Stewart, Charlie Lee, Sr.
PD-1631-15
Tex. App.Dec 18, 2015Background
- Appellant Charlie L. Stewart, Sr. was convicted by a jury of continuous sexual abuse of a child and sentenced to 60 years’ imprisonment.
- Victim T.M., who lived with appellant during sixth grade, testified that appellant repeatedly penetrated her; forensic nurse and interviewer corroborated her outcry.
- Semen stains on the mattress where T.M. slept tested consistent with appellant’s DNA; two other girls (extraneous-act witnesses) testified about prior sexual assaults by appellant.
- At trial appellant denied the allegations and argued fabrication and a theory that T.M.’s mother orchestrated evidence gathering.
- On appeal to the Third Court of Appeals (Austin), Stewart raised three jury-charge complaints: (1) omission of an Article 38.23 instruction about unlawfully obtained evidence (underwear); (2) failure to properly tailor definitions of “intentionally” and “knowingly” to aggravated sexual assault conduct elements; and (3) inclusion of a non‑statutory instruction that “penetration is complete regardless how slight.”
- The Austin Court affirmed, reasoning that even assuming error on those points, Stewart did not show the requisite egregious harm; Stewart then petitioned the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals for discretionary review, arguing the Austin Court failed to perform its “first duty” of deciding whether the charge was erroneous.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Stewart) | Defendant's Argument (State/Austin Ct.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether the appellate court must first decide whether a jury charge contains error before conducting harm analysis | Austin Court skipped the required two‑step review (determine error, then harm); it improperly proceeded straight to harm | Austin Court applied harm analysis and affirmed because any assumed errors were harmless | Austin Court affirmed conviction without a clear, separate ruling that the charge contained error; Stewart petitions CCA for supervision/review of that practice |
| 2. Omission of Article 38.23 instruction regarding underwear allegedly obtained by victim’s mother | Jury should have been instructed to disregard unlawfully obtained evidence when the issue was raised | Evidence from the underwear was weak; no article 38.23 instruction requested or objected to; even if omission was error, overwhelming other evidence prevented egregious harm | Austin Court: any omission harmless (no egregious harm); issue overruled |
| 3. Definitions of “intentionally” and “knowingly” not tailored to conduct elements (aggravated sexual assault) | Trial court erred by failing to limit culpable‑mental‑state definitions to the conduct elements (penetration, contact) | Application paragraphs tracked statute and used the terms correctly; intent was not contested (defense disputed occurrence, not mental state); even if error, no egregious harm | Austin Court: assumed or potential error did not cause egregious harm; issue overruled |
| 4. Instruction that "penetration is complete regardless how slight" constituted improper comment on the evidence | The non‑statutory definition is an improper judicial comment and lacks statutory basis | Longstanding precedent in many intermediate courts has approved similar instruction; penetration was not contested and testimony uniformly described penetration; any error harmless | Austin Court: even if instruction erred, it was harmless; issue overruled |
Key Cases Cited
- Arline v. State, 721 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (describing the two‑step Almanza framework: first determine charge error, then assess harm)
- Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (establishing standard for reviewing jury‑charge error and harm analysis)
- Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (preservation and differing standards of harm depending on objection)
- Barrios v. State, 283 S.W.3d 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (defining egregious harm under Almanza/Almanza framework)
- Brown v. State, 122 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (court held certain jury instructions may amount to improper judicial comment on the evidence)
- Vasquez v. State, 389 S.W.3d 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (trial charge must accurately state the law and set out all essential elements)
- Price v. State, 457 S.W.3d 437 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (trial court must limit culpable‑mental‑state language to the appropriate conduct element)
- Phillips v. State, 463 S.W.3d 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (reiterating that an appellate court’s first duty is to decide whether charge error exists)