed who noises, the witness went out to the at the ing stabbing, that still at the scene of the porch front where he saw someone wear- was suspect and that pursuing run around Gonzalez was ing a dark hooded sweatshirt Stange in his they head on 44th were headed direction. the house and then west house in time to see uрstairs neighbor emerged The from the Street. witness’s 44th yard, chasing Miller east on from the front “Call the Gonzalez shouted Stange him. straight told toward As cops. I’ve been stabbed.” The victim Street witness, porch and identified Stange, who told that al- came down from officer, to himself as a Miller darted though person who stabbed was mask, chain link jumped high it the left and a chest wearing a ski he believed was yard. fence into a small boyfriend. ex-wife’s evening, As with his other сhoices sergeant charge informed Gonza- yard ill was on 44th this one was conceived. The suspect lez that fled west (the by eight wide to ten only home was six to seven feet Street street on which the located) deep. It was enclosed on the south and then headed feet for one block link by high the chest chain on Avenue. Gonzalez walked and east sides south 21st fence, by west side the side of gas until reached the station that route he by a tall on its north side garage, south—at one block west and one block yard overgrown explore wooden fence. The will more below. Gonzalez jumped light shining tall and had a with weeds into the chain link fence directly and landed nearby from source. Once he head, breaking his left fence, trapped. Miller was The wood As the officers handcuffed Miller and garage fence and blocked the north and car, walked him to the Miller continued to west of the respectively Gonzalez, resist and told “You ain’t have to approaching Stange south. my jaw.” break In response, Gonzalez and, jumped the south fence after Miller said, you “I told not to run.” drawn, gun with his ordered Miller to the way car, On the to the squad ground. response In to told Stange’s com- officers, mand, around, “I ain’t going say anything Miller turned took a few about steps away go.” from the this. Just let me lay wooden The officers *4 stоmach, placed down on his and his declined the deal arms and instead insisted that out to spread-eagle According his sides. Miller receive medical care at the hospital facts, Stange’s to version of the Miller kept where emergency surgery he had repair to body his arms under ignored his and his jaw. jaw his broken Miller’s was wired repeated place commands to his hands be- shut for about six placed weeks and he was back, hind his but because this case comes liquid on a pain diet and had that could not summary before us from a motion for be pain controlled with over-the-counter facts, judgment, we take all of the includ- medication. complains Miller now of a one, ing this in the light most favorable to persistent jaw click in opens when he Miller, and construe all reasonable infer- his mouth. ences from the evidence in his favor. against Miller filed suit Stange Officers 12-3620, Cooper, Townsend v. No. and § Gonzalez under 42 U.S.C. 678, 684-85, 2014 WL at *5 claiming that the officers violated his 2014). July Cir. rights by Fourth Amendment using exces- point, At this Miller lying was on the sive during Specifically, force his arrest. ground pointing with his head south to- alleged Miller that Gonzalez used excessive ward 44th street and close to the chain link force when he fractured Miller’s and fence, pointing his feet north toward the Stange that for failing pre- was liable to ‍‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‍wooden and his face was on the vent injuring Gonzalez from him. east, ground turned to the toward east- Stange Gonzalez and filed a motion for ern side of the chain link fence. Seconds summary judgment arguing that no rea- lay after Miller ground down on the jury sonable could find that their actions order, response to Stange’s Gonzalez ar- objectively were unreasonable because rived. Gonzalez testified that he could not injuries Miller’s resulted from an accident see at all. dispute Miller Millеr does not acts, through rather than intentional this, and argues that he submitted compe- purposeful, if it was the force was yard tent evidence that lighted was given reasonable the circumstances that source, from a nearby any and that weeds might stabbing have been the in the did sus- not cover the entire area pect and that they such that him the fence would hide from view. evidence, asserts, to Relying might on this assist a fellow officer who have jury reasonably being Stange argued could been attacked. discredit Gonzalez’s claim against factually that he could not see that Miller Miller’s claim him spread-eagle legally and thus no and insufficient unreasonable be- longer anyone a threat to position assertion we cause he was not in a to intervene —an arrest, during his and cessive force anticipated pre- nor not have he could it. Miller Stange preventеd Miller. Fi- could have injuring

