*1 HARRIS, Anthony Appellant, John
COMMONWEALTH of
Kentucky, Appellee.
No. 88-SC-45-MR.
Supreme Kentucky. Court 15, 1990.
March
As Modified on Denial of Sept.
Rehearing 1990. *2 Niehaus, Deputy Appellate
J. David De- fender, Defender, Jefferson Dist. Public Louisville, appellant. for Cowan, Gen., Atty. Ian Frederic J. G. Gen., Frankfort, Sonego, Atty. for Asst. appellee.
STEPHENS, Chief Justice. Harris, Anthony Appellant, John was murder, kidnapping, wanton convicted evidence, tampering physical with these sen- corpse. abuse of a He received tences: life without imprison- years kidnapping; for the life murder; years’ imprisonment ment for five tampering; and 12 months and a $500 corpse. appeals fine for abuse of a He right. convictionas a matter of We affirm. Testimony appellant at trial was that the planned “playing joke” on a on Sabra Ann Timothy El- Diamond and invited James join Testimony more to him. established appellant planned stop and Elmore gun Ms. Diamond’s car and shoot a into the night April air scare her. On pair followed her a car driven They stopped Elmore. her on a desert- by blocking ed road her car Elmore’s with loaded, ap- Carrying pistol, car. cocked pellant approached her car on the driver’s speak side. Ms. Diamond refused to with appellant pointed pistol him. The then head, opened at the and she the car victim’s “lunged” at him. she door and out When gun appellant pulled reached for the gunshot trigger. The victim died from a wound to head.
Appellant confessed that he and Elmore
placed
body in
Ms. Diamond’s
Elmore’s car.
They
LaGrange
dragged
drove
woods,
body
appel-
victim’s
into the
where
lant removed her clothes and covered the
corpse
leaves. There
with
was evidence
corpse
subjected
that the
was
to sexual
intercourse. Elmore testified that he ob-
Appel-
appellant commit
act.
served
purse from her car.
lant took the victim’s
police
determined that a small amount
money
missing
purse.
from her
As
result,
charged
also
with
tampering
physical
robbery and
evi-
First,
prongs.
claims that
jury acquitted
dence. The
him on the rob-
two
the lan-
guage of
not properly
the indictment did
bery charge.
Second,
charge
offense.
he com-
eight
Appellant presents
assignments of
plains
instruction
error.
will address them in
order
We
phase
guilt/innocence
at the
close
presented in his brief.
require proof of the
trial failed to
victim’s
First, appellant claims
his con
death.
*3
police
sup
the
should
fession to
have been
argument, appellant
to
cor-
As
the first
pressed
it was obtained in the ab
because
rectly
kidnapping
capital
is a
that
states
repeatedly
he
sence of counsel after
had
not
offense
is
released
when the victim
lawyer.
The
held
requested a
trial
509.040(2). Appellant argues
alive. KRS
hearing pursuant
evidentiary
an
to RCr
specifical-
did not
that since
indictment
the
9.78 and found that Harris’s statement was
allege
re-
ly
that Ms. Diamond was not
given voluntarily and that his claim of a
alive, capital kidnapping
not
leased
was
The
request
was not
for counsel
credible.
alleged.
form
Appellant favors
over sub-
ruling
trial
record shows that the
court’s
shows that
one
stance. The record
count
evidence,
supported by
and its
substantial
original indictment
an
of both the
findings are therefore conclusive.
factual
kidnapping
amended
stated that
version
9.78;
RCr
Halvorsen v.
charged
capital
as a
offense.
being
was
denied,
Ky., 730
921
cert.
S.W.2d
the
Count two
victim suffered
stated
484
108
98
407
L.Ed.2d
proceeding
capital
death.
the
notice
Both
(1987).
suppress appellant’s
The motion to
particulars
the
noted that the
bill of
properly
confession was
overruled.
kidnap
appel-
a result of the
victim died as
therefore,
Appellant
hold,
next
that it was
claims
lant’s actions. We
jury
court to
the
error for the trial
instruct
the indictment
appellant was not misled
murder,
in
on
because there was
penalty
Wylie
wanton
as to the
and its
basis.
jury Commonwealth,
(1977).
from
the
1
Ky.,
sufficient evidence
which
556 S.W.2d
6.12;
that he acted under “cir
could conclude
The
sufficient. RCr
indictment was
manifesting
Commonwealth, Ky.,
extreme indiffer
554
cumstances
Howard v.
life,”
required by
(1977).
as
KRS
ence to human
S.W.2d 375
507.020(l)(b). Appellant
preserve
to
failed
argu
appellant’s second
We find
making
specific
objection.
this issue
trial,
At
one.
defense
ment
be a curious
Duke,
9.64(2);
RCr
Commonwealth v.
instructing
jury
argued against
counsel
(1988).
