OPINION
In this Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (“FACTA”) case, Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Bateman appeals the district court’s denial of class certification. Bateman sued American Multi-Cinema, Inc., (“AMC”) on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, alleging that AMC violated FACTA by printing more than the last five digits of consumers’ credit or debit card numbers on electronically printed receipts in December 2006 and January 2007.
See
15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g) (2005). On behalf of himself and other consumers who received such receipts, Bateman sought to recover statutory damages ranging from $100 to $1,000 for each willful violation of FACTA. The district court denied class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) (“Rule 23(b)(3)”), finding that a class action was not the superior method of litigating the case because AMC had made a good faith effort to comply with FACTA after this lawsuit was filed and the magnitude of AMC’s potential liability — $29 million to $290 million — was enormous and out of proportion to any harm suffered by the class.
See Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc.,
I
In 2007, Bateman filed a complaint against AMC, on behalf of himself and those individuals similarly situated, alleging violations of FACTA. Bateman alleged that from December 2006 to January 2007, AMC issued credit and debit card receipts from some of its automated box offices that included both the first four and the last four digits of the credit card, a violation of FACTA. To protect against identity theft, FACTA requires, in relevant part, that credit and debit card receipts issued to consumers not reflect the expiration date or more than the last five digits of the card number. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(l). FACTA incorporates the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s (“FCRA”) statutory damages provision, which allows a consumer to recover damages between $100 and $1,000 for each willful 1 violation of FACTA without having to prove actual damages. See id. § 1681n. In the complaint, Bateman did not allege any actual harm to his identity resulting from the claimed violations.
After conducting discovery, Bateman filed a motion for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3). Bateman sought to certify a class of individuals who, between December 4, 2006, and January 29, 2007, had used a credit card or debit card to purchase a movie ticket from an automated box office- at an AMC theater and who received a receipt that included the first four and last four digits of the person’s credit/debit card number. An AMC internal review conducted after the lawsuit was filed revealed that more than 290,000 receipts had been printed in violation of FACTA during the relevant period.
The district court denied Bateman’s motion for class certification without prejudice, concluding that Bateman had failed to demonstrate that a class action would be superior to other available methods of adjudicating his claim, as required under Rule 23(b)(3). In particular, the district court denied certification because, in its opinion, class treatment could result in enormous liability completely out of proportion to any harm suffered by the plaintiff. The district court further concluded that class certification was not appropriate because AMC demonstrated good faith by complying with FACTA within a few weeks of the filing of Bateman’s complaint. 2
After denying Bateman’s motion to certify, the district court approved the parties’ stipulation to stay the case pending
*712
the outcome of an appeal in a different case raising an issue identical to the one presented here.
See Soualian v. Int'l Coffee & Tea, LLC,
No. CV 07-0502-RGK (JCx),
II
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, “[a] class action may be maintained if two conditions are met: The suit must satisfy the criteria set forth in subdivision (a)
(ie.,
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation), and it also must fit into one of the three categories described in subdivision (b).”
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
— U.S. -,
The decision to grant or deny class certification is within the trial court’s discretion.
Yamamoto v. Omiya,
Ill
The district court refused to certify the class because it concluded that the proposed class failed to meet Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement.
See Bateman,
A. Proportionality Between Liability and Actual Harm
The district court denied class certification in part because it concluded that AMC’s liability would be “completely out of proportion to any harm suffered by Plaintiff.” Id. at 651. We therefore must consider whether Rule 23(b) permits consideration of such a factor when deciding whether to certify a class in a FACTA case. We hold that it does not.
Rule 23 provides little, if any, guidance on this question. 3 The rule provides a non-exhaustive list of factors relevant to the superiority inquiry:
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). None of these enumerated factors appear to authorize a court to consider whether certifying a class would result in disproportionate damages. A court may consider other, non-listed factors, however, and we have suggested that a broad inquiry is appropriate:
“Superiority must be looked at from the point of view (1) of the judicial system, (2) of the potential class members, (3) of the present plaintiff, (4) of the attorneys for the litigants, (5) of the public at large and (6) of the defendant. The listing is not necessarily in order of importance of the respective interests. Superiority must also be looked at from the point of view of the issues.”
