986 F.3d 1305
11th Cir.2021Background
- ATS contracted with the City of North Miami Beach to operate its red‑light camera program, monitor violations, mail notices, and process payments; the contract permitted ATS to collect up to a 5% convenience fee on electronic payments.
- Pincus received a Notice of Violation for running a red light and paid the $158 statutory penalty online by credit card, incurring a $7.90 (5%) convenience fee collected and retained by ATS.
- Pincus sued ATS in federal court, asserting one unjust enrichment claim in three counts, each premised on violation of a different Florida statute: Fla. Stat. § 316.0083(1)(b)(4) (prohibiting commissions), § 318.121 (no additional surcharges on certain civil traffic penalties), and § 560.204(1) (money‑transmitter licensure requirement).
- The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, reasoning the fee was not a prohibited commission under § 316.0083, § 318.121 did not apply because the penalty was assessed under Chapter 316 not Chapter 318, and that § 560.204 could not serve as a basis for common‑law unjust enrichment.
- On de novo review the Eleventh Circuit found there was no controlling Florida precedent on several dispositive statutory and common‑law questions implicated by the complaint.
- Because the answers may have wide effect on Florida red‑light enforcement and unjust enrichment law, the Eleventh Circuit certified five questions to the Supreme Court of Florida rather than deciding them.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ATS’s 5% convenience fee is a “commission” under Fla. Stat. § 316.0083(1)(b)(4) | The fee is part of the total "revenue collected from violations" and thus a prohibited commission. | "Revenue" means the statutory $158 penalty; ATS did not take a cut of that penalty, so the fee is not a banned commission. | No controlling Florida precedent; Eleventh Circuit certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court. |
| Whether the fee is barred as a surcharge under Fla. Stat. § 318.121 (applies to penalties "assessed under" Chapter 318) | The penalty was assessed under Chapter 318 (interrelated statutory scheme), so § 318.121 bars the surcharge. | The statutory scheme establishing authority and the specific penalty resides in Chapter 316, so § 318.121 does not apply. | No controlling Florida precedent; Eleventh Circuit certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court. |
| Whether ATS was an unlicensed "money transmitter" under Fla. Stat. § 560.204(1) | ATS received payments for the purpose of transmitting them and thus needed a license; its agent status does not immunize it. | ATS either is exempt via the City (a political subdivision) or, as agent, did not ‘‘receive’’ funds for transmission in a way that triggers the statute. | No controlling Florida precedent; Eleventh Circuit certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court. |
| Whether an unjust enrichment claim may be premised on a statutory violation that provides no private right of action | Pincus: common law unjust enrichment survives unless statute expressly or implicitly precludes it (Silver Star‑style reasoning). | ATS: allowing such claims would circumvent the Legislature’s decision to withhold a private remedy (Buell‑style concern). | No controlling Florida precedent; Eleventh Circuit certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court. |
| Whether Pincus’s claim fails because he received adequate consideration (convenience of card payment) | Pincus: no true bargain existed—ATS was the government’s payment interface—so retention of the fee may be inequitable. | ATS: Pincus knowingly accepted the convenience option; Baptista doctrine bars unjust enrichment when adequate consideration was received. | No controlling Florida precedent; Eleventh Circuit certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court. |
Key Cases Cited
- Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (federalism/comity principle; state supreme court is ultimate expositor of state law)
- Jimenez v. State, 246 So. 3d 219 (Fla. 2018) (upholding vendor relationships for red‑light camera enforcement subject to officer probable‑cause determination)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading standard for plausibility under Rule 12(b)(6))
- State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Silver Star Health & Rehab, 739 F.3d 579 (11th Cir. 2013) (unjust enrichment permitted even where statute lacks express private remedy when statutory scheme treats certain claims as noncompensable)
- Baptista v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 640 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2011) (unjust enrichment fails where plaintiff received adequate consideration for fee)
- Thornber v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 568 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1990) (common law remains unless statute clearly abrogates it)
- In re Cassell, 688 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2012) (certification to state supreme court appropriate when substantial doubt exists about dispositive state law questions)