44 F.4th 318
5th Cir.2022Background
- Stramaski, an Academic Advisor employed through the Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station (TEES), was told a paycheck might be delayed unless she submitted a second doctor’s note; she complained and HR assured her she would be paid on time.
- She was timely paid, but soon after TEES department head Dr. Mark Lawley criticized her for being “aggressive” about pay, sent her home, issued a coaching letter, and then terminated her employment on March 7, 2019.
- Stramaski sued Lawley in his individual capacity under the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision (29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)), seeking damages and declaratory/injunctive relief.
- The district court dismissed the injunctive/declaratory claims for lack of standing but denied Lawley’s motions to dismiss the damages claim based on sovereign (Eleventh Amendment) and qualified immunity defenses.
- On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the court considered (1) whether the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit as actually against the state, and (2) whether qualified immunity applies to FLSA retaliation claims and, if so, whether Lawley is entitled to it on these facts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Eleventh Amendment bars suit against state employee in his individual capacity | Stramaski: suit alleges Lawley’s personal retaliation; recovery would come from him as the true party in interest | Lawley: plaintiff’s relief (lost wages, benefits) would ultimately come from TEES/state, so state is the real party in interest | Court: Affirmed denial of sovereign immunity — Eleventh Amendment does not bar this individual-capacity retaliation claim on these facts |
| Whether qualified immunity applies to FLSA claims and to Lawley on the facts | Stramaski: FLSA-right against retaliation was violated and clearly established | Lawley: if qualified immunity applies to FLSA, his conduct was objectively reasonable and the law was not clearly established | Court: Vacated denial of qualified immunity and REMANDED for district court to decide (court flagged substantial unresolved questions on whether qualified immunity is available under the FLSA; held that if it is, Lawley likely entitled to it here because no clearly established law covered firing over a prospective, unrealized late-pay complaint) |
Key Cases Cited
- Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (state is the real party in interest analysis for Eleventh Amendment)
- Modica v. Taylor, 465 F.3d 174 (Fifth Circuit: FMLA/FLSA employer definitions treated similarly; individual liability possible)
- Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519 (suit nominally against official can be treated as against the state depending on facts)
- Luder v. Endicott, 253 F.3d 1020 (Seventh Circuit: large collective claims against individuals may effectively be suits against the state)
- Henley v. Simpson, [citation="527 F. App'x 303"] (panel decision distinguishing policy-based claims from individual-retaliation claims for Eleventh Amendment purposes)
- Lee v. Coahoma Cnty., 937 F.2d 220 (governmental managers can be individually liable under the FLSA)
- Atlantic Co. v. Broughton, 146 F.2d 480 (failure to pay on a regular payment date violates FLSA)
- Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (test for when qualified immunity may be implied in a statute — common-law analog and firm-rooted immunity)
- Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (sovereign immunity bars suits against states under the FLSA)
- Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617 (informal complaints can suffice for FLSA retaliation if they assert illegality)