appellant
Even if
to a
for or
claims that
convic- S.W.2d
manslaughter
degree
purposes
tion of
the first
none of these unlawful
crime;
any
beyond
other
shown
a reasonable doubt. He
suggests
jury acquitted
that since the
him
(b)
to,
Including,
not limited
but
robbery,
relying
it could not have been
operation of a motor vehicle under cir-
felony
satisfy
on this
the first basis for a
manifesting
cumstances
extreme indif-
finding
guilt.
life,
wantonly
human
en-
ference to
gages
grave
in conduct which creates a
Appellant states that he could not
person
risk of death to another
raise this issue before the
returned its
thereby
per-
causes the death of another
possible
verdict because of the number of
son.
However,
if
verdicts available.
improp
require proof
Murder does not
believed that the instructions were
Kidnapping
erly phrased in the
so as to
victim had been restrained.
alternative
require proof
not
would
does
of death of
create
verdict
Therefore,
unanimous,
objected
victim.
the offenses do not
not be
he should have
*5
merge
jeopardy
ground
jury
and there is no
vio on this
before the
was sent
double
9.54(2).
phase
guilty/innocence
lation at the
of the
back to deliberate. RCr
sentencing stage
trial.
It is not until the
aside,
is not a
Preservation issues
this
kidnapping
merge.
that murder and
could
Boulder,
in
it
supra,
situation as
where
point
proof
kidnap
It
this
is at
that
only
theory
guilt
one
of
was
was clear that
ping
necessary
victim’s death is
to enhance
supported by the
In the case at
evidence.
kidnapping
capital kidnapping. Cosby
to
v. bar, the record
sufficient evidence to
shows
Commonwealth,
367,
Ky.,
373
776 S.W.2d
grounds given in
support the alternative
—
denied,
-,
-,
cert.
finding
for a
kidnapping
instruction
880,
(1990).
110 S.Ct.
life benefit of without has served a the defendant role until GANT, STEPHENS, C.J., COMBS, (25) years of his twenty-five minimum of WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., LAMBERT and (Em- sentence, imposed.” shall not be concur. added) phasis LEIBSON, J., by separate dissents interpretation is strained Majority’s VANCE, J., joins. opinion in which give effect to the statute as and fails to victim is not When whole. Justice,
LEIBSON, dissenting. *7 alive,” kidnap- this fact makes “released offense, no stat- but there is ping a portion from that Respectfully, I dissent also, in specifies that this and of ute that affirms the Majority Opinion of the itself, aggravating circumstance mak- is an possibility of sentence of life without the eligible pen- for the death ing the offender (25) twenty-five years on parole for alty. up- Majority kidnapping conviction. The on the holds the sentence basis 532.025(2) aggra- Certainly, KRS allows in the course of murder of the victim spe- vating other than those circumstances aggravat- of is an commission to be cifically enumerated that section by by circumstance “otherwise authorized in its into consideration taken quoting addition, using Majority by deliberations, by so holds law.” The but in “and,” despite requires at portion conjunctive the statute and statute only a statutory cir- statutorily enumerated cir- one of the enumerated fact that no least the death found before required by cumstances be cumstances were found as twenty- 532.025(3). parole for 532.025(2) penalty or life without and KRS parole twenty- (25) imposed. This of death or life without for years five can be is so Assembly years, the crime is murder the General regardless of whether five kidnapping. in KRS 532.- kidnapping or murder and so enumerated should have inescapable 025(2). This conclusion is because oth- Assembly the General have erwise would aggravated pun- I on the would reverse disjunctive
used the “or” instead of the to the court for ishment and remand trial phrases conjunctive “and” the two between resentencing in accordance with KRS 532.- 532.025(2). in KRS 030. why logic There is still another reason
compels interpretation of our death VANCE, J., joins this dissent.
penalty statute. The statute was written eye complying an with the then
recent decisions of the United States Su- mini-
preme stating Court constitutional penalty Gregg
mums a death statute. 153, 2909, 49 Georgia,
v. 428 U.S. 96 S.Ct. (1976), rehearing
L.Ed.2d 859
denied
197, 198,
96 S.Ct.
where the victim not released alive. interpretation
We have fashioned an penalty
our death statute that fail the will
constitutional minimum. Our decision in-
terprets permit our statutes to the death (as
penalty imposed to be well as life with- twenty-five
out the
years) statutory narrowing without the eligible required by
the death Gregg class Georgia, supra, Georgia, v. Furman
408 U.S.
see
(1980), holding
unconstitutional a allowing
statute death when *8 outrageously
the murder was found vile, inhuman,
wantonly as a horrible vague to as a substantive
statute too serve
predicate. statutory aggra-
If is to be a circumstance, itself,
vating in and of eligible a murderer for the
makes
