Stewart v. Heineman
296 Neb. 262
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Three same-sex couples sued DHHS officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging: (1) a 1995 administrative memorandum (Memo 1-95) that on its face barred persons who identify as homosexuals from being licensed as foster parents and (2) a contemporaneous “Pristow Procedure” requiring extra layers of review for placements with gay applicants.
- Plaintiffs alleged they were ready and able to apply to be foster/adoptive parents but were deterred by Memo 1-95 and the additional scrutiny of the Pristow Procedure; two plaintiffs had engaged with DHHS and one couple completed extensive licensing steps earlier and were told of the policy.
- DHHS officials testified Memo 1-95 remained on the DHHS website and in training materials, though some managers orally directed caseworkers to follow a different practice (the Pristow Procedure); the Pristow Procedure imposed up to five levels of approval for placements involving gay applicants.
- The district court granted plaintiffs summary judgment, struck Memo 1-95, enjoined DHHS from applying policies that treated gay applicants differently under the “best interests of the child” standard, and awarded attorney fees and costs.
- Defendants appealed, arguing lack of standing/ripeness (plaintiffs had not applied or been denied), mootness because Memo 1-95 was removed from the website during briefing, and procedural defects in the attorney-fee proof.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing / Ripeness to seek declaratory/injunctive relief against Memo 1-95 and the Pristow Procedure | Stewart: stigma and barrier from Memo 1-95/Pristow deterred plaintiffs; they are ready and able to apply, so suit is ripe | Heineman: Plaintiffs haven’t applied or been denied so injury is speculative; relief is premature | Court: Plaintiffs had standing; equal-protection injury is a barrier and stigmatic harm; ripeness satisfied (preemptive relief appropriate) |
| Mootness based on DHHS removing Memo 1-95 from website during litigation | Stewart: removal does not moot case because memo was public, deliberately kept, and Pristow Procedure remained; voluntary cessation standard applies | Heineman: removal moots dispute over Memo 1-95 | Court: Removal did not moot case; defendant failed to show wrongful conduct could not recur; published memo and undisclosed verbal policy keep controversy live; Pristow Procedure independently challenged |
| Merits of discrimination claim (equal protection/due process) — whether differential process justified | Stewart: Memo and Pristow impose unequal treatment and stigmatic injury; no legitimate state interest shown | Heineman: same best-interests standard applies; extra review is supervisory and not discriminatory | Court: defendants conceded no child-welfare interest served by differential treatment; both Memo 1-95 and Pristow Procedure violated equal protection/due process (merits not contested on appeal) |
| Award of attorney fees — sufficiency/form of proof | Stewart: fee affidavits filed and considered by trial court; award appropriate under § 1988 | Heineman: fee evidence appears only in transcript, not bill of exceptions, so insufficient on appeal | Court: fee proof was filed, considered, and unobjected to at hearing; trial court did not abuse discretion in awarding fees |
Key Cases Cited
- Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (equal-protection standing: injury is barrier to equal treatment; plaintiffs need show readiness to compete)
- Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993) (ripeness: challenge to barriers may be ripe where plaintiffs face future competitive harm)
- Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984) (stigmatic injury from official discrimination can confer standing)
- Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (those deterred by an openly declared discriminatory policy need not subject themselves to futile, humiliating application to show injury)
- Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (ripeness/standing principles in equal-protection context; review of governmental classifications)
- Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (standing requires personal injury; stigmatic harms recognized for those personally subjected to discrimination)
- Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (prudential standing; one plaintiff with standing can support relief for a consolidated action)
- Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (voluntary cessation of wrongful conduct does not automatically moot a case; defendant must show wrongful behavior cannot reasonably recur)