Steven Barnett v. Joshua Marquis
662 F. App'x 537
9th Cir.2016Background
- Plaintiff Steven M. Barnett, a potential witness for the Clatsop County D.A.’s Office, brought a § 1983 suit alleging First and Fourteenth Amendment violations after prosecutors stopped using him as a witness and declined to work with him on investigations.
- The district court dismissed Barnett’s claims; Barnett appealed. The Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and reviews de novo on Rule 12(b)(6) and absolute-immunity questions.
- Prosecutors Marquis and Brown publicly communicated decisions: they would not vouch for Barnett’s credibility, would not use him as a witness, and Brown declined to work with him on ongoing investigations.
- Barnett contends the decisions were retaliatory — conditioned on his political speech (an article criticizing Marquis) — and thus outside prosecutorial immunity.
- The district court held prosecutors are absolutely immune for (1) the decision to stop using Barnett as a witness, (2) Brown’s refusal to work with Barnett on investigations, and (3) communications of those decisions to the Seaside Police Department.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for deciding not to use Barnett as a witness | Barnett: decision was retaliatory and conditioned on his speech, so not protected | Prosecutors: witness-selection decisions are prosecutorial functions entitled to absolute immunity | Court: Absolute immunity applies; witness credibility/presentation decisions are prosecutorial and immune |
| Whether Brown’s refusal to work with Barnett on ongoing investigations is protected | Barnett: refusal was retaliation and outside prosecutorial power | Brown: decision analogous to not prosecuting an officer’s cases, so absolutely immune | Court: Immunity applies; decision akin to nonprosecution and is protected |
| Whether communications to Seaside Police about not using Barnett are immune | Barnett: communications were administrative/employment actions deserving only qualified immunity | Prosecutors: communicating nonprosecution/nonuse decisions is protected by absolute immunity | Court: Communications protected by absolute immunity under Botello |
| Whether alleged conditioning on political silence defeats immunity | Barnett: conditioning prosecutorial decisions on political silence intermingles illegal acts with prosecutorial functions | Prosecutors: cited precedents distinguish scenarios where immunity denied; here conduct fits protected prosecutorial functions | Court: Second Circuit cases Barnett cites are distinguishable; immunity remains intact |
Key Cases Cited
- Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (prosecutors absolutely immune for conduct intimately associated with judicial phase)
- Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (functional approach: immunity depends on nature of function, not actor)
- Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (focus on nature of function performed for immunity analysis)
- Roe v. City of San Francisco, 109 F.3d 578 (prosecutor decisions about witness credibility/presentation protected by absolute immunity)
- Botello v. Gammick, 413 F.3d 971 (prosecutor communications of nonprosecution decisions and refusal to prosecute an officer’s cases protected by absolute immunity)
- Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896 (immunity analysis is an inexact science; court takes functional approach)
- United States v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142 (rule against vouching applies narrowly to jury presentations)
- United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530 (limitations on prosecutor vouching for witness credibility)