Kamm v. Cal. City Dev. Co.,
Nor do the Advisory Committee Notes shed any light on the question. In its Note to Amended Rule 23, the Advisory Committee explains:
Subdivision (b)(3) encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.
Although neither the Rule nor its legislative history clearly expresses whether the proportionality between the actual harm caused and the defendant’s potential liability is a proper superiority consideration, many courts have assumed as much.
Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co.,
Courts have heavily relied on
Rainer’s
reasoning for the proposition that Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement authorizes consideration of the proportionality between the potential damages and the actual harm.
5
See, e.g., Klay v. Humana, Inc.,
By contrast, the one federal court of appeals to have addressed this issue in the context of the FCRA rejected
Ratner’s
reasoning.
See Murray v. GMAC Mort. Corp.,
AMC relies heavily on our opinion in
Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co.
to defend the district court’s denial of class certification. In
Kline,
we considered an action brought against Los Angeles County real estate brokers who had allegedly conspired to fix brokerage commissions in violation of the Sherman Act.
Of the three justifications for our holding, one was our significant concern over the amount of damages that might be imposed jointly and severally on the individual defendants.
Id.
at 235. Specifically, we noted that, if the plaintiffs were successful, the defendants in the class would be jointly and severally liable for $750 million.
Id.
at 234. In reversing, we reasoned that, “when 2,000 [defendant class members] are joined in an action in which each is jointly and severally liable, the liability is increased in geometric progression. Such an award against each of 2,000 real estate broker defendants would shock the conscience” and lead to an “ad absurdum result.”
Id.
at 234-35. We further noted that “ ‘the allowance of thousands of minimum recoveries like plaintiffs would carry to an absurd and stultifying extreme the specific and essentially inconsistent remedy Congress prescribed as the means of private enforcement.’ ”
Id.
at 234-35 (quoting
Ratner,
Kline,
AMC argues, created binding circuit precedent that Rule 23(b)(3) permits consideration of the proportionality of the potential liability. That is an overbroad reading of
Kline.
The basis of
Kline’s
conclusion was not simply that potential liability would be disproportional to the harm incurred, but rather that such liability would be inconsistent with congressional intent in enacting the statutory damages provision. As
Kline
explains, the treble damages provisions in the Clayton and Sherman Acts act as statutory punitive measures in which “ ‘two thirds of the recovery is not remedial and inevitably presupposes a punitive purpose.’ ”
Id.
(quoting
Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec.
*716
Corp.,
The intent of Congress under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. [§ ] 15, appears to have been to impose punishment upon the violator of section 1 of the Sherman Act for his own malefactions[,] not to subject him to vicarious liability by the coincidence of a class action for the staggering damages of the multitude.
Id.
(emphasis added). That conclusion about congressional intent was particularly sound given that the Clayton and Sherman Acts were enacted before the Supreme Court created the presumption that class actions are available unless Congress expressed its contrary intent.
See Califano v. Yamasaki,
The court in
Ratner
also focused on whether the potentially enormous liability would be consistent with congressional intent in creating the statutory damages provision.
See
Therefore, in accord with these principles and Kline’s reasoning, we look to FACTA itself for evidence of congressional intent as to the appropriateness of class certification in such cases. Specifically, we must examine FACTA to determine whether the denial of class certification is consistent with congressional intent and FACTA’s remedial scheme where a district court concludes that potential liability is disproportionate to any actual harm.
*717 1. Background on FACTA
In an effort to combat identity theft, in 2003 Congress enacted FACTA, which amended the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x. See Pub.L. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003). FACTA provides, in relevant part, that “no person that accepts credit cards or debit cards for the transaction of business shall print more than the last 5 digits of the card number or the expiration date upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale or transaction.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(l). Congress imposed civil liability for willful noncompliance in the amount of “any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure or damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000.” Id. § 1681n(a)(l)(A). In addition, FACTA allows prevailing parties to recover attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. § 1682n(a)(3).
