State v. Young, 166 A.3d 704

Defendant Patrick Young was convicted by a jury of first‑degree assault (intentionally causing serious physical injury by means of a deadly weapon) and carrying a pistol without a permit; his probation was revoked.
Victim (Turner), defendant’s cousin (Turner) and roommate (McFadden), and defendant’s girlfriend (Zambrano) were involved after Zambrano stole a $6,500 check; disagreement about cashing/keeping the money led to a confrontation.
During a stop near woods, defendant retrieved a silver .38 revolver, forced Turner from the car, pointed the gun at her head, and later shot her multiple times (one bullet exited wrist, another hit torso; a .38 bullet was later removed).
Zambrano led police to a marina where the recovered firearm matched the description (.38 Smith & Wesson).
At trial defendant testified; the state impeached his credibility by introducing the names of three prior felony convictions (conspiracy to commit larceny, attempt to commit robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery).
Defendant appealed claiming insufficient evidence, improper admission (and naming) of prior felony convictions, and that a supplemental jury instruction naming those convictions unduly highlighted them.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence for 1st‑degree assault	State: evidence (victim testimony, recovered gun, .38 bullet removed) permits inference of intent and serious injury	Young: witness inconsistencies and conflicting statements make evidence insufficient	Affirmed—evidence sufficient; credibility and inconsistencies are for jury to resolve
Admission of names of prior felony convictions for impeachment	State: prior larceny/robbery convictions are probative of veracity and admissible under impeachment rules	Young: naming felonies was unfairly prejudicial and suggested propensity to commit charged crimes	Affirmed—trial court did not abuse discretion; crimes bore on credibility and weren't so similar to charged offenses to make names unduly prejudicial
Supplemental jury charge naming prior convictions after deliberations began	State: supplement was to clarify limited use of prior convictions for credibility	Young: supplemental charge unduly highlighted convictions and marshaled evidence, prejudicing him	Affirmed—supplement properly limited jury use to credibility and protected defendant from improper use; naming convictions did not constitute impermissible marshaling

State v. Revels, 313 Conn. 762 (2014) (standard for appellate sufficiency review)
State v. Papandrea, 120 Conn. App. 224 (2010) (intent may be inferred from conduct and natural consequences)
State v. Crumpton, 202 Conn. 224 (1987) (admissibility and naming of prior convictions for impeachment)
State v. Geyer, 194 Conn. 1 (1984) (larceny/robbery convictions reflect on credibility; probative value vs. prejudice)
State v. Muhammad, 91 Conn. App. 392 (2005) (test for undue prejudice: whether evidence will improperly arouse juror emotion)