vented Gonzalez they argued that that the statement of stab- argues also nally, both defendants immunity be- Rule qualified he submitted with his bing to victim were entitled 60(b) violate a constitutional the court they did not motion should have caused cause him judgment against be- right. to vacate chase, that, during the cause he showed granted district court reasonably have be- could not The court officers. judgment to both stabbing suspect. that he was lieved not have time to Stange “did agreed blow, prevent to anything” do II. theory rejected too “far fetched” as of the begin our de novo review jump the fence and We could that Gonzalez darkened, the motion for overgrown yard grant with in a land involving the intentionally Stange, as the facts against to strike enough precision (R. 62, simpler. review against For that claim are We p. light in the most favorable reason, that Miller had those facts the court concluded all the non-movant and construe any evidence of “intentional use not shown the evidence in excessive.” reasonable inferences from that could be deemed of force Liberty Lobby, it found that the officers his favor. Anderson at Because Id. *5 2505, Inc., 242, 255, 477 106 S.Ct. 91 Miller’s Fourth Amend- U.S. had not violated Townsend, 202, (1986); the 759 F.3d the court did not reach L.Ed.2d rights, ment 3511751, 680-81, at *1. immunity. at 2014 WL qualified issue of judg- the district court entered After for A officer can be liable ment, for relief under Feder- Miller moved only if excessive force another officer’s 60(b), Procedure based on al Rule of Civil opportunity had a realistic that officer written statement of newly a discovered first officer’s ac stop intervene and the statement, In the stabbing victim. City Chicago, v. 700 tions. See Sanchez of “appeared assailant reports victim that his (7th Cir.2012); 919, Miller v. 925-926 argued male. Miller that to be” a white (7th Smith, Cir.2000); 491, 495 220 F.3d grant undercuts the of sum- this evidеnce (7th Hardin, 282, Yang v. 37 F.3d 285 light- mary judgment because he is Cir.1994). opportunity” A “realistic means thereby vitiat- skinned African American using exces a chance to warn the officer suspi- of ing the reasonableness Gonzalez’s City Abdullahi v. stop. sive force to See committed a serious cion that he had (7th 763, Madison, 774 Cir. 423 F.3d of pointed out that crime. Miller also had no reason to think Stange But made no mention of a red police reports strike Miller when he Gonzаlez would motion, The court denied the vehicle. no time to yard, into the and thus change not stating that the evidence would to the act until after the one blow of the case. We have consoli- the outcome Stange thought Even if over. Miller’s separate appeals from his dated force, not he could using excessive of underlying judgment and the denial have known it until the moment Gon 60(b) Rule motion. by then it jaw, on Miller’s zalez landed Miller claims thаt he was too late. Even appeal argues that we should On until the officer was summary did not see Gonzalez grants judgment. vacate the (R. 53, 2;p. R. “flying over the fence.” jury that a could He contends reasonable 51.). 45-2, at of Julian Miller intentionally Deposition used ex- find that Gonzalez 827 argues jury reasonably that a could inferences to draw from the facts. Stange Iroquois find that had reason to believe that McCann v. Hosp., Mem’l (7th 745, Cir.2010); jump Gonzalez would оver the fence into F.3d Payne, 337 so, and, F.3d at 770. doing strike Miller. speculation, But Miller’s hunches and intu Sometimes the heftiness of the summary judgment. ition cannot defeat side, evidence on one or credulity of a Payne Pauley, 337 F.3d particular litigant makes our task of sus Cir.2003). Nor can Miller thwart sum pending credibility factual and determina mary judgment by speculating as to difficult, tions but whatever the difficulty, Stange’s state of mind. Id. Miller admits we must stick to the task on Stange plan and Gonzalez did not judgment. Payne, 337 F.3d at 771. That chase, capture, or the arrest. And it is is, summary judgment is not appropriate undisputed Stange and Gonzalez were “if the evidence is such that a reasonable together not and therefore did not have jury could return a verdict the nonmov- plan any time to confer or sort of use of Anderson, ing party.” U.S. positioning force or of Miller on the 106 S.Ct. 2505. We must therefore con Stange jumped before the fence. light struе the record in the most favor only opportunity Stange The would have able to the nonmovant and temp avoid the had to intervene would have been as he party’s tation to decide which version of jumping by saw Gonzalez likely the facts more Shepherd is true. opportunity then there was no reasonable Carp., Slater Steels 168 F.3d ‍‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‍1009-10 to intervene. And alleged because the ex (7th Cir.1999). act, cessive force was limited to this one distriсt court concluded that ongoing ability there was no to intervene. Miller lacked sufficient evidence that Gon facts, jury Under these could not find zalez’s blow was intentional. But that Stange failing is liable for to inter imagine difficult to of an admission —short *6 Gutierrez, Hadley vene. See v. 526 F.3d from Gonzalez—what other evidence Mil (11th Cir.2008) 1324, (concluding 1330-31 present ler could of Gonzalez’s intent. that separate officer was not liable for The district court discredits Miller’s аsser officer’s excessive force because he could tion that Gonzalez could see him when he anticipated not have or stopped officer’s fence, jumped reasoning over the that single stomach); punch plaintiffs to Gonzalez had no reason to know in where Krzeminski, 11-12 O’Neill 839 F.2d “dark, overgrown yard” Miller was (2d Cir.1988) (concluding that non-inter according hidden. But to vening opportunity pre officer had no to him from could see оutside the punches quick vent three in succession to knew that he was subdued. Miller asserts plaintiff, but could be liable for later inac considerably that the officer was taller plaintiff tion while dragged was across the than the chain-link the area was floor). by nearby lighting, illuminated and Gonza Gonzalez’s judgment enough mo lez had time to see Miller on the tion, hand, on the other prostrate falls on the other because Miller was job side of the line. Recall that our when ten to twelve seconds before Gonzalez assessing motion is over the fence and struck him. evidence, weigh events, not to credibility make Under this version of it is an unre determinations, disputes resolve factual markable stretch to conclude that Gonzalez contests, swearing have, may alleges, deliberately or decide which as Miller body his to weight used the body’s Ml fence and his knee with

