596 F. App'x 184
4th Cir.2014Background
- Krein was stopped by WV State Police troopers Snyder and Price at a gas station in December 2008 for arrest warrants; Price fired two shots, the second shot striking Krein in the head and leaving him permanently disabled.
- Krein sued Price, Snyder, and the State Police in state court; the case was removed to federal court, where summary judgment on qualified immunity was denied because material facts were disputed.
- The district court concluded a reasonable factfinder could find Price’s second shot unreasonable and not protected by qualified immunity.
- The Fourth Circuit reviews denials of qualified immunity de novo, viewing the record in Krein’s favor and applying the objective-reasonableness standard.
- The court holds that sufficient evidence could show the second shot was excessive and that the right against excessive force was clearly established at the time by Waterman v. Batton, making Price liable absent immunity.
- Dissent argues the majority misapplies the standard and that Price reasonably believed Krein posed a serious threat when firing the second shot.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the second shot violated the Fourth Amendment | Krein: second shot excessive and unlawful | Price: second shot objectively reasonable to prevent escape | Second shot could be objectively unreasonable |
| Whether the right against excessive force was clearly established | Krein: Waterman clearly established the rule | ||
| for excessive force | Price: right not clearly established in these facts | Right was clearly established; price not entitled to immunity | |
| Whether Price is entitled to qualified immunity on the first prong | Krein: constitutional rights violated; not clearly established | Price: no violation under objective reasonableness | Price not entitled to qualified immunity |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (U.S. 1989) (objective reasonableness standard for use of force)
- Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 2011) (threat-based reasonableness in excessive-force analysis)
- Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471 (4th Cir. 2005) (distinguishes pre-threat vs. post-threat shots in excessive-force context)
- Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (U.S. 2014) (clearly established law and excessive-force standards in high-speed/chase scenarios)
- Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (U.S. 2002) (notice that officials can be on notice even in novel factual circumstances)
- Doe ex rel. Johnson v. S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 597 F.3d 163 (4th Cir. 2010) (non-mere-technical discussion on clearly established law)
- Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640 (4th Cir. 1996) (recognizes danger in split-second judgments and reasonable use of force)
- Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (U.S. 1991) (qualified immunity allows mistakes in police judgments)