SCINDIA STEAM NAVIGATION CO., LTD. v. DE LOS SANTOS ET AL.
No. 79-512
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued December 1, 1980—Decided April 21, 1981
451 U.S. 156
Graydon S. Staring argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Robert H. Madden.
James A. Grutz argued the cause for respondents and filed a brief for respondent De Los Santos.*
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Santos, a longshoreman and an employee of respondent Seattle Stevedore Co., was injured while he was helping load the M/S Jalaratna, a vessel owned by petitioner Scindia Steam Navigation Co., Ltd. He later brought an action against Scindia pursuant to § 5 (b) of the Longshoremen‘s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), as amended in 1972,1 which, as set forth in
“In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel as a third party in accordance with the provisions of section 933 of this title, and the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the contrary
*Harry M. Philo, Arthur Roth, and Nathan Baker filed a brief for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
E. D. Vickery filed a brief for Apex Marine Corp. et al. as amici curiae.
shall be void. . . . The liability of the vessel under this subsection shall not be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury occurred. The remedy provided in this subsection shall be exclusive of all other remedies against the vessel except remedies available under this chapter.”2
The District Court granted petitioner‘s motion for summary judgment;3 the Court of Appeals, disagreeing with the District Court on both the facts and the law, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 598 F. 2d 480 (CA9 1979). We granted certiorari, 446 U. S. 934, because the Courts of Appeals are in considerable disagreement as to the meaning and application of
I
For present purposes, we take the facts from the opinion of the Court of Appeals, which properly viewed the case in the light most favorable to Santos, against whom summary judgment had been granted.
On December 10, 1972, Seattle Stevedore Co., pursuant to its undertaking with Scindia, was engaged in loading a cargo of wheat into a hold of the M/S Jalaratna. A winch, part of the ship‘s gear, was being used to lower wooden pallets, each containing seventy 50-pound sacks of wheat, into the hold. Because of the location of the winch controls, the longshoreman operator relied on the hatch tender, another long-
On the day of the accident, as it had for the two previous days, the braking mechanism of the winch was malfunctioning in that it would not quickly stop the descent of a loaded pallet, which would continue to drop for several feet before coming to a stop. At the time important here, while a pallet was being lowered, the hatch tender signaled the winch operator to stop the descent of the load. The brake was applied, but the pallet did not stop before striking a pallet jack5 with some force and spilling about half the sacks of wheat from the pallet. The hatch tender signaled the operator to raise the pallet about 15 feet and, believing that the remaining sacks on the pallet were secure enough not to fall, permitted Santos and the other men to clear away the spilled sacks then lying below in the hold. Some minutes later, however, more sacks fell from the pallet, striking and injuring Santos. There was dispute as to whether the additional sacks fell because the suspended pallet was swinging back and forth or because while the pallet was suspended the braking mechanism slipped on three or four occasions, each time requiring the operator to raise it again, thus working loose the additional sacks that fell on Santos.
Relying on the legislative history of the 1972 Amendments to the Act, the District Court held that the negligence standards governing the longshoreman‘s action against a shipowner under
“a shipowner is not liable for dangerous conditions created by the stevedore‘s negligence while the stevedore [is] in exclusive control over the manner and area of the work . . . , nor is the shipowner under a duty to warn the stevedore or his employees of dangers or open and obvious defects which are known to the stevedore or his employees or which are so obvious and apparent that they may reasonably be expected to discover them.” 1976 A. M. C. 2583, 2585.
Based on the admissions of the parties and the depositions available to the court, the District Court concluded (1) that there was no dispute that the premises were in the exclusive control of Seattle during the loading operation and (2) that
Reversing, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court and with other Courts of Appeals with respect to the applicable law. Sections 343 and 343A of the Restatement were improper measures of the shipowner‘s liability for negligence under
“A vessel is subject to liability for injuries to longshoremen working on or near the vessel caused by conditions on the vessel if, but only if, the shipowner
“(a) knows of, or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover, the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such longshoremen, and
“(b) the shipowner fails to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to protect the longshoremen against the danger.” 598 F. 2d, at 485.
