Steiner v. Superior Court
164 Cal. Rptr. 3d 155
Cal. Ct. App.2013Background
- Richard and Christie Steiner sued Volkswagen, Ford and others alleging asbestos exposure from automotive parts caused Richard Steiner's lung cancer.
- During trial, Volkswagen (joined by Ford) moved to require plaintiffs' counsel Simona A. Farrise to remove two pages from her law firm website that touted prior verdicts against Ford, arguing jurors might access them and be prejudiced.
- The trial court ordered Farrise to remove the two specified web pages for the duration of the trial and admonished jurors not to "Google" the attorneys or conduct independent internet research.
- Petitioners sought a writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal and then petitioned the California Supreme Court; the matter was transferred back and an order to show cause issued. The two pages were restored after trial, making the writ moot, but the court exercised its discretion to decide the merits under the public-interest exception.
- The Court of Appeal held the removal order was an unlawful prior restraint on counsel's First Amendment rights because it was more extensive than necessary to protect the fair-trial interest; juror admonitions were a presumptively adequate, less-restrictive alternative.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a trial court may order an attorney to remove website content during trial to prevent juror exposure | Farrise: the order unlawfully restrains counsel's free speech; admonitions suffice | Volkswagen: removal was necessary to prevent juror access and ensure a fair trial | The order was an unlawful prior restraint; juror admonitions were the less-restrictive, presumptively adequate means |
| Applicable level of First Amendment scrutiny for the restraint | Farrise: strict scrutiny should apply to gag orders on trial participants | Volkswagen: more lenient commercial-speech (Central Hudson) standard should govern because website advertising is commercial | Court analyzed under Central Hudson (and noted failure under that test means it would fail strict scrutiny too) |
| Whether the web pages were misleading commercial speech justifying restraint | Farrise: pages were not shown to be misleading; restraint was to prevent juror access, not to cure deception | Volkswagen: pages omitted context (e.g., settlements, other verdicts) and could be misleading | Court: Volkswagen did not seek or prove misleadingness; no finding that content was false or deceptive, so Central Hudson first prong not established |
| Whether less-restrictive alternatives existed | Farrise: admonitions, jury instructions, contempt powers, and other courtroom measures could protect the trial | Volkswagen: modern Internet access makes admonitions insufficient and prior restraint necessary to avoid mistrial | Court: less-restrictive alternatives (cautionary admonitions, instructions, contempt, statutory changes) were available and adequate; removal was more extensive than necessary |
Key Cases Cited
- Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (prior restraints on speech are highly disfavored; courts must balance fair-trial rights with free speech under strict scrutiny)
- Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (attorney speech in criminal cases may be regulated under a disciplinary rule addressing substantial likelihood of material prejudice)
- Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (commercial speech test: lawful/nonmisleading, substantial interest, direct advancement, and not more extensive than necessary)
- NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.4th 1178 (1999) (cautionary admonitions and jury instructions are the presumptively adequate remedy for juror exposure to extrajudicial information)
- Freedom Communications, Inc. v. Superior Court, 167 Cal.App.4th 150 (2008) (court-ordered prior restraint on media reporting of witness testimony was improper; admonitions are less restrictive and preferable)
- Hurvitz v. Hoefflin, 84 Cal.App.4th 1232 (2000) (gag orders on trial participants are prior restraints subject to strict scrutiny)