Stewardson v. Cass County
3:18-cv-00958
N.D. Ind.Oct 14, 2021Background
- Plaintiff Blake Stewardson alleges excessive force by Deputy Christopher Titus and a failure-to-intervene by Deputy Cameron Biggs; state-law assault and battery claims were asserted against Sheriff Randy Pryor in his official capacity.
- The court previously granted in part and denied in part the defense's partial summary judgment, leaving the excessive-force and failure-to-intervene claims for trial; Deputy Biggs moved for reconsideration claiming inadequate notice and asserting qualified immunity.
- The court reviewed the standards for interlocutory reconsideration (limited to correcting manifest errors) and for pleading (facts control over labels; legal theories need not be separately counted).
- The court held that Stewardson’s first amended complaint adequately alleged a failure-to-intervene theory based on the same operative facts as the excessive-force claim, so notice was sufficient and reconsideration on that ground was denied.
- On qualified immunity, the court denied immunity to Biggs for failing to intervene when Deputy Titus tripped and slammed a handcuffed Stewardson (close-in-time, observed), but granted immunity for failing to prevent a later "hip-toss" ~31 minutes later that Biggs did not observe.
- The court struck Stewardson’s unauthorized second amended complaint (which added facts and theories beyond the court’s leave), ordered dismissal of City of Logansport, Joseph Schlosser, and John Doe, and substituted the Sheriff of Cass County for Sheriff Randy Pryor.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the complaint gave adequate notice of a failure-to-intervene claim | Stewardson: facts in the FAC support a failure-to-intervene theory based on the same occurrence as the excessive-force claim | Biggs: claim lacked adequate notice and should have been pleaded as a separate count | Court: FAC provided sufficient factual notice; denial of summary judgment on this ground stands |
| Whether claims must be pleaded in separately labeled counts | Stewardson: labels unnecessary; facts control and legal theories can be inferred | Biggs: Rule 10(b) requires separate counts for separate claims | Court: Labels not required; legally distinct theories can be pleaded from same facts; no fatal pleading defect |
| Qualified immunity for failure to intervene as to the tripping/slamming incident (observed, immediate) | Stewardson: Biggs witnessed the prior slam and had opportunity to intervene; clearly established duty to intervene | Biggs: raised qualified immunity (earlier only on excessive force) | Court: Qualified immunity denied for this incident — violation was clearly established |
| Qualified immunity for failure to intervene as to the later "hip-toss" (~31 minutes later, not observed) | Stewardson: earlier force put Biggs on notice and created duty to prevent later force | Biggs: argued immunity; no opportunity/immediacy; not present for hip-toss | Court: Qualified immunity granted for the hip-toss claim — not clearly established under analogous precedent |
| Legality of second amended complaint and party/substitution requests | Stewardson filed second amended complaint after dismissal of three defendants | Defendants: amendment exceeded court's leave and added new facts/theories after discovery closed | Court: Struck the second amended complaint; dismissed City, Schlosser, John Doe; substituted Sheriff of Cass County for Sheriff Pryor |
Key Cases Cited
- Galvan v. Norberg, 678 F.3d 581 (7th Cir. 2012) (district court may revisit interlocutory orders)
- Oto v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 224 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2000) (manifest-error standard; notice pleading principles)
- Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2005) (failure-to-intervene claim closely linked to excessive-force claim)
- Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282 (7th Cir. 1994) (duty to intervene when officer has reason to know excessive force is used and realistic opportunity to prevent it)
- Miller v. Smith, 220 F.3d 491 (7th Cir. 2000) (duty to intervene for force against handcuffed/nonresisting individuals)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity two-step; courts may address clearly-established prong first)
- Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (doctrine protects reasonable but mistaken judgments; avoid high-level generality in clearly-established analysis)
- Chessie Logistics Co. v. Krinos Holdings, Inc., 867 F.3d 852 (7th Cir. 2017) (when a purported new claim at summary judgment changes factual theory, it may be an impermissible amendment)
- Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485 (7th Cir. 2000) (district court must construe facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party on summary judgment)
- Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 1995) (unpublished or district-court decisions do not clearly establish law for qualified immunity)