Under this standard, Scindia‘s duty to inspect did not end even if the vessel was turned over to the stevedore in safe condition. If conditions dangerous to the longshoremen subsequently developed, in light of the vessel‘s practical opportunities to discover the dangers and remedy them, failure to do so could be negligence on its part.10
hand, the First and Third Circuits, like the Ninth Circuit, have held that these sections should not apply in
II
Initially, we must briefly revisit the 1972 Amendments to the Act. Prior to 1972, a longshoreman injured while loading or unloading a ship could receive compensation payments and also have judgment against the shipowner if the injury was caused by the ship‘s unseaworthiness or negligence. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85 (1946). Proof of unseaworthiness required no proof of fault on the part of the shipowner other than an unsafe, injury-causing condition on the vessel. This was true even though the condition was
licensee rather than an invitee. This Court reversed, preferring to adopt a single duty of “exercising reasonable care under the circumstances of each case,” rather than to incorporate in the maritime law the complexities of the common law of invitee and licensee. Id., at 632. The Kermarec standard was reaffirmed in Marine Terminals v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U. S. 404 (1969), a case involving a suit by a stevedore against the shipowner. We have no quarrel with this standard. Inevitably, however, the rule will undergo refinement as it is applied to various categories of cases. Thus, in considering the reasonableness of Scindia‘s conduct under this standard, the Court of Appeals found it appropriate to inquire whether the shipowner had a continuing duty to inspect and held that it did. As will become evident, we have a different view: the shipowner‘s duty of reasonable care under the circumstances does not impose a continuing duty to inspect the cargo operations once the stevedore begins its work.
The 1972 Amendments, particularly by adding
Section 905 (b) did not specify the acts or omissions of the vessel that would constitute negligence. In light of the differences among the lower federal courts as to the construction and application of
III
We held in Marine Terminals v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U. S. 404, 415 (1969), that the vessel owes to the stevedore and his longshoremen employees the duty of exercising due care “under the circumstances.” This duty extends at
action under whatever judicial nomenclature it may be called, such as ‘unseaworthiness‘, ‘non-delegable duty‘, or the like.” S. Rep. No. 92-1125, p. 10 (1972) (hereafter Rep.). (H. R. Rep. No. 92-1441 (1972) is in all relevant respects identical to the Senate Report.) The vessel was not to be liable on the theory of unseaworthiness for the acts or omissions of stevedores, or of the employees of stevedores, for the manner in which the stevedore performed its work, or for its defective gear or equipment. Rep., p. 10. Its liability was to be “based on its own negligence” and could be proved only if it was shown “to have acted or have failed to act in a negligent manner such as would render a land-based third party in non-maritime pursuits liable under similar circumstances.” Id., at 11.
At the same time, the Committees observed that the statutory cause of action for negligence would “meet the objective of encouraging safety because the vessel would still be required to exercise the same care as a land-based person in providing a safe place to work.” Id., at 10. Nothing was intended “to derogate from the vessel‘s responsibility to take appropriate corrective action where it knows or should have known about a dangerous condition” as long as the vessel was not “chargeable with the negligence of the stevedore or employees of the stevedore.” Id., at 10, 11.