dropped his jaw. The district cоurt’s Miller’s though Mil- strike jaw, even weight onto ultimately proposition rests on the decision resisting arrest. longer no ler was cannot be use of force that an accidental to have been appears court The district Amendment. the Fourth excessive under facts version of the crediting Gonzalez’s of force was Gonzalez’s use But whether that court concluded The district instead. ques- disputed precisely accidental is pursuit on foоt “Officer Gonzalez resolved question that cannot be tion—a and another offi- plaintiff and followed competing ver- given on this record In yard. into a the fence and cer over Pauley, 337 F.3d sions of the event. See knee so, and fell and his he stumbled doing (“Where vastly present two parties (R. 8). jaw.” p. plaintiffs landed on the ... it is almost certain different stories account of events But this was Gonzalez’s issues of material genuine that there are affidavit, Miller’s. not from his dispute.”). fact the ex also infer from juryA could that the dis- Finally Miller also asserts that Gonza immediately thereafter change police report crepancy between Gonzalez’s injure Mil intend to Miller. lez did indeed provides further evidence and his affidavit exclaimed, my “You ain’t have to break ler jury might use to conclude replied you “I told not jaw!” and Gonzalez facts to cover manipulating interpretation оne run.” Of course to In use of force. up his intentional merely stating the unre that Gonzalez was that he police report Gonzalez states had ordered [he] markable truism grass on the wet “jumped slipped the fence But Mil disobeyed. halt and he Miller to Stange. I help [police and dove to officer] interpretation Gonza ler’s alternate —that suspect and heard then landed retaliating that he was implying lez was (R. jaw.” you my on yell out Man landed his decision to run —is against Miller for 1). 52-10, p. In his affidavit he states Richman inherently implausible. not Cf. and land- he “fell forward off of the fence” Sheahan, Cir. (R. 49, p. Perhaps, as ed Miller. 2008) ar (noting that bad blood between out, merely this is point the defendants and arrestee could allow resting officers wording rather slightly result of different infer, just barely,” “if that officers jury to discrepancy, than an actual material just and not attempting punish, were to for a fact- such a determination is one him). Deciding which inference arrest finding jury. of a the conversation is the task draw from *7 Miller, if be- Having concluded that Anderson, 255, 477 U.S. at fact finder. lieved, from which presented has evidence 2505; Payne, 337 F.3d at 106 S.Ct. jury could determine that Gon- a rational court also concluded that is district deliberately inflicted the blow that zalez could have implausible too reject jaw, must also Gonza- broke his we face in the aimed fоr and struck Miller’s the of argument alternative use lez’s dark, question implausibility the of under the cir- force was reasonable such According to begs question: cumstances. at the enclosed when Gonzalez arrived assessing In whether an officer’s for at least ten seconds yard, he could see stomach, of force violates the Fourth Amend lay motionless on his use that Miller ment, officer’s actions we ask whether the with his arms outstretch gunpoint, аt and light of the objectively are reasonable Despite Miller’s exhibited and ob ed. an ar- known at the time of information passivity, served 829 Phillips Cmty Corp., rest. See v. Ins. 678 standing suspect’s previous a behavior— (7th 513, Cir.2012); 519-20 ‍‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‍including arrest, F.3d Common resisting threatening offi- (7th 940, City Chicago, v. 661 F.3d 943 safety, potentially cer or carrying a weap- of Cir.2011); City Corydon, Marion v. Jones, Jennings 2, 11, on. See 499 F.3d of Indiana, (7th Cir.2009). 700, (1st Cir.2007) (officer 559 F.3d 705 16-18 may who have question This on “severity turns of the deliberately broken anklе no-longer-re- of issue, crime at whether the suspect poses sisting suspect was not qualified entitled to safety an immediate threat to the of the immunity though even suspect previ- had others, officers or and whether sus [the ously actively arrest, been resisting police pect] actively resisting is or at arrest could not see suspect’s they hands as were tempting by flight.” to evade arrest Gra trapped under body, police reason- Connor, 386, 396, ham v. 490 U.S. 109 ably believed the suspect weapon); had (1989). 1865, S.Ct. 104 L.Ed.2d 443 As Mattox, 1416, Smith v. 127 F.3d 1419-20 bewill clear from the discussion that fol (11th Cir.1997) (officer intentionally who lows, right to be free from the suspect’s broke during arm handcuffing, type of applied “clearly force Gonzalez suspect after submitted to an order to lie established,” such that Gonzalez not en is qualified was not entitled to qualified immunity. titled to See Abbott immunity though suspect even had Ill., 706, Sangamon Cnty., 705 F.3d 725 safety, threatenеd officer’s and had resist- (7th Cir.2013); Oakes, Sallenger v. 473 by running away); ed arrest Cy- see also (7th Cir.2007). 731, F.3d 741 Wisconsin, rus v. Town Mukwonago, of (7th (force Cir.2010) 624 F.3d believed, If Miller is Gonzalez saw is suspect poses reasonable while a at gunpoint, lying subdued motionless may threat no longer be reasonable as the spread-eagled ground, and then decreases); threat Wynalda, Ellis v. deliberately brought down his knee on Mil Cir.1993) (same). enough ler’s with force to break it. The officers concеde that under Miller’s By Miller’s account he was visible to (which version of events we must credit at Gonzalez and had been for up- motionless point) this only he demonstrated “passive seconds, gunpoint, wards ten when resistance,” is, lying with his arms true, Gonzalez kneed him in the If obeying every outstretched and order ex this situation distinguishable from the cept for the order to move his hands be Scott, situation in Johnson v. 576 F.3d See, e.g., hind his back. Phillips, 678 F.3d (7th Cir.2009), upon which Gonzalez (describing at 525. а willful obey refusal to Johnson, In shooting relies. suspect fled a police “passive officer’s order as resis until he was in a cornered tance” warranting only a minimal use of yard. residential Literally Id. at 659. mo- force). Under the aforementioned factors after suspect ments turned and offered (sus by elucidated Court Graham surrender, by pursu- he was bitten crime, officers, pected threat to and resis ing dog officer’s and the officer struck him tаnce), clearly the law is established that several times until he was handcuffed. Id. *8 police officers cannot use “significant” at In affirming 659-60. the district court’s suspects only passively force on who are grant summary of judgment on Johnson’s Abbott, resisting arrest. See at claim, that, excessive-force we ruled while (citing dating cases back to may officers not continue to use force prohibition against significant