In response to misunderstandings about the truncation requirements, Congress amended FACTA in 2008 with the Clarification Act. Apparently, a significant number of merchants had erroneously concluded that merely truncating the account number down to the last five digits while leaving the expiration date displayed would satisfy FACTA’s requirements.
See
Clarification Act § 2(a)(3),
2. Statutory Analysis of FACTA
Unfortunately, neither FACTA nor the Clarification Act addresses the availability of class actions. Where a statute is silent on the availability of class relief, the Supreme Court has instructed that we presume it to be available in all “civil actions brought in federal court.”
Califano,
We therefore must decide whether a plaintiff satisfies Rule 23’s requirements where certification of a class would threaten to impose liability disproportionate to the harm caused. As we have explained, the touchstone of this determination is whether denying class certification on this ground is consistent with congressional intent. We conclude that it is not.
We begin, as always, with the plain language of the statute.
See United States v. Mohrbacher,
Although the congressional record is silent about why Congress provided for statutory damages in these amounts,
7
we presume that the statutory damages serve a compensatory function.
See L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l., Ltd.,
The need for statutory damages to compensate victims is plain. The actual harm that a willful violation of FACTA will inflict on a consumer will often be small or difficult to prove. As the Seventh Circuit similarly noted in
Murray,
under the FCRA “individual losses, if any, are likely to be small — a modest concern about privacy, a slight chance that information would leak out and lead to identity theft. That actual loss is small and hard to quantify is why statutes such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act provide for modest damages without proof of injury.”
In addition to that compensatory function, FACTA’s actual and statutory damages provisions also effectuate the Act’s deterrent purpose.
See L.A. News Serv.,
The factors that a court considers when assessing the superiority of a class action under Rule 23(b)(3) must be consistent with these dual purposes of FACTA’s statutory damages remedy.
Cf. Kline, 508
F.2d at 235 (concluding that class certification would be inconsistent with Congress’s
*719
intent to limit punitive damages to an amount only three times the harm an individual defendant caused). Congress expressly created a statutory damages scheme that intended to compensate individuals for actual or potential damages resulting from FACTA violations, without requiring individuals to prove actual harm. Thus, irrespective of whether Bateman and all the potential class members can demonstrate actual harm resulting from a willful violation, they are entitled to statutory damages. There is no language in the statute, nor any indication in the legislative history, that Congress provided for judicial discretion to depart from the $100 to $1000 range where a district judge finds that damages are disproportionate to harm. Further, we cannot surmise a principled basis for determining when damages are and are not “proportionate” to actual harm. Indeed, one might plausibly argue that a $1000 award, or even a $100 award, for a single violation of FACTA, without any allegation of harm, is not proportionate. But the plain text of the statute makes absolutely clear that, in Congress’s judgment, the $100 to $1000 range
is
proportionate and appropriately compensates the consumer. That proportionality does not change as more plaintiffs seek relief; indeed, the size of AMC’s potential liability expands at exactly the same rate as the class size. In the absence of any showing that courts have the discretion to modify this remedial scheme, we agree with the Seventh Circuit that “it is not appropriate to use procedural devices to undermine laws of which a judge disapproves.”
Murray,
To the extent that statutory damages also serve a deterrent purpose, a court undermines that purpose in denying class certification on the basis of the proportionality of actual harm and statutory liability. Congress, in its legislative judgment, specified the range of damages that it considered sufficient to have a deterrent effect. Despite Congress’s awareness of the availability of class actions, it set no cap on the total amount of aggregate damages, no limit on the size of a class, and no limit on the number of individual suits that could be brought against a merchant. Allowing denial of class certification because of the sheer number of violations and amount of potential statutory damages would allow the largest violators of FAC-TA to escape the pressure of defending class actions and, in all likelihood, to escape liability for most violations. In other words, whatever risk of overdeterrence class certification poses, refusing to certify a class on these grounds poses the risk of significant underdeterrence.