The Committees also anticipated that in
Otherwise, the definition of the vessel‘s negligence and its resulting liability were left to be “resolved through the application of accepted principles of tort law and the ordinary process of litigation—just as they are in cases involving alleged negligence by land-based third parties.” Rep., p. 11. It was anticipated, however, that questions arising in
The parties, however, like the District Court and the Court of Appeals, are in sharp disagreement as to the vessel‘s duty under
Considering first the position of the Court of Appeals, we cannot agree that the vessel‘s duty to the longshoreman requires the shipowner to inspect or supervise the stevedoring operation. Congress intended to make the vessel answerable for its own negligence and to terminate its automatic, faultless responsibility for conditions caused by the negligence or other defaults of the stevedore. Cases holding the vessel liable on the ground that it owed nondelegable duties to protect the longshoremen from injury were rejected.15 It would
Act perform their work, A. N. G. Stevedores vs. Ellerman Lines, 369 U. S. 355, Blassingill vs. Waterman SS Corp., 336 F. 2d 367; for gear or equipment of stevedores or employees of stevedores subject to this Act whether used aboard ship, or ashore, Alaska SS Co. vs. Peterson, 347 U. S. 396, Italia Societa vs. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U. S. 315, or for other categories of unseaworthiness which have been judicially established. This listing of cases is not intended to reflect a judgment as to whether recovery on a particular actual setting could be predicated on the vessel‘s negligence.” Rep., p. 10.
exercise of reasonable care by the vessel under the circumstances.” Id., at 10-11.
However, when the failure to remove the oil spill would be “willful” or “negligent” or what the exercise of reasonable care under the circumstances would require was not explicated except to say that the “vessel will not be chargeable with the negligence of the stevedore or employees of the stevedore.” Id., at 11.
“Oregon, a specialist in stevedoring, was hired to load and unload the petitioner‘s vessels and to supply the ordinary equipment necessary for these operations. The defective rope which created the condition of unseaworthiness on the vessel and rendered the shipowner liable to the stevedore‘s employee was supplied by Oregon, and the stevedoring operations in the course of which the longshoreman was injured were in the hands of the employees of Oregon. Not only did the agreement between the shipowner place control of the operations on the stevedore company, but Oregon was also charged under the contract with the supervision of these operations. Although none of these factors affect the shipowner‘s primary liability to the injured employee of Oregon, since its duty to supply a seaworthy vessel is strict and nondelegable, and extends to those who perform the unloading and loading portion of the ship‘s work, Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85, cf. Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U. S. 406, they demonstrate that Oregon was in a far better position than the shipowner to avoid the accident. The shipowner defers to the qualification of the stevedoring contractor in the
selection and use of equipment and relies on the competency of the stevedore company.” Id., at 322-323.19
The 1972 Amendments foreclosed indemnity of the shipowner by the stevedore in
We are of the view that absent contract provision, positive law, or custom to the contrary—none of which has been cited to us in this case—the shipowner has no general duty by way of supervision or inspection to exercise reasonable care to discover dangerous conditions that develop within the confines of the cargo operations that are assigned to the stevedore. The necessary consequence is that the shipowner is not liable to the longshoremen for injuries caused by dangers unknown to the owner and about which he had no duty to inform himself. This conclusion is plainly consistent with the congressional intent to foreclose the faultless liability of the shipowner based on a theory of unseaworthiness or nondelegable duty. The shipowner, within limits, is entitled to rely on the stevedore, and owes no duty to the longshoremen to inspect or supervise the cargo operations. To the extent that the judgment of the Court of Appeals rested on a contrary view, we disagree.