This force against suspect, subdued Jоhnson was against suspect applies a subdued yet notwith- not known to be subdued when his for Officer judgment I would affirm Id. at 660. force. applied

pursuers as well. Gonzalez that the officer in critical fact Johnson going ‍‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‍to Johnson was how “had no idea Id. at 660. cornered.” once he was

behave Johnson, by- arresting officer

Unlike account, could see

Miller’s gunpoint. subdued prone and

he was this, objectively rea- not be would

Given jaw to effectuate

sonable to break officers), (or notwith- protect arrest MARINE AND GENERAL NEW YORK flee. And attempt to standing previous COMPANY; In Starr INSURANCE demonstrate, this cited above as the cases demnity Liability Company Plain & of Mil- at the time clearly established tiffs-Appellees ler’s arrest. 60(b) motion, Rule As for Miller’s COMPANY, CEMENT CONTINENTAL newly discovered evidence argued that the Materials, LLC; LLC Summit through sought to introduce that Miller Defendants-Appellants change the outcome on motion would precluded because it Materials, LLC; Continental Summit finding that Gonzalez the district court’s Company, LLC Counter Cement Because are vacat- reasonably. we acted Claimаnts-Appellants summary grant of remanding the ing and 60(b) Gonzalez, Miller’s Rule judgment for Insur New York Marine and General at issue. longer motion is no Indemnity Company; & Li ance Starr reasons, we For all of these VACATE ability Company Defendants- Counter judgment in favor of of grant Appellees. proceed- and remand for further No. 13-2313. opinion. In all ings consistent with this AF- judgment respects, other Appeals, United States Court FIRMED. Eighth Circuit. March 2014. Submitted: CUDAHY, dissenting in Judge, Circuit part. July Filed: judgment

I Officer agree But, I am affirmed. also

Stange must be there is insufficient evi-

convinced that Mr. Miller’s claim supporting

dence over the

somehow Officer Gonzalez deliberately ‍‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‍in an obscure area and

fence lying he was

broke Mr. Miller’s while The evidence Mr. Miller

on his stomach. not create a simply does presented

has viewing skimpy story, even

plausible favor as we must

evidence Miller’s Accordingly,

summary judgment review.

Case Details

Case Name: Julian J. Miller v. Albert Gonzalez
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Date Published: Aug 5, 2014
Citation: 761 F.3d 822
Docket Number: 11-2906, 12-2950
Court Abbreviation: 7th Cir.
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