Steven Ingram v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
690 F. App'x 527
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff Steven Ingram, an African American electrician and former PG&E employee, sued under Title VII alleging he was terminated because of his race.
- PG&E terminated Ingram after a history of safety/disciplinary problems: multiple switching errors that caused significant power outages and equipment damage, driving-policy violations (failing to report license-status changes, driving with an expired/suspended license), and specifically on May 17, 2011, driving a company vehicle after being ordered not to and committing a major switching error that caused an outage and damage.
- District court granted summary judgment for PG&E, concluding Ingram failed to make a prima facie Title VII case because he lacked minimal evidence of satisfactory job performance and failed to identify a similarly situated non-African American treated more favorably.
- Ingram appealed and also challenged the denial of his request for an adverse inference instruction based on alleged spoliation/nonproduction.
- The Ninth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo and the adverse-inference denial for abuse of discretion, and affirmed the district court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Ingram established a prima facie Title VII discrimination claim | Ingram argued he belonged to a protected class, suffered an adverse action (termination), and could show similarly situated non-African Americans were treated better | PG&E argued Ingram failed to show he performed satisfactorily and did not identify any non-African American with a comparable combination of switching and driving violations | Held: Ingram failed to show minimal evidence of satisfactory performance and did not identify a similarly situated comparator; prima facie case not met |
| Whether Ingram identified a similarly situated non‑African American treated more favorably | Ingram pointed to employees with either switching errors or driving violations as comparators | PG&E emphasized Ingram’s unique combination of serious switching errors plus repeated driving violations and refusal to follow a direct order | Held: Comparators were not similarly situated in all material respects; no genuine issue for trial |
| Whether the district court applied the correct prima facie evidentiary standard | Ingram contended the court improperly required substantial evidence rather than minimal evidence at prima facie stage | PG&E maintained that, on the actual record, even the minimal evidence standard is not met | Held: Although district court may have misstated the standard, summary judgment was proper under the correct minimal-evidence standard |
| Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying an adverse inference instruction at summary judgment | Ingram sought an adverse inference for alleged spoliation/nonproduction to create a triable issue | PG&E argued adverse-inference instructions are for juries at trial and denial at summary judgment was proper | Held: Denial was not an abuse of discretion; adverse-inference instruction is a jury instruction and inappropriate at summary judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- Sierra Club v. BLM, 786 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2015) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (Sup. Ct.) (framework for disparate-treatment Title VII claims)
- Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir.) (prima facie elements and comparator analysis)
- Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc., 292 F.3d 654 (9th Cir.) (minimal-evidence requirement for prima facie showing)
- Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748 (9th Cir.) (similarly situated standard: materially similar in all respects)
- United States v. Fries, 781 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir.) (standard for reviewing denial of adverse-inference instruction)