Steven Smith v. Crounse Corporation, 72 F.4th 799

Smith, a Mulzer employee, was operating a skid steer to clear the last foot of coal from Crounse-owned barge #128 when the machine struck a raised seam (“scab”) in the hopper floor; Smith was injured when his seatbelt failed and he struck a safety bar.
Mulzer contractually received barges from Crounse and agreed to clear any remaining coal for its own sale; Mulzer employees sometimes encountered split seams/scabs when blade-cleaning hoppers.
The barge was about 24 years old; Mulzer blade-cleaned it without incident 23 days before the accident and again after the incident before professional repairs in June 2017.
Crounse had regular inspection/repair procedures (deckhand/engineer checks; damaged barge reports; hull-water checks to detect split seams) and repaired serious defects promptly; no Crounse reports of this defect before the accident.
After the accident Mulzer employees hammered the scab down and emailed Crounse that a ~12–14" scab should be addressed sometime; they did not report the injury to Crounse.
Smith sued under §905(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, general maritime law, and Indiana law; the district court granted summary judgment for Crounse and Smith appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) Did Crounse have actual or constructive knowledge of the scab (turnover duty)?	Smith: scab appeared old (rust, hammer marks) so Crounse should have known.	Crounse: no reports or notice of defect; reasonable inspections; scab could arise from third parties or on transit.	Held: No evidence Crounse knew or should have known; turnover-duty claim fails.
2) Was the district court’s exclusion of Smith’s lay opinion (age/origin of scab) erroneous?	Smith: his observations and inferences about age/origin should be admissible.	Crounse: such inferences require expert technical/scientific knowledge.	Held: Exclusion proper—opinions about corrosion age/origin were expert, not lay.
3) Did the court apply the wrong legal standard (cargo-stow vs vessel defect)?	Smith: court used cargo-stow standard improperly.	Crounse: court applied Scindia/Howlett turnover duty for vessel condition correctly.	Held: Court applied the correct turnover duty standard for vessel defects in cargo area.
4) Were Crounse’s inspection/repair practices inadequate such that summary judgment was improper?	Smith: procedures were insufficient; constructive notice from wear-and-tear.	Crounse: inspections were regular and consistent with industry practice; no evidence they were inadequate.	Held: Smith produced no evidence rebutting the reasonableness of Crounse’s inspection practices; summary judgment affirmed.

Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (turnover duty and limits on shipowner’s duty to inspect/supervise stevedore)
Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., 512 U.S. 92 (narrow turnover duty for latent hazards; duty to warn; duties framework)
Cameron v. Consolidated Grain & Barge Co., 654 F.2d 468 (insufficient evidence of actual/constructive notice where owner showed reasonable inspection)
Matthews v. Ernst Russ S.S. Co., 603 F.2d 676 (jury-liability discussion; does not establish broad constructive-knowledge rule)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment standard)