189 F. Supp. 3d 170
D.D.C.2016Background
- Sharon K. Stewart (pro se at filing) sued the FCC alleging hostile work environment, gender discrimination, and multiple retaliation claims related to her removal from higher-level duties (including preparing "Section 610 Reports").
- On April 8, 2016 the Court granted in part and denied in part the FCC’s motion: it dismissed certain discrimination and retaliation claims, but preserved the hostile work environment claim and one retaliation claim (Count Three).
- Stewart retained counsel, who moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) to modify the April 8 Order and revive the portion of Count Five alleging retaliation based on removal of Section 610 Report duties.
- The Complaint alleges Stewart had performed Section 610 duties since 2004 (previously done by a GS-14) and that a HR manager removed those duties after she filed an EEO complaint; the Complaint does not expressly detail harm from the reassignment beyond impairing promotion prospects.
- The Court reconsidered whether the retaliation "adverse action" standard was applied correctly and whether the pleadings plausibly allege materially adverse consequences that could deter protected activity.
- The Court granted relief, holding that the Complaint—liberally construed—plausibly alleges that removal of the Section 610 duties could materially deter a reasonable employee and thus denied dismissal of that portion of Count Five to allow discovery.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court applied the correct adverse-action standard for retaliation claims | Stewart: Burlington White standard applies (acts that might dissuade a reasonable worker) and her removal of Section 610 duties meets that standard | FCC: Plaintiff pleaded no materially adverse consequences affecting terms/conditions of employment; dismissal proper | Court: Applied controlling test (objective "might dissuade" standard); found Stewart’s pleaded facts plausibly allege a materially adverse action and denied dismissal of that theory of Count Five |
| Whether removal of Section 610 duties, as alleged, can constitute adverse action at motion-to-dismiss stage | Stewart: Removal deprived promotion opportunities and thus is materially adverse | FCC: Complaint lacks facts showing significant change or increased burden to infer adverse action | Court: At pleading stage, allegations (longstanding higher-level duties, previously performed by GS-14, removal after EEO filing) are sufficient to make claim plausible; discovery permitted |
Key Cases Cited
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (retaliation standard: action that would dissuade a reasonable worker)
- Gaujacq v. EDF, Inc., 601 F.3d 565 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (retaliation requires materially harmful action as measured by Burlington)
- Pardo-Kronemann v. Donovan, 601 F.3d 599 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (lateral transfers/reassignments can be adverse if they cause materially adverse consequences)
- Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (whether reassignment is adverse typically is a jury question)
- Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (retaliation protections sweep broader than discrimination claims)
- Gordon v. U.S. Capitol Police, 778 F.3d 158 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (applying Burlington’s objective standard)
- Harris v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 791 F.3d 65 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (at pleading stage courts ask whether alleged facts plausibly render retaliation claim viable)
- Abdelfattah v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 787 F.3d 524 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (pro se complaints are to be liberally construed)