Stokeling v. United States
139 S. Ct. 544
| SCOTUS | 2019Background
- Denard Stokeling pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1); the probation office recommended ACCA's 15-year mandatory minimum based on three prior felonies including a 1997 Florida robbery conviction.
- ACCA defines a “violent felony” in part by the elements clause: any felony that "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another" (18 U.S.C. §924(e)(2)(B)(i)).
- Stokeling argued his Florida robbery conviction did not qualify as an ACCA predicate because Florida robbery can be satisfied by minimal force (e.g., overcoming slight resistance). The District Court applied a facts-based inquiry and declined the enhancement; the Eleventh Circuit reversed.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the degree of force necessary to overcome a victim’s resistance satisfies ACCA’s “physical force” requirement.
- The Court majority held that "physical force" includes the degree of force necessary to overcome a victim’s resistance (the common-law robbery standard), so Florida robbery qualifies under ACCA’s elements clause.
- Justice Sotomayor dissented, arguing Johnson v. United States requires a higher, "violent" degree of force and that Florida robbery can be committed with only minimal force and thus should not automatically qualify.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Stokeling) | Defendant's Argument (United States) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the elements clause’s "physical force" includes force sufficient to overcome a victim’s resistance | Florida robbery can be committed with only minimal force and thus does not meet ACCA’s “physical force” requirement | "Physical force" in ACCA encompasses force sufficient to overcome resistance (common-law robbery) and therefore Florida robbery qualifies | Yes; "physical force" includes force needed to overcome resistance; Florida robbery qualifies as an ACCA predicate |
| Proper interpretive baseline for "physical force": common-law meaning or Johnson’s definition | Johnson requires a heightened, "violent" degree of force; common-law minimal force is insufficient | Historical statutory context and common-law background show Congress retained common-law force when it adopted the elements clause | Majority: historical context and statutory continuity support applying a force standard that covers common-law robbery; Johnson is consistent with that reading |
| Whether Johnson’s “capable of causing physical pain or injury” requires a probability of injury | Stokeling: Johnson mandates force reasonably expected to cause pain/injury (a higher threshold) | Government: Johnson requires potentiality (capability), not a probability; overcoming resistance inherently meets that capability | Majority: "capable of causing physical pain or injury" means potentiality; overcoming resistance meets that standard |
| Whether Florida aggravated/armed-robbery statutes are affected | Stokeling: extending ACCA to Florida robbery would sweep in low‑level offenders and misalign with ACCA’s purpose | Government: excluding many state robbery statutes would unduly limit ACCA’s reach contrary to Congress’ intent to expand predicates | Majority: Florida statutory scheme (and its cases) shows robbery requires overcoming resistance; both simple and aggravated robbery qualify under the elements clause |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (interpreting “physical force” in ACCA’s elements clause as "force capable of causing physical pain or injury")
- United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014) (reading "physical force" in a different statutory context to include certain minor uses of force for domestic‑violence statute)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (categorical‑approach framework for comparing state statute elements to federal generic crimes)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (adoption of the categorical approach for defining predicate offenses)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (ACCA targets offenders whose prior crimes make them likely to pose an increased risk of gun violence)