331 F. Supp. 3d 990
C.D. Cal.2018Background
- Plaintiffs (transgender service members and Equality California) challenged President Trump's 2017 memorandum that barred open military service and related retention/accession directives; the court granted a preliminary injunction in December 2017.
- President Trump announced a transgender ban by tweet (July 2017) and issued a 2017 memorandum formalizing accession, retention, and surgery restrictions; courts enjoined enforcement.
- Secretary Mattis convened a DOD Panel, produced a DOD Report and a Mattis Memorandum recommending a new policy disqualifying many transgender individuals; President Trump issued a 2018 memorandum allowing DOD to implement the revised policy.
- Defendants moved to dissolve the December 2017 preliminary injunction, arguing the new policy is materially different, medical-condition–based, and entitled to military deference (rational-basis).
- The court held a hearing and denied Defendants’ motion, finding the new policy is substantively the same as the prior ban, not entitled to deferential rational-basis review, and fails intermediate scrutiny on readiness and unit-cohesion grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mootness: whether the 2018 policy renders challenge to 2017 memorandum moot | The 2018 policy remains substantively the same and continues to disadvantage transgender people | The 2018 policy is materially different (medical-condition focus, exceptions) and thus moots prior injunction | Denied mootness; new policy disadvantages transgender people in the same fundamental way, so controversy survives |
| Level of review / military deference | Transgender status warrants heightened review (intermediate scrutiny); DOD after-the-fact report not entitled to deference | Policy is based on medical condition and is a military decision deserving deference and rational-basis review | Rejected military deference; intermediate scrutiny applies (court had earlier applied intermediate scrutiny) |
| Sufficiency of DOD justifications (readiness, deployability, costs) | DOD justifications are pretextual or insufficiently tied to the actual policy effect | DOD Report shows risks to readiness and deployability, and significant costs that justify policy | DOD justifications not "exceedingly persuasive" or substantially related to the broad ban; costs and readiness rationales fail to sustain the policy under intermediate scrutiny |
| Unit cohesion / privacy concerns | Evidence from other militaries and prior integration shows inclusion does not undermine cohesion or privacy | Transgender service (especially anatomy/facility use) threatens privacy and unit cohesion; logistical issues make accommodation impracticable | Court finds unit-cohesion/privacy rationale not sufficiently persuasive; historical analogies (race, sex, sexual orientation integration) undermine the cohesion argument |
Key Cases Cited
- Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (preliminary injunction preserves status quo)
- Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (preliminary injunction standard)
- City of Jacksonville v. Fla. First Nat'l Bank, 508 U.S. 656 (repeal/replacement statute may not moot challenge where effects remain fundamentally the same)
- Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (deference to military judgments in appropriate contexts)
- Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (discussion of after-the-fact justifications in military context)
- United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (government must offer an "exceedingly persuasive" justification for gender-based classifications)
- Arcamuzi v. Continental Air Lines, 819 F.2d 935 (9th Cir.) (preliminary injunction standards)
- Mariscal-Sandoval v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 851 (9th Cir.) (modification/dissolution of injunction requires significant change in facts or law)