State v. Yusef B. Allen, A-7-25

Allen was convicted of murdering Lannie Silver, Jr. after Ruby Waller testified that Allen and McNeil confronted Silver outside a drug house, Allen retrieved a gun, and shots followed. 1
Waller testified she had prior cocaine convictions and an unresolved 1998 shoplifting arrest, but denied expecting any benefit from the State for her testimony. 2
Years later, Allen obtained Waller’s 1991 plea form showing she had agreed to testify truthfully against a co-defendant in exchange for a favorable sentence. 3
Allen sought a new trial, first under Brady and later under Carter, arguing the undisclosed plea form would have impeached Waller’s credibility. 4
The Appellate Division held the trial court used the wrong standard but deemed the error harmless, concluding Allen could not show a different outcome under Brady. 5

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Do Brady and Carter use the same materiality standard? 6	Allen says Carter is stricter than Brady.	State says the standards differ, but the result is the same here.	The standards are different; Brady is less demanding. 7
What is Brady materiality? 8	Allen need only show a reasonable probability of a different verdict.	The undisclosed plea form would not probably change the verdict.	Brady requires a reasonable probability of a different result. 9
What is Carter materiality? 10	Allen argues Carter should not be treated as more stringent.	Carter requires evidence that would probably change the verdict.	Carter is more stringent than Brady. 11
Did the undisclosed plea form satisfy Brady materiality? 12	Waller’s prior leniency could have shown a motive to curry favor with the State.	The plea deal was unrelated to Allen’s case and no evidence linked it to her testimony.	No; Allen failed to show a reasonable probability of a different verdict. 13

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1963) (suppression of favorable evidence violates due process when material 14)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (reasonable probability standard is less than preponderance and informs Brady prejudice 15)
State v. Carter, 85 N.J. 300 (N.J. 1981) (newly discovered evidence must probably change the jury’s verdict 16)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (U.S. 1985) (Brady materiality asks whether disclosure would have created a reasonable probability of a different result 17)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (U.S. 1995) (Brady materiality asks whether the verdict is worthy of confidence, not whether acquittal was more likely than not 18)
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (U.S. 1999) (clarifies Brady materiality and rejects reasonable-possibility formulations 19)
State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233 (N.J. 1996) (New Jersey adopted the Bagley Brady standard 20)
State v. Ways, 180 N.J. 171 (N.J. 2004) (later opinions used Carter and Brady wording interchangeably, creating confusion the Court clarifies here 21)
State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352 (N.J. 2008) (recited Carter language in an ineffective-assistance discussion but applied Strickland’s reasonable-probability test 22)
State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538 (N.J. 2021) (repeated the Carter phrasing while evaluating Strickland prejudice 23)