To deny class certification based on the potential amount of damages as compared to the extent of harm presumes that Congress left it to the courts to evaluate the relative amount of liability necessary to serve the statute’s compensatory and deterrent purposes. Despite the absence of anything in the text or legislative history of the statute explicitly delegating such authority, AMC suggests it can be inferred from language in the Clarification Act. Specifically, AMC points to the following language in the Clarification Act’s “Findings” section:
(4) Almost immediately after the deadline for compliance [with FACTA] passed, hundreds of lawsuits were filed alleging that the failure to remove the expiration date was a willful violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act even where the account number was properly truncated.
(5) None of these lawsuits contained an allegation of harm to any consumer’s identity.
(6) Experts in the field agree that proper truncation of the card number, by *720 itself as required by the amendment made by the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, regardless of the inclusion of the expiration date, prevents a potential fraudster from perpetrating identity theft or credit card fraud.
(7) Despite repeatedly being denied class certification, the continued appealing and filing of these lawsuits represents a significant burden on the hundreds of companies that have been sued and could well raise prices to consumers without corresponding consumer protection benefit.
Clarification Act § 2(a)(3),
While some courts had denied class certification under FACTA on superiority grounds at the time the Clarification Act was enacted in June 2008, other courts had granted certification despite superiority arguments like AMC’s.
See, e.g., Redmon v. Uncle Julio’s of Ill., Inc.,
Where Congress in the past has been confronted with concerns over disproportionate, potentially enormous statutory damage awards, it has acted decisively to make its intent clear. Responding to the problem identified in Ratner, Congress amended TILA’s civil liability provision in 1974. Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub.L. No. 93-495, § 408(a), 88 Stat. 1500, 1518. As evidenced by the Report of the Senate Banking Committee, Congress was aware of the potentially enormous liability facing defendants where TILA claims were pursued as class actions. In relevant part, that report stated:
A problem has arisen in applying minimum liability provisions in class action suits involving millions of consumers. If each member of the class is entitled to a minimum award of $100, a creditor’s liability can be enormous.
The purpose of the civil penalties section under Truth in Lending was to provide creditors with a meaningful incentive to comply with the law without relying upon an extensive new bureaucracy. However, the Committee feels this objective can be achieved without subjecting creditors to enormous penalties for violations which do not involve actual damages and may be of a technical nature. Putting a reasonable limit on a creditor’s maximum class action liability would seem to be in the best interests of both creditors and consumers.
S.Rep. No. 93-278, at 14 (1973). Accordingly, Congress added a provision to TILA limiting aggregate statutory damages. Act of Oct. 28, 1974 § 408(a),
We therefore are not convinced that this passing reference to denial of class certification is sufficient to overcome the plain text of the statute and congressional silence on the issue of class relief, both of which strongly suggest that the proportionality of the damages is an irrelevant consideration in effectuating FACTA’s compensatory and deterrence purposes.
We also note an additional problem with AMC’s position. AMC would have us leave it to the discretion of district courts to decide whether a potential award would be so disproportionate to the actual harm that a class action would not be the superi- or method of adjudication. Yet such unguided discretion results in decidedly nonuniform decisions about class certification. For example, in
Price v. Lucky Strike Entm’t,
We therefore hold that the district court abused its discretion in considering the proportionality of the potential liability to the actual harm alleged in its Rule 23(b)(3) superiority analysis.
B. Enormous Liability
Having concluded that the proportionality of the potential liability to actual harm was an improper consideration under FACTA, we turn to the district court’s second justification: that “class treatment would render the magnitude of the defendant’s liability enormous.” We hold that such a consideration is not an appropriate reason to deny class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).
It is widely accepted that class certification “may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class action and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, Advisory Committee Notes to 1998 Amendments. Indeed, “[e]ven in the mine-run case, a class action can result in ‘potentially ruinous liability.’ ”
Shady Grove,
The decision to certify a class thus necessarily “places pressure on the defendant to settle even unmeritorious claims.”
Shady Grove,
Rather, in accord with our reasoning under
Kline,
whether the potential for enormous liability can justify a denial of class certification depends on congressional intent. For substantially the same reasons discussed in Part III.A, we conclude that allowing consideration of the potential enormity of any damages award would undermine the compensatory and deterrent purposes of FACTA. As the Seventh Circuit noted, the reason that damages can become enormous under FACTA “does not lie in an ‘abuse’ of Rule 23; it lies in the legislative decision to authorize awards as high as $1,000 per person,” combined with multiple violations of the statute.
