Steve Evanto v. Federal National Mortgage Association
814 F.3d 1295
11th Cir.2016Background
- In 2003 Evanto obtained a mortgage that was later assigned to Fannie Mae; Green Tree serviced the loan.
- After foreclosure proceedings began, Evanto requested a payoff balance from Green Tree, which allegedly never provided it within the seven business days required by 15 U.S.C. § 1639g.
- Evanto sued Fannie Mae (the assignee) for Green Tree’s alleged failure to timely provide the payoff balance.
- The district court dismissed Evanto’s amended complaint; Evanto appealed.
- The Eleventh Circuit reviews dismissal de novo and accepts plausible factual allegations as true for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an assignee can be held liable under 15 U.S.C. § 1641(e)(1) for a servicer’s failure to provide a payoff balance | Evanto: § 1641(e)(1) permits suit against an assignee for servicer violations like failure to provide a payoff balance | Fannie Mae: § 1641(e)(1)(A) limits assignee liability to violations "apparent on the face of the disclosure statement," which does not include post-closing payoff requests | Court: Affirmed dismissal — failure to provide a payoff balance is not a violation apparent on the face of the disclosure statement and thus not actionable against an assignee under § 1641(e)(1) |
| Meaning of "the disclosure statement" in § 1641(e)(1)(A) | Evanto: statute should be read to allow assignee liability for § 1639g violations despite textual limits (policy gap-filling) | Fannie Mae: statutory text and context show "the disclosure statement" means pre-credit loan disclosures provided before closing | Court: Interprets "the disclosure statement" as the pre-extension loan disclosure required by § 1638; payoff balances arise post-closing and cannot be apparent on that disclosure |
Key Cases Cited
- World Holdings, LLC v. Federal Republic of Germany, 701 F.3d 641 (11th Cir. 2012) (standard of review for dismissal)
- Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (textual reading and use of definite article and singular noun in statutory interpretation)
- Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 527 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1975) (describing disclosure statement as incident to extension of credit)
- Rodash v. AIB Mortg. Co., 16 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 1994) (use of "disclosure statement" to refer to pre- or at-closing disclosures)
- Iroanyah v. Bank of Am., 753 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2014) (similar usage of disclosure statement)
- Vincent v. The Money Store, 736 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2013) (similar usage of disclosure statement)
- Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2013) (similar usage of disclosure statement)
- Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 181 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 1999) (courts should not expand statutory remedies beyond those provided)
- Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 63 F.3d 1030 (11th Cir. 1995) (same principle against expanding statutory remedies)
- Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158 (2015) (follow statutory text even if it frustrates statutory objectives)