Steven Papp v. Fore-Kast Sales Co Inc
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 20924
| 3rd Cir. | 2016Background
- Plaintiff Steven Papp sued Boeing in New Jersey state court alleging his wife Mary suffered secondary "take-home" asbestos exposure from Robert Keck’s sandblasting of the landing gear of a C-47 military transport built by Douglas (now part of Boeing).
- Boeing removed under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), asserting it acted as a government contractor and raising the federal government-contractor defense (Boyle). Removal was premised on discovery at a deposition that the aircraft was a government C-47.
- Boeing submitted a declaration from a longtime Douglas employee (Fogg) describing government supervision of specifications, manuals, labels/warnings, and Boeing’s compliance and lack of superior knowledge about asbestos risks.
- The District Court granted remand, applying a heightened “special burden” and requiring Boeing to show an affirmative federal prohibition on warnings; it found Boeing had not met that standard.
- The Third Circuit reviewed de novo, construing the removal notice facts in Boeing’s favor, rejected the special-burden/affirmative-prohibition standard, and held Boeing met the statutory elements for removal, including a colorable Boyle defense.
- The court also rejected Papp’s timeliness objection as forfeited (presented only in a footnote) and found Boeing’s removal timely based on the deposition as the triggering “other paper.”
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a private contractor may remove under § 1442(a)(1) for acts while "acting under" federal officers | Papp: Boeing is merely a contractor and must meet a heightened "special burden" to show it acted under federal control | Boeing: Contractors who assist the federal government in producing items can act under federal officers; no special burden beyond statutory test | Court: Contractors can remove; "acting under" is liberally construed and Boeing satisfied it |
| Whether the alleged conduct was "for, or relating to" an act under color of federal office | Papp: Failure-to-warn claims are not sufficiently connected to federal oversight | Boeing: Manufacturing C-47 for the military under government specifications and review connects warnings to federal authority | Court: The facts show a sufficient connection/association; requirement met |
| Whether Boeing asserted a colorable federal (Boyle) defense | Papp: Boeing’s evidence (Fogg) is insufficient at removal stage; government did not necessarily control warnings | Boeing: Boyle applies: government approved specifications and warnings; Boeing conformed and lacked superior knowledge | Court: Boeing’s asserted Boyle defense is colorable on the pleaded facts and Fogg declaration; suffices for removal |
| Whether removal was timely under § 1446(b) | Papp: Boeing’s removal was untimely (outside 30 days) because Boeing could have discovered the aircraft earlier | Boeing: Deposition identifying the C-47 constituted the first ‘‘other paper’’ triggering the 30-day clock; removal was within 30 days | Court: Papp forfeited timeliness argument on appeal; and even on merits, deposition was the triggering paper, so removal was timely |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Commonwealth’s Motion to Appoint Counsel Against or Directed to Def. Ass’n of Phila., 790 F.3d 457 (3d Cir.) (framework for § 1442 elements and colorable defense requirement)
- Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402 (1969) (purpose of federal officer removal; defendant need not win merits to remove)
- Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (government-contractor defense elements)
- Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 551 U.S. 142 (2007) (liberal construction of "acting under" and contractor assistance rationale)
- Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633 (2006) (§ 1442 as exception to well-pleaded complaint rule; broad construction)
- Jefferson Cty., Ala. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423 (1999) (nexus requirement under prior statute formulation)
- Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir.) (application of Boyle in failure-to-warn contractor cases)
