Steven Bassett v. Abm Parking Services
883 F.3d 776
| 9th Cir. | 2018Background
- Plaintiff Steven Bassett received a parking receipt in 2016 showing his card’s full expiration date, allegedly violating 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g) (FCRA/FACTA truncation requirement).
- Bassett sued ABM in a putative class action seeking statutory damages for a willful FCRA violation, alleging only an increased "exposure" or "imminent risk" of identity theft; he did not allege the receipt was lost, stolen, copied, or misused.
- The district court dismissed with prejudice for lack of Article III standing, applying Spokeo’s requirement that a statutory violation must cause a concrete injury in fact.
- The Ninth Circuit panel affirmed, joining the Second and Seventh Circuits, holding that receipt-disclosure to the cardholder alone—without more—does not allege a concrete injury or a material risk of harm.
- The court relied on legislative history (the Clarification Act) indicating that revealing an expiration date alone, when the card number is truncated, does not materially increase identity-theft risk and that Congress sought to curb abusive suits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Bassett alleged a concrete injury in fact under Article III | The printed expiration date created exposure and an imminent risk of identity theft sufficient for standing | No concrete injury: receipt was seen only by Bassett; no loss, theft, misuse, or increased material risk alleged | No standing; statutory violation alone, without concrete harm or material risk, insufficient |
| Whether a violation of § 1681c(g) creates a "substantive" right that alone confers standing | The FCRA creates a substantive privacy right; its invasion is a concrete injury | Any purported substantive right depends on framing; here no disclosure to a third party occurred | Rejected: no invaded substantive right because information was not disclosed to others |
| Whether a procedural FCRA violation can, by itself, present a material risk of harm | The procedural violation (expiration date printed) creates a risk of identity theft | The Clarification Act and evidence show truncation prevents fraud; expiration-date alone does not materially increase risk | Rejected: procedural violation here is too speculative to satisfy concreteness requirement |
| Role of congressional findings and historical practice in concreteness analysis | Plaintiff argues statutory remedy suffices | Defendant argues congressional judgment and history show such violations are not the sort that traditionally supported lawsuits | Court gives weight to history and the Clarification Act, finding they counsel against recognizing a concrete injury |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (Supreme Court) (Article III requires a concrete and particularized injury even for statutory violations)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (Supreme Court) (standing requires injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent)
- Meyers v. Nicolet Rest. of De Pere, LLC, 843 F.3d 724 (7th Cir.) (expiration-date-on-receipt allegations insufficient for Article III standing)
- Crupar‑Weinmann v. Paris Baguette Am., Inc., 861 F.3d 76 (2d Cir.) (same; Clarification Act dispositive that expiration date alone poses minimal risk)
- Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (Supreme Court) (threatened injury must be certainly impending; speculative harms insufficient)
- Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir.) (history and congressional judgment weigh in concreteness analysis)
- Syed v. M‑I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492 (9th Cir.) (some statutory privacy violations can constitute concrete injuries when information is disclosed to third parties)
- Bateman v. Am. Multi‑Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708 (9th Cir.) (discussion of FCRA’s purpose to deter disclosure and combat identity theft)