959 F.3d 178
5th Cir.2020Background
- Maxwell Gruver died after an LSU fraternity hazing event; his parents sued LSU under Title IX and Louisiana law, alleging sex discrimination in hazing enforcement (fraternities policed more leniently than sororities).
- LSU moved to dismiss, arguing Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity deprived the federal court of jurisdiction; the district court dismissed state-law claims but denied dismissal of the Title IX claim, relying on Fifth Circuit precedent that acceptance of Title IX funds waives immunity.
- LSU appealed the denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity interlocutorily; the appeal centers on whether 42 U.S.C. §2000d–7 validly conditions federal funds on a state’s waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
- Key statutory and doctrinal framework: Spending Clause conditions are evaluated under South Dakota v. Dole’s five-factor test, including that conditions be unambiguous and not coercive so any waiver is knowing and voluntary.
- LSU argued National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius changed the coercion inquiry, making §2000d–7 coercive (because the waiver does not "govern the use of funds" and was enacted after Title IX); the Fifth Circuit panel rejected that argument and affirmed that LSU waived immunity by accepting federal funds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gruvers) | Defendant's Argument (LSU) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether acceptance of Title IX funds waives Eleventh Amendment immunity under 42 U.S.C. §2000d–7 | §2000d–7 clearly conditions funds on waiver; Pederson controls, so waiver applies | §2000d–7 cannot validly waive immunity after NFIB; immunity remains | Waiver stands; precedent controls—§2000d–7 validly conditions funds and LSU waived immunity |
| Whether NFIB transformed the coercion inquiry so §2000d–7 is coercive because it does not govern use of funds | Longstanding conditional funding and clear statutory language satisfy Dole; no coercion | NFIB requires stricter scrutiny: non-fund-use conditions and post-acceptance additions are coercive here | NFIB did not unequivocally change Dole; §2000d–7 is not coercive in this factual posture |
| Whether a Supreme Court intervening decision allows a panel to overturn prior circuit precedent | Pederson and Pace remain binding; acceptance of funds was voluntary and non-coercive | NFIB is an intervening change that permits reexamination of Pederson | Panel adheres to rule of orderliness; NFIB not an "unequivocal" change to warrant overturning Pederson |
Key Cases Cited
- Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding Title IX funding conditions effectuate waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity)
- Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 2005) (applying Dole tests to Spending Clause waivers and rejecting coercion challenge)
- National Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (plurality opinion applying coercion analysis to Medicaid expansion)
- South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (five-factor test for valid Spending Clause conditions)
- Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity principles)
- College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (distinguishing conditional-spending waivers from impermissible constructive waivers)
- P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993) (interlocutory appeal of jurisdictional rulings)
- Miller v. Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 421 F.3d 342 (5th Cir. 2005) (applying §2000d–7 waiver analysis to other antidiscrimination statutes)