2016 COA 189
Colo. Ct. App.2016Background
- Wendy Stone, a Life Time Fitness member, tripped on a blow-dryer cord in the women’s locker room after washing her hands and fractured her ankle.
- Stone sued Life Time for common-law negligence and under Colorado’s Premises Liability Act (PLA), § 13-21-115.
- Life Time moved for summary judgment relying on exculpatory/assumption-of-risk language in the membership Agreement Stone signed.
- The district court granted summary judgment, finding the Agreement valid and releasing Life Time from Stone’s claims.
- The appellate court affirmed dismissal of Stone’s common-law negligence claim (abrogated by the PLA) but reversed as to the PLA claim, finding the Agreement’s exculpatory language not clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal as applied to Stone’s locker-room injury.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Stone's common-law negligence claim could proceed despite PLA | Stone pursued negligence claim for Life Time’s failure to keep premises safe | Life Time argued PLA governs and exculpatory agreement bars claims | Held: Negligence claim barred (PLA provides sole remedy); summary judgment on negligence affirmed |
| Whether the Agreement’s exculpatory/assumption-of-risk clauses barred Stone’s PLA claim for locker-room injury | Stone argued the Agreement did not clearly and unambiguously cover injuries incurred after washing hands in locker room | Life Time argued the Agreement’s broad language expressly covered the injury and released liability | Held: Release not clear/unambiguous re: locker-room accident; PLA claim reversal and remand |
| Whether the Agreement was fairly entered into (Jones factor 3) | Stone suggested potential bargaining disparity | Life Time argued recreational contracts are not typically adhesive in the Jones sense | Held: No unfair disparity shown; factor did not preclude enforcement |
| Whether the Agreement addressed ‘‘inherent risks’’ broadly enough to include ordinary locker-room accidents | Stone argued ‘‘inherent risk’’ language applies to dangerous activities, not sink/locker-room slips | Life Time contended phrasing like "including" and lists make release expansive | Held: Context, drafting, and statutory/case law use of "inherent risks" for dangerous activities made the release ambiguous for locker-room injuries; ambiguity defeats enforcement |
Key Cases Cited
- Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981) (four-factor test for validity of exculpatory agreements)
- Chadwick v. Colt Ross Outfitters, Inc., 100 P.3d 465 (Colo. 2004) (requires clear, unambiguous, unequivocal release language)
- B & B Livery, Inc. v. Riehl, 960 P.2d 134 (Colo. 1998) (exculpatory agreements disfavored)
- Vigil v. Franklin, 103 P.3d 322 (Colo. 2004) (PLA provides sole remedy against landowners)
- Graven v. Vail Assocs., Inc., 909 P.2d 514 (Colo. 1995) (discussion of inherent risks in skiing context)
- Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781 (Colo. 1989) (adhesive bargain/unequal power considerations)
- Teneyck v. Roller Hockey Colo., Ltd., 10 P.3d 707 (Colo. App. 2000) (inherent risk concept applied to spectator injuries)
- Mudd v. Dorr, 574 P.2d 97 (Colo. App. 1977) (inherent risks in medical procedures)
- Geczi v. Lifetime Fitness, 973 N.E.2d 801 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012) (example of clear waiver that specifically included locker rooms)