IV
We arrive at the more difficult and recurring issue involved in this case: What are the shipowner‘s duties when he learns that an apparently dangerous condition exists or has developed in the cargo operation, which is known to the steve-
In Crumady v. The J. H. Fisser, 358 U. S. 423 (1959), a ship‘s winch had been set by ship‘s officers to shut off the current at twice the safe working load of the unloading gear. The gear parted when subjected to undue strain because of the negligence of the stevedore. The Court held the ship unseaworthy. Consistent with past cases, the Court declared that the longshoremen‘s protection against unseaworthiness “imposes a duty which the owner of the vessel cannot delegate,” a duty which, as to appliances, “does not end with supplying them; he must keep them in order.” The shipowner “is not relieved of these responsibilities by turning control of the loading or unloading of the ship over to a stevedoring company.” Id., at 427. The Court, nevertheless, permitted the ship to recover over from the stevedore “since the negligence of the stevedores . . . brought the unseaworthiness of the vessel into play . . . .” Id., at 429.20
In Crumady, the Court declared that “those acting for the vessel owner” had adjusted the winch “in a way that made it unsafe and dangerous for the work at hand.” Id., at 427. It thus appeared that the vessel had at least been negligent, yet it was entitled to shift its entire liability to the stevedore
The court below rejected this position, holding that if the vessel should realize that the condition presents an unreasonable risk of harm, it is liable if it “fails to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances” to protect the longshoremen. The court did not suggest how to recognize an “unreasonable risk” of harm from an obvious danger or suggest what reasonable care under the circumstances might be.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, while disagreeing with the duty-to-inspect thesis of the Court of Appeals in the present case, has also rejected this position, ruling that although the shipowner is normally entitled to rely on the stevedore to guard against hazards to its employees, “there may be circumstances in which it would not be reasonable for the shipowner to assume that the stevedore will correct the problem.” Evans v. S.S. “Campeche,” 639 F. 2d, at 856.21 As that court sees it, mere knowledge of the
On the facts posited here, for two days prior to the accident, it had been apparent to those working with the winch that this equipment was malfunctioning. Even so, whether it could be safely used or whether it posed an unreasonable risk of harm to Santos or other longshoremen was a matter of judgment committed to the stevedore in the first instance. The malfunctioning being obvious and Seattle having continued to use it, Scindia submits that if it was aware of the condition or was charged with knowledge of it, it was nevertheless entitled to assume that Seattle, the specialist in loading and unloading, considered the equipment reasonably safe and was entitled to rely on that judgment.
Yet it is quite possible, it seems to us, that Seattle‘s judgment in this respect was so obviously improvident that Scindia, if it knew of the defect and that Seattle was continuing to use it, should have realized the winch presented
apparent hazard—for example, “where the dangerous condition would be too difficult for the stevedore alone to remedy, or where the custom in the industry places the burden of acting on the shipowner, or where the ship affirmatively joins in the decision to continue despite the hazard.” 639 F. 2d, at 856. The court should endeavor “to reach a realistic conclusion concerning the shipowner‘s reasonable anticipation.” Id., at 856-857.
As we have indicated, the legal duties placed on the stevedore and the vessel‘s justifiable expectations that those duties will be performed are relevant in determining whether the shipowner has breached its duty. The trial court, and where appropriate the jury, should thus be made aware of the scope of the stevedore‘s duty under the positive law. But an equally necessary inquiry is whether the pertinent statutes, regulations, or custom place or assume a continuing duty on the vessel to repair defective ship‘s gear being used by the stevedore in the cargo operation.23
The statutory duty of the stevedore under
We raise these questions but do not answer them, since they are for the trial court in the first instance and since neither the trial nor appellate courts need deal with them unless there is sufficient evidence to submit to the jury either that the shipowner was aware of sufficient facts to conclude that the winch was not in proper order, or that the winch was defective when cargo operations began and that Scindia was chargeable with knowledge of its condition. The District Court concluded that there was no triable issue of fact as to whether the shipowner knew or should have known of the alleged condition of the winch. The Court of Appeals read the record quite differently, ruling that there was a disputed material fact, which the District Court should not itself have resolved, with respect to the shipowner‘s actual or constructive knowledge of the condition of the winch. To the extent that this conclusion was based on the Court of Appeals’ erroneous view that the vessel should have known the facts because of its duty to inspect the stevedore‘s cargo handling operation, it was infirm. But as we understand the opinion below, the Court of Appeals held that there was a triable issue as to whether the shipowner had actual knowledge of the failure in the winch‘s braking mechanism or was chargeable with knowledge because the winch was defective from the outset. Based on our own examination of the record, we agree with the Court of Appeals in this respect and with its conclusion that the District Court erred in granting
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the decision of this case.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, concurring.
My views are that under the 1972 Amendments: (1) a shipowner has a general duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances; (2) in exercising reasonable care, the shipowner must take reasonable steps to determine whether the ship‘s equipment is safe before turning that equipment over to the stevedore; (3) the shipowner has a duty to inspect the equipment turned over to the stevedore or to supervise the stevedore if a custom, contract provision, law or regulation creates either of those duties; and (4) if the shipowner has actual knowledge that equipment in the control of the stevedore is in an unsafe condition, and a reasonable belief that the stevedore will not remedy that condition, the shipowner has a duty either to halt the stevedoring operation, to make the stevedore eliminate the unsafe condition, or to eliminate the unsafe condition itself.
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, concurring.
I join the Court‘s opinion because I agree with its basic thrust—placing the primary burden on the stevedore for avoiding injuries caused by obvious hazards. I write only to emphasize the distinction between this approach and the general “reasonableness” standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit in this case.
Under the Court‘s opinion, “the shipowner has no general duty by way of supervision or inspection to exercise reasonable care to discover dangerous conditions that develop within the confines of the cargo operations that are assigned to the stevedore.” Ante, at 172. In addition, the opinion makes clear that the shipowner has only a limited duty with respect to obvious hazards of which it is aware. Although the shipowner cannot rely in all cases on the judgment and primary responsibility of the stevedore concerning what conditions allow safe work to continue, safety is a “matter of judgment committed to the stevedore in the first instance.” Ante, at 175. Only where the judgment of the stevedore is “obviously improvident,” ibid., and this poor judgment either is known to the shipowner or reasonably should be anticipated under the circumstances, does the shipowner have a duty to intervene.1 As the opinion points out, the customs and regulations allocating responsibility for particular repairs are highly relevant to this inquiry.
Notes
Ҥ 343. Dangerous Conditions Known to or Discoverable by Possessor
“A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he
“(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and
“(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and
“(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.”
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A provides:
Ҥ 343A. Known or Obvious Dangers
“(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.
“(2) In determining whether the possessor should anticipate harm from a known or obvious danger, the fact that the invitee is entitled to make use of public land, or of the facilities of a public utility, is a factor of importance indicating that the harm should be anticipated.”
In Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U. S. 494 (1971), however, we ruled that a single act of operational negligence by the stevedore did not render the vessel unseaworthy or subject the vessel to liability.
“So, for example, where a longshoreman slips on an oil spill on a vessel‘s deck and is injured, the proposed amendments to Section 5 would still permit an action against the vessel for negligence. To recover, he must establish that: 1) the vessel put the foreign substance on the deck, or knew that it was there, and willfully or negligently failed to remove it; or 2) the foreign substance had been on the deck for such a period of time that it should have been discovered and removed by the vessel in the
“(a) . . . Every employer shall furnish and maintain employment and places of employment which shall be reasonably safe for his employees in all employments covered by this chapter and shall install, furnish, maintain and use such devices and safeguards with particular reference to equipment used by and working conditions established by such employers as the Secretary may determine by regulation or order to be reasonably necessary to protect the life, health, and safety of such employees, and to render safe such employment and places of employment, and to prevent injury to his employees.”
We note with some interest that in affirming a jury verdict for a longshoreman in Irizarry v. Compania Maritime Navegacion Netumar, S. A., No. 79-7876 (CA2, May 22, 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-94, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit relied on the Joint Maritime Safety Code issued by the New York Shipping Association, Inc., the International Longshoremen‘s Association, and the Port of New York Joint Safety Committee. The Code was prepared pursuant to the terms of the labor agreement between the shipping association and the longshoremen‘s union and contains what is described as “the commonly agreed on practices for working together safely.” The provision of the Code relied on by the Court of Appeals states that “[t]he owner, master and officers of the vessel shall supply and maintain in safe condition for use all ship‘s gear equipment, tools and work spaces which are to be used in stevedoring operations.”