611 S.W.3d 645
Tex. App.2020Background
- Early morning stop: Deputy Constable Avila observed a white Dodge pickup stopped on the Highway 249 connector ramp, impeding traffic; appellant exited the truck and appeared to urinate.
- Officer intervention: Avila used a spotlight, appellant reentered the truck and drove onto the Sam Houston Tollway; Avila initiated a traffic stop once the truck entered the tollway.
- Signs of intoxication: Avila observed red, glassy eyes, slurred speech, smelled alcohol, and appellant admitted to drinking; appellant completed only the HGN test (showing six clues) and refused other field tests.
- Blood warrant and testing: Avila transported appellant to the station, obtained a magistrate-issued search warrant, blood was drawn and later analyzed, showing BAC above the legal limit.
- Conviction and appeal: Appellant stipulated two prior DWI convictions, was convicted of felony DWI and sentenced to four years; he appealed raising three issues: (1) exclusion of blood-analysis evidence (warrant issues), (2) suppression of the traffic stop (reasonable suspicion), and (3) error in the jury charge/article 38.23 instruction (definition of "impeding traffic").
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of blood analysis (warrant(s) & staleness) | Ramirez: testing the blood required a second warrant; alternatively, the search warrant was stale because analysis occurred more than three days after issuance | State: a single magistrate-issued warrant to seize blood for DWI purposes authorized subsequent testing; chapter 18’s three-day rule limits physical seizure, not later forensic analysis | Denied. Court distinguished Martinez (medically drawn blood tested without warrant) and relied on Crider rationale that a warrant to seize for evidentiary DWI purposes authorizes testing; held execution-time limit applies to seizure, so later lab analysis did not stale the warrant |
| Suppression of traffic stop (reasonable suspicion) | Ramirez: Avila lacked reasonable suspicion because the vehicle was not lawfully "impeding traffic" | State: appellant failed to preserve the claim for appellate review (no timely objection; appellant admitted exhibits and extensively cross-examined) | Denied as unpreserved. Court found objections were untimely and appellant affirmatively admitted evidence, so issue waived |
| Jury charge / article 38.23 instruction (definition of "impeding traffic") | Ramirez: trial court gave incorrect instruction and was egregiously harmed by it | State: no disputed material facts about whether vehicle impeded traffic; thus defendant was not entitled to an article 38.23 instruction and any error was harmless | Denied. Assuming error, no disputed fact was raised so error was harmless and not egregiously harmful |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Martinez, 570 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (holding testing of medically drawn blood is a separate Fourth Amendment search requiring a warrant)
- United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90 (2006) (probable-cause requirement looks to whether evidence will be found when the search is conducted)
- State v. Story, 445 S.W.3d 729 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (standard of review for denial of motion to suppress is abuse of discretion)
- Ramos v. State, 303 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (statutory construction reviewed de novo)
- Arteaga v. State, 521 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (plain-meaning approach to statutory interpretation)