Stone v. Holder
859 F. Supp. 2d 48
D.D.C.2012Background
- Stone, proceeding pro se, filed three separate civil actions against federal agencies/officials in the D.D.C. arising from his 2004 Texas conviction and related restitution/forfeiture orders.
- Actions target: (i) Treasury regarding seizure of property under a forfeiture order; (ii) HUD regarding restitution payments under MVRA; (iii) Holder (Attorney General) challenging subject-matter jurisdiction of the Texas court and related program existence.
- The court treats identical memorandum as filed in all three cases and sua sponte dismisses for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity.
- Stone previously pursued post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255; the court notes limited avenues for relief and the appellate route.
- Court concludes MVRA does not waive sovereign immunity, APA waiver requires final agency action which is absent, and Declaratory Judgment Act does not waive sovereign immunity.
- Even if jurisdiction were possible, the suits would impermissibly collateral attack Stone’s Texas conviction and final judgments.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the United States and agencies are subject to suit without waiver of sovereign immunity. | Stone contends § 1331 or APA provide jurisdiction/waivers. | Waivers do not exist; sovereign immunity bars suit. | Lacks jurisdiction; sovereign immunity applies. |
| Whether MVRA or APA provide a waiver allowing suits against HUD and related actions. | MVRA/APA authorize review and relief against agency action. | MVRA does not waive immunity; APA requires final agency action not present here. | No waiver; actions dismissed. |
| Whether Holder, in official capacity, can be sued for jurisdictional reasons or under the Declaratory Judgment Act. | Holds jurisdiction under §1331, DJA, or APA. | No waiver under these authorities; final agency action absent. | No jurisdiction; claims fail. |
| Whether the lawsuits are improper collateral attacks on the Texas conviction. | Suits are not collateral attacks; seek different relief. | Relief would overrule final Texas judgments; not proper collateral challenge. | Yes, improper collateral attacks; dismissed. |
| Whether the court should exercise any alternative jurisdiction (e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2255). | Reasserts entitlement to relief via § 2255 or appellate route. | Remedies available are § 2255 or appeal; court lacks jurisdiction to hear new challenges. | Remedies exist elsewhere; this court lacks jurisdiction. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (agency jurisdiction and standing framework)
- Shekoyan v. Sibley Int'l Corp., 217 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2002) (pro se pleading liberal construction)
- Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994) (jurisdictional dismissal standard)
- United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (sovereign immunity premise)
- FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) (sovereign immunity applies to agencies absent waiver)
- Transohio Sav. Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (agency immunity scope and official-capacity suits)
- Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) (official-capacity suit limitations)
- Walton v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 533 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2008) (D.C. Circuit/agency-immunity reasoning)
- REO Const. Consultants, Inc. v. Stone, 409 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2006) (second collateral attack treated as collateral attack)
- Stone v. United States, 2010 WL 2403720 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (references to prior conviction and restitution orders)