Stinnett v. City of Chicago, 630 F.3d 645

Background

Stinnett, an Ambulance Commander in Chicago Fire Department, sues City under Title VII for race discrimination in promotion to Field Officer.
In 2000, Stinnett was ranked 32 on the Field Officer eligibility list; Byrne and Kaveney ranked 29 and 31 respectively; all had identical exam scores but Byrne and Kaveney had greater seniority.
The department used the 2000 list to fill vacancies; eight promotions occurred from that list, including Byrne and Kaveney; Stinnett remained unpromoted.
In December 2006 the department announced a new promotion exam for March 23, 2007; a new 2007 eligibility list would be created.
Stinnett then took the 2007 exam; on the new list he ranked 48; promotions from the old list ceased after Byrne and Kaveney were promoted in February 2007.
In 2008 the department promoted eleven commanders from the new list but not Stinnett; district court granted summary judgment for the City.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Byrne and Kaveney were similarly situated to Stinnett	Stinnett is similarly situated because all three were eligible for the next promotion and would have been promoted if vacancies existed.	Stinnett is not similarly situated since Byrne and Kaveney ranked higher on the 2000 list and the list was being updated.	Not clearly similarly situated to the extent required; the district court was too narrow.
Whether stopping promotions from the 2000 list after Byrne and Kaveney undermines McDonnell Douglas	Stopping promotions created an adverse impact on Stinnett as the next eligible black employee was passed over.	Updates to eligibility lists are neutral and necessary; stopping promotions was not a pretext.	Updating lists is neutral; no evidence of pretext to discriminate.
Whether the 2007 promotions from the new list and the ignored 2000 list violated equal protection principles	The department should have continued promotions from the old list until all eligible were promoted.	Promotion from a new list is permissible and standard practice; no deliberate bias shown.	No violation shown based on the transition between lists.
Whether the district court erred by not treating Stinnett’s broader whites-promoted comparisons as probative	Stinnett should be compared to all whites promoted ahead of him, not just Byrne and Kaveney.	Comparing to whites promoted later on the new list is not appropriate for the threshold issue.	Court allowed broader comparison later; still upheld summary judgment.

Key Cases Cited

Grayson v. City of Chicago, 317 F.3d 745 (7th Cir. 2003) (similarly situated analysis in McDonnell Douglas context)
White v. Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority, 429 F.3d 232 (6th Cir. 2005) (broader similarity considerations in promotion context)
Jones v. City of Springfield, 554 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 2009) (group of similarly situated employees and promotion decisions)
Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 605 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2010) (flexible approach to similarly situated in McDonnell Douglas framework)
Deveraux v. City of Chicago, 14 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 1994) (neutrality of updating eligibility lists)
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1987) (no proper presumption in discrimination claims)
Haywood v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 323 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 2003) (discusses burden-shifting and discrimination standards)
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (sex-based harassment framework cited in discrimination analysis)
Adams v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2006) (evidence requirements for discrimination claims under McDonnell Douglas)