939 F.3d 633
5th Cir.2019Background
- In 2006 Judge Layne Walker accused attorney Stella Morrison of suborning perjury in her representation of Peter Tran; grievance and grand jury matters followed.
- Seven years later Morrison, represented by John Morgan, sued Walker alleging he fabricated the perjury charge and asserted it was unrelated to any matter in Walker’s court (implicating judicial immunity).
- The district court dismissed most claims but allowed the falsified-perjury claim to proceed only if Morrison amended to show judicial immunity didn’t apply and answered seven specific questions.
- Morgan filed amended complaints in January and May 2014 reiterating that the charge was unrelated to Walker’s court despite limited factual support and Morrison’s admitted memory problems.
- Walker submitted the Peter Tran transcript showing the accusation arose from proceedings in his court; Morrison later admitted the transcript was accurate, confirming judicial immunity barred the claim throughout.
- Walker sought fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927; the district court held a hearing and imposed $29,592.50 in § 1927 sanctions for Morgan’s conduct from May 20, 2014 to August 28, 2015; Morgan appealed and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1927 sanctions were justified | Morgan: relied on client statements; did not act recklessly | Walker: Morgan persisted in a meritless, immunity-barred claim despite obvious contrary evidence | Affirmed — district court did not abuse discretion; conduct was unreasonable and vexatious from Jan 2014 and sanctions appropriate for May 2014–Aug 2015 |
| Standard of proof for § 1927 fee shifting | Morgan: higher (clear-and-convincing) standard should apply | Walker: clear-and-convincing applies only when shifting all costs; partial fees need not meet that bar | Held: clear-and-convincing not required here because sanctions did not shift all defense costs; abuse-of-discretion review applies |
| Whether attorney may rely on client’s representations to avoid sanctions | Morgan: was entitled to rely on Morrison’s representations about where events occurred | Walker: numerous red flags (memory deficits, grievance docs, Williams affidavit, court questions) made such reliance unreasonable | Held: reliance was unreasonable given obvious contradictory evidence; Vanderhoff nonprecedential and distinguishable |
| Whether the fee award required strict segregation/itemization | Morgan: award improperly included fees for unrelated matters and lacked segregation | Walker: Walker remained a defendant only because of the baseless claim, so fees during the period were attributable | Held: affirmed — segregation unnecessary where sanctioned amount is less than total fees and is attributable to sanctionable conduct |
Key Cases Cited
- Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 280 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2002) (sets Procter factors and standard of review for § 1927 sanctions)
- Mercury Air Grp., Inc. v. Mansour, 237 F.3d 542 (5th Cir. 2001) (attorney may be sanctioned for pursuing a suit in the face of clear evidence there is no suit to pursue)
- Browning v. Kramer, 931 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1991) (§ 1927 permits awarding only fees and costs caused by sanctionable conduct)
- Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 2005) (four-factor test for whether judge’s acts are judicial in nature for immunity analysis)
- F.D.I.C. v. Calhoun, 34 F.3d 1291 (5th Cir. 1994) (when an obvious defense exists, counsel has a duty to investigate; failure to pursue dispositive motion bears on sanctions analysis)
- Walker v. City of Bogalusa, 168 F.3d 237 (5th Cir. 1999) (clarifies when clear-and-convincing proof is required to shift all costs)
- Cambridge Toxicology Grp., Inc. v. Exnicios, 495 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2007) (discusses application of clear-and-convincing standard in the § 1927 context)