Stinnett v. Commonwealth
364 S.W.3d 70
Ky.2011Background
- Appellant Lawrence Stinnett convicted by Warren Circuit Court of murder and kidnapping; sentenced to life without parole; represented himself with hybrid stand-by counsel; appeal filed as of right under Ky. Const. § 110.
- Defendant argued kidnapping exemption in KRS 509.050 precludes kidnapping conviction; trial court declined to apply exemption.
- Factual backdrop: in Feb. 2006, Stinnett returned from Oklahoma after overhearing girlfriend with other men, threatened violence, then beat, gagged, and restrained Renshaw, with Lewis participating; Renshaw died from blunt force trauma.
- During the attack, Stinnett threatened to kill and also attempted to coerce Lewis to participate; scene lasted over an hour with extensive restraint and degradation.
- Evidence supported both murder and kidnapping elements; trial court instructed on both crimes, and the jury convicted of murder and kidnapping.
- Defendant raised issues about the kidnapping exemption, jury instruction on intentional murder, replacement of counsel or self-representation, compulsion of an out-of-state witness (Dr. Auble), and admissibility of a letter from prior counsel and associated hearsay.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether kidnapping exemption applies to bar kidnapping | Stinnett; exemption should bar kidnapping since underlying crime was murder and restraint exceeded incidental level | Stinnett; exemption should apply due to intent to detain for murder and restraint being incidental | Exemption did not apply; restraint exceeded that ordinarily incident to murder, so both crimes stood |
| Whether intentional murder instruction was proper | Court implicitly found no intent to kill when denying exemption, so instruction flawed | Instruction duplicative or improper given exemption ruling | Instruction proper; offenses did not merge; murder instruction was warranted |
| Whether trial court erred in denying removal of counsel and allowing self-representation | Counsel should have been removed; self-representation necessary due to incompetence or coercion | Waived right to counsel; competent to waive counsel per Faretta and Godinez | No error; Faretta compliance; defendant competent to represent himself with standby counsel |
| Whether trial court properly denied out-of-state subpoena of Dr. Auble | Auble's testimony was material and necessary to defense | Subpoena should have been granted under KRS 421.250; materiality shown | No abuse of discretion; Dr. Auble’s testimony would have been incomplete and not material |
| Whether use of prior attorney's letter and hearsay testimony was improper | Letter and testimony violated attorney-client privilege and introduced impermissible hearsay | Privilege waived by voluntary disclosure; testimony could be admitted for limited purpose | Privilege waived; any hearsay was harmless error |
Key Cases Cited
- Hatfield v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 590 (Ky. 2008) (three-prong test for kidnapping exemption)
- Gilbert v. Commonwealth, 637 S.W.2d 632 (Ky. 1982) (case-by-case analysis for restraint exceeding ordinary)
- Murphy v. Commonwealth, 50 S.W.3d 173 (Ky. 2001) (first prong satisfaction when underlying offense defined outside chapter)
- Duncan v. Commonwealth, 322 S.W.3d 81 (Ky. 2010) (abuse-of-discretion review for exemption application)
- Harris v. Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 802 (Ky. 1990) (link between restraint and capital kidnapping matters)
- Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (standard for competence to stand trial and waivers)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (right to self-representation and required safeguards)
- Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004) (limitations on self-representation and counsel)
- 3M Co. v. Engle, 328 S.W.3d 184 (Ky. 2010) (attorney-client privilege waiver and admissibility implications)