Kinney v. StateKinney v. State
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- Peters
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the legislature intended judges of the Superior Court to come within the jurisdictional confines of the Workers’ Compensation Act,
*56The plaintiff sought workers’ compensation benefits on the theory that the chronic stress connected with her husband’s employment with the defendant contributed to his death. After the defendant contested her claim pursuant to
On the basis of these findings of fact, the commissioner concluded that the decedent’s employment relationship with the defendant constituted a contract of employment for the purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act;
*58In its appeal to the compensation review division, the defendant challenged the validity of the commissioner’s determination that the instant case falls within the jurisdiction of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The defendant maintained then, as it does now, that a judge of the Superior Court is not an employee for the purposes of workers’ compensation, and does not have an employer-employee relationship with the defendant. The review division decided to seek guidance on these questions of law, and propounded the reservation that is presently before us.
We must decide in this case whether the legislature intended the Workers’ Compensation Act to confer jurisdiction upon the commissioner to award benefits to the plaintiff. Even though the plaintiff has presented a factual record that warrants sympathetic consideration of her claims, her entitlement to relief cannot transcend the jurisdictional limits of the statute under which she seeks recovery. Once an issue of subject matter jurisdiction is raised,9 the court must dispose of this legal question as a threshold matter. Concerned Citizens of Sterling v. Sterling, 204 Conn. 551, 556-57, 529 A.2d 666 (1987); Cahill v. Board of Education, 198 Conn. 229, 238, 502 A.2d 410 (1985). “ ‘ “[Wjhenever a court discovers that it has no jurisdiction, it is bound to dismiss the case, without regard to previous rulings.” ’ Chzrislonk v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 101 Conn. 356, 358, 125 A. 874 (1924).” Cahill v. Board of Education, supra; Pet v. Department of Health Services, 207 Conn. 346, 351, 542 A.2d 672 (1988). The applicability of these principles is no less compelling in the instant case where the limited and statutory jurisdiction at issue is the legislative will as expressed in the Workers’ Compensation Act. Although the Workers’ Com*59pensation Act “should be broadly construed to accomplish its humanitarian purpose”; Adzima v. UAC/Norden Division, 177 Conn. 107, 117, 411 A.2d 924 (1979); Perille v. Raybestos-Manhattan-Europe, Inc., 196 Conn. 529, 541, 494 A.2d 555 (1985); its remedial purpose cannot transcend its statutorily defined jurisdictional boundaries. Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 420, 435, 541 A.2d 1216 (1988); Perille v. Raybestos-Manhattan-Europe, Inc., supra, 541-42; Jester v. Thompson, 99 Conn. 236, 238, 121 A. 470 (1923). “The act is not triggered by a claimant until he brings himself within its statutory ambit.” Castro v. Viera, supra, 433.
The plaintiff would have us resolve the jurisdictional issue in this case by deferring to the commissioner’s findings of fact. This we cannot do. We recognize that the commissioner found that the decedent’s judicial duties amounted to a contractual relationship with the defendant such that he was an “employee” for purposes of workers’ compensation as defined by
*60The commissioner exercises jurisdiction only “ ‘under the precise circumstances and in the manner particularly prescribed by the enabling legislation.’ Heiser v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 150 Conn. 563, 565, 192 A.2d 44 (1963).” Castro v. Viera, supra, 427-28.10 The parties cannot confer jurisdiction upon the commissioner by agreement, waiver or conduct. Id., 430; Jester v. Thompson, supra, 238. The plaintiff may invoke the remedy provided under the Workers’ Compensation Act only if her decedent, as a matter of law, satisfies the requisite jurisdictional standard of “employee” as defined by the legislature in
We begin our examination of the scope of
It is undisputed that judges of the Superior Court meet the three part test that determines the existence of a public office: “ ‘(1) an authority conferred by law, (2) a fixed tenure of office, and (3) the power to exercise some portion of the sovereign functions of government. Kelly v. Bridgeport, 111 Conn. 667, 671, 151 A. 268 [1930]; Mechem, Public Officers § 1.’ ” Murach v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 196 Conn. 192, 198, 491 A.2d 1058 (1985). The Connecticut constitution so provides. With respect to the first and third prongs, article second of the Connecticut constitution, in dividing the broad powers of government into three distinct branches, confers “a separate [judicial] magistracy” upon a “distinct department,” the judiciary; Pellegrino v. O’Neill, 193 Conn. 670, 679, 480 A.2d 476, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 875, 105 S. Ct. 236, 83 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1984); Heiberger v. Clark, 148 Conn. 177, 185, 169 A.2d 652 (1961); while article fifth, § 1 describes its organizational structure and reiterates that its powers and jurisdiction shall be defined by law. With respect to the second prong, article fifth, § 2 provides in relevant part: “They shall hold their offices for the term of eight years . . . .” Moreover, the judiciary’s right *62to compensation as public officers falls clearly within the distinction contemplated in Sibley v. State, supra, 685, where this court denied workers’ compensation benefits to a sheriff because, as a public officer, his right to compensation “ ‘belongs to him not by force of any contract, but because the law attaches it to the office.’ ”12 Id., quoting F. Mechem, supra, §§ 855 and 856.
The distinction between public employees and public officers, for the purpose of workers’ compensation, finds textual recognition in the jurisdictional definitions contained in the Workers’ Compensation Act.
The legislative history of the evolution of the definition of “employee” under the Workers’ Compensation Act supports our conclusion that the legislature intended the express inclusions enumerated in
*64Our conclusion that the distinction between employment and public office is firmly embedded in our law of workers’ compensation does not conflict with the proposition that, in other circumstances, a public official may be considered an employee. “[A] municipal position, for certain purposes, may constitute a ‘public office’ and, for others, mere employment.” Murach v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 200; State ex rel. Sloane v. Reidy, 152 Conn. 419, 426, 209 A.2d 674 (1965). With respect to judges of the Superior Court, and the Probate Court administrator, the legislature has determined, as
It bears noting, finally, that the legislature has enacted comprehensive provisions concerning benefits specifically for judges. General Statutes, chapter 872. These statutes not only provide annual salaries;
To construe
In response to the reservation from the compensation review division, whether a judge of the Superior Court is an “employee” for purposes of entitlement to workers’ compensation as defined by
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
Notes
The compensation review division originally reserved two questions for the advice of this court: (1) Is a judge of the Superior Court of Connecticut an “employee” as defined in
Procedurally, we have transferred this reservation to ourselves on two separate occasions. This court initially transferred the appeal to itself, but *56subsequently returned it to the compensation review division by order on January 19, 1989, for a decision on the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the appeal. On April 6,1989, the compensation review division denied the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss for a procedural defect because, as a threshold matter, the review division could not exercise its competence over the claim until resolution of the jurisdictional challenge. The compensation review division resubmitted its jurisdictional reservation to the Appellate Court and we once again transferred the matter to this court pursuant to
The decedent’s immediate supervisor, Chief Court Administrator Aaron Ment, testified and the commissioner so found that “ ‘five hats were a lot of work to do’ and that no single judge since then does all these jobs anywhere in the state.”
The fact that a finding of similar causality by the commissioner in the case of a private employee covered by workers’ compensation would result in an award of benefits; McDonough v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 204 Conn. 104, 119, 527 A.2d 664 (1987); sheds no light on the legal issue presently before us regarding the applicability of the Workers’ Compensation Act to judges of the Superior Court.
Although the defendant initially contested its liability by claiming that the decedent’s heart conditions were preexisting and not causally related to his work, it declined to challenge the causality finding on appeal.
The commissioner ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff dependent widow $408 weekly plus the applicable cost of living increase as provided in
Both the defendant and the compensation review division on its own motion raised the question of subject matter jurisdiction in the instant case.
Like courts of probate; In re Juvenile Appeal (85-BC), 195 Conn. 344, 366-67 n.18, 488 A.2d 790 (1985); and administrative agencies; Waterbury v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 160 Conn. 226, 230, 278 A.2d 771 (1971); workers’ compensation commissioners must act strictly within their statutory authority and cannot unilaterally modify, abridge or otherwise change such provisions because the act’s enabling legislation does not expressly grant that power. Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 420, 428-29, 541 A.2d 1216 (1988).
Attorney General Carl R. Ajello confirmed this distinction in an informational opinion in the form of a letter to State Comptroller J. Edward Caldwell dated January 21,1976. In response to an inquiry whether a Superior Court judge, suspended from service by the Judicial Department pending disposition of a criminal charge against him, is entitled to his regular salary, the attorney general stated that “[a] Judge of the Superior Court is one who holds an office,” and that his “right to a salary depends upon the legal title to the office and not upon the performance of the work.”
For example, the legislature expanded the definition of “employees” to include members of the General Assembly in 1972. The legislative history of the debate surrounding passage of that legislation is particularly instructive on the point that the legislature was aware that state officers do not receive their salary as a matter of contract of service and would thus need a special amendment bypassing decisional law in order to qualify for workers’ compensation benefits. Representative Gerald F. Stevens remarked: “I would submit to you that once you take the oath of office you don’t ever have to come here and you are entitled to your pay.” 15 H.R. Proc., Pt. 6, 1972 Sess., p. 2494A-55.
“(b) The probate court administrator shall receive: (1) Retirement benefits provided in
As the state maintains, it is clear as a matter of law that a statutorily mandated salary, such as provided for judges in