Murray,
In the absence of such affirmative steps to limit liability, we must assume that Con *723 gress intended FACTA’s remedial scheme to operate as it was written. To limit class availability merely on the basis of “enormous” potential liability that Congress explicitly provided for would subvert congressional intent.
We note, however, that this is not a case where the defendant has argued or demonstrated that the potential liability would result in bankruptcy. In the context of Rule 23(f), which allows for interlocutory appeal of class certification decisions in some circumstances, we have required an appellant to demonstrate that the potential liability would be “ruinous” before granting interlocutory appeal.
See Chamberlan,
We also reserve judgment as to whether, if Bateman prevails at trial, the district court may be entitled to reduce the award if it is unconstitutionally excessive.
See Murray,
C. Good Faith Compliance
In conducting its Rule 23(b)(3) analysis, the district court also concluded that a class action would not be a superior method of adjudication because AMC “demonstrated good faith by complying with FAC-TA within a few weeks of the filing of Plaintiffs Complaint. This limits the deterrent effect of a class action.” We hold that the district court’s consideration of AMC’s post-complaint good faith compliance was inconsistent with congressional intent in enacting FACTA. Congress did not include any safe harbor or otherwise limit damages for good faith compliance with the statute after an alleged violation. The mere fact that AMC changed the content of its receipts to comply with FACTA after the lawsuit was filed does not suggest that certification of the class would have limited deterrent effect. To the contrary, we are quite sure that certification of a class here would preserve, if not amplify, the deterrent effect of FACTA. Because Bateman’s complaint clearly alleged that he was seeking classwide damages, we can reasonably surmise that AMC’s speedy compliance with FACTA was promoted, at least in part, by the specter of a substantial damages award. Thus, to deny class certification on this ground would communicate to other potential violators that, as *724 long as they comply with FACTA after a complaint is filed, they may avoid liability for widespread violations. In other words, to deny class certification on this ground undermines the deterrent effect of FACTA itself.
IV
As Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit mused, “[m]aybe suits such as this will lead Congress to amend the [statute]; maybe not. While a statute remains on the books, however, it must be enforced rather than subverted.”
Murray,
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Notes
. A “willful” violation under the FCRA includes "not only knowing violations of a standard, but reckless ones as well.”
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr,
. Within two weeks of the filing of Bateman’s complaint, AMC modified its machines to comply with FACTA.
. We reserve judgment, however, on whether Rule 23(b)(3) per se prohibits consideration of a defendant’s potential liability in deciding whether to certify a class. Because we con-elude that considering such liability contravenes congressional intent under FACTA, we need not decide that broader question.
. Unlike the "technical'' violations alleged in
Ratner,
Bateman has alleged "willful” violations of FACTA. A "willful” violation is not merely "technical.” In order to prevail in the lawsuit, Bateman must demonstrate either a "knowing” or "reckless” violation of the Act.
See Safeco,
. It is somewhat ironic that
Ratner
has played such a prominent role in shaping the scope of the Rule 23 superiority analysis. The district judge there specifically distanced himself from the "sweeping pronouncements” about the role of Rule 23 made by the respective parties, and instead emphasized his "molecular purpose” to rule only on the "specific case at hand.”
. See supra footnote 2.
. Nor does the legislative history of the FCRA shed any light on the purpose of the statutory damages provision. No committee report accompanied the final bill. In fact, there was no discussion on how Congress arrived at the range of statutory damages or the appropriateness of that remedy. A 1993 Senate Report mentions that the civil liability provisions were added in order to assist consumers in "protecting] their privacy” and to "ensure the accuracy of information in their files.” S.Rep. No. 103-209, at 6 (1993). That statement of purpose, however, does not speak to Congress's specific intent in enacting the remedial scheme.
. Indeed, as the Supreme Court has noted, a defendant’s “aggregate liability ... does not depend on whether tire suit proceeds as a class action,” because "[e]ach of the ... members of the putative class could ... bring a freestanding suit asserting his individual claim.”
Shady Grove,