Stec v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 10 A.3d 1

Stec and the decedent Raymark employee filed a workers' compensation claim in 1986; Raymark later entered bankruptcy and the Second Injury Fund was joined as a party under § 31-355.
After hearings 2002–2005, the commissioner issued a 2005 finding and award recognizing a compensable lung injury from asbestos exposure, but held Raymark could not be ordered to pay because of bankruptcy; relief would be sought against Raymark and the Fund if bankruptcy relief were granted.
Bankruptcy relief was granted; in 2006 the commissioner issued a new finding and award ordering Raymark to pay benefits and later issued an order directed to the Fund to pay those benefits.
The Fund appealed to the Compensation Review Board (board) on November 13, 2006; The Hartford filed a brief opposing the Fund, arguing the appeal was untimely under § 31-301(a).
The board dismissed the Fund's appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as untimely; the Appellate Court later reversed, holding timeliness could be waived if no timely motion to dismiss was filed.
This certified appeal asks whether the untimely filing of an appeal to the board deprives the board of subject matter jurisdiction, and whether Murphy v. Elms Hotel governs the result.
The Supreme Court held that the twenty-day appeal period in § 31-301(a) is jurisdictional and that an untimely filing deprives the board of jurisdiction; the Fund's November 13, 2006 appeal was untimely and properly dismissed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the twenty-day filing limit deprive the board of jurisdiction?	Fund contends time is nonjurisdictional and may be waived.	Hartford argues time is jurisdictional and untimely filing defeats jurisdiction.	Yes; § 31-301(a) time limit is jurisdictional and untimely filing deprives jurisdiction.
Is Murphy v. Elms Hotel controlling on untimely appeals under § 31-301(a)?	Fund relies on Murphy to treat untimely appeals as voidable, not void, arguing potential waiver.	Hartford argues Murphy is not controlling in this statutory scheme.	No; Murphy does not control; time-tested, reasonable interpretation governs here.
Does Hartford have standing to challenge the Fund's appeal?	Hartford argues lack of standing because liability is derivative and uncertain.	Fund argues Hartford has standing due to potential reimbursement and prior related liability.	Hartford has standing to pursue its challenge.

Murphy v. Elms Hotel, 104 Conn. 351 (1926) (untimely appeal treated as voidable, not void)
HUD/Barbour-Waverly v. Wilson, 235 Conn. 650 (1995) (time limits implicate jurisdiction in housing/summary processes)
Ambroise v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 226 Conn. 757 (1993) (time limitations on statutory appeals implicate jurisdiction)
Kinney v. State, 213 Conn. 54 (1989) (statutory jurisdictional boundaries cannot be transcended by remedial interpretation)
Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Lighthouse Landings, Inc., 279 Conn. 90 (2006) (twenty-day limitation in practice acts not absolute bar to late appeals; contextual relevance)
Ambroise v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc. (alternative cited], 226 Conn. 757 (1993) (see above)