Stephen Farrar v. Colette Peters
698 F. App'x 363
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Stephen L. Farrar, an Oregon state prisoner, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging due process, Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference, and retaliation claims arising from prison disciplinary actions, mental-health diagnosis/treatment, single-cell status change, and sciatic pain.
- The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on all claims and denied Farrar relief on several motions (counsel, expert, discovery, preliminary injunction) and denied leave to amend; Farrar appealed pro se.
- The Ninth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo and the district court’s discretionary rulings for abuse of discretion.
- Farrar alleged procedural defects in disciplinary proceedings, inadequate mental-health/medical care, and retaliatory motives for prison actions.
- Farrar also sought appointment of counsel and an expert, additional discovery, a preliminary injunction, and leave to amend; the district court denied each request.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Due process in disciplinary proceedings | Farrar: disciplinary process violated his due process rights | Defendants: procedures provided met constitutional requirements; decision supported by evidence | Affirmed — no genuine dispute; "some evidence" standard satisfied/no due process violation |
| Deliberate indifference to medical/mental-health needs | Farrar: defendants ignored serious health/mental conditions and risks | Defendants: lacked subjective knowledge or disregard of excessive risk; treatment differences are not Eighth Amendment violations | Affirmed — no evidence defendants knew of and disregarded excessive risk; mere disagreement/negligence insufficient |
| Retaliation | Farrar: actions were motivated by retaliation for protected conduct | Defendants: actions lacked retaliatory motive; legitimate penological reasons | Affirmed — Farrar failed to raise genuine issue of retaliatory motive |
| Denial of motions (counsel, expert, discovery, preliminary injunction, leave to amend) | Farrar: needed counsel, expert, discovery, injunctive relief; should be allowed to amend | Defendants: district court acted within discretion; requests unsupported or futile | Affirmed — no abuse of discretion: no exceptional circumstances for counsel; expert/discovery/ injunction not warranted; amendment would be futile |
Key Cases Cited
- Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir.) (deliberate indifference requires knowledge and disregard of an excessive risk)
- Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (U.S.) (prison disciplinary decisions meet due process if supported by "some evidence")
- Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (U.S.) (due process protections in prison disciplinary proceedings)
- Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850 (9th Cir.) (no constitutional right to a specific administrative review procedure)
- Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930 (9th Cir.) (requirement of personal participation for § 1983 liability)
- Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir.) (elements of retaliation claim in prison context)
- Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965 (9th Cir.) (appointment of counsel requires exceptional circumstances)
- Walker v. Am. Home Shield Long Term Disability Plan, 180 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir.) (standard for appointment of experts in civil cases)
- Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732 (9th Cir.) (trial court’s broad discretion to deny discovery; prejudice required to overturn)
- Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953 (9th Cir.) (standards for preliminary injunction)
- Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir.) (standard for denial of leave to